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Abstract 
This study traces origins, operation, successes and failures of the People-to-People 
program featured during the second term of the Eisenhower presidency. The program was a 
product of and a reaction to the Cold War international conflicts that emanated from 
diametrically opposed ideologies of democracies and the communist world. U.S. claims to the 
superiority of democracy over communism were rooted in immediate post-war America’s quest 
for world leadership. The People-to-People campaign was a government-backed popular 
movement, which spread in the 1950s and expanded into the 1960s. It was partially coordinated 
and partially funded by the United States Information Agency during its first few years, with the 
expectation that it would attract private as well as grassroots support once it was launched. This 
dissertation explores People-to-People’s various programs and projects including the Sister-
Cities and the University chapter as models for secular voluntary movements of ordinary 
citizens who were committed to improving mutual understanding between peoples from different 
cultures.  
The idealistic nature of people-to-people diplomacy, along with a wide variety of 
personal and social stakes associated with international travel and relations, made the People-
to-People University program one of the most popular student organizations on college 
campuses in the 1960s. People-to-People’s popularity and ideals at that time attracted young 
Americans and provided them with both the opportunity and the enthusiasm to interact with 
foreign peoples at the grassroots level. It also gave them a sense of belonging to a broader, 
constructive human network, which promoted an appreciation of diverse cultures and a way to 
contribute to building the “bonds of solidarity” among people of many nations during the 
contested period of the Cold War. 
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Chapter One. Introduction  
Winning Hearts and Minds as Historical Experience 
 The idea of winning hearts and minds of a global audience was a crucial part of 
America’s grand strategies during the Cold War era. But this idea was far from new. In a 
letter penned to James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, then American Ambassador to 
France recounted: “You see I am an enthusiast on the subject of the arts. But it is an 
enthusiasm of which I am not ashamed, as its object is to improve the taste of my 
countrymen, to increase their reputation, to reconcile to them the respect of the world 
and procure them its praise.”1 
Jefferson’s enthusiasm for the role and influence of culture was inherently related 
to America’s mission of being a role model for the rest of the world, which was 
manifested in the vision of its earlier settlers. As early in 1630, John Winthrop 
emphasized that his Puritan community “shall be a “city upon a hill, the eyes of all 
people upon us.” Assumptions of the idealization of America became a policy priority by 
the late nineteenth century. The diplomatic historian Emily Rosenberg contended that 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century cultural and economic relations embodied a 
fundamental condition of a national interest and international betterment.2 
It is rather complicated to define the interrelationships between diplomacy and 
the outreach initiatives undertaken by ordinary individuals in conducting international 
relations. According to the public diplomacy scholar Jan Melissen, in recent years non-
                                                           
1Letter dated 20 September 1785 was quoted in Cynthia P. Schneider, “Culture Communicates: U.S. 
Diplomacy That Works,” in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan 
Melissen (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 147. 
2 Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion 
1890-1945 (New York: Hill& Wang, 1982), 230. 
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state actors “have turned out to be extremely agile and capable of mobilizing support at 
a speed that is daunting for rather more unwieldy foreign policy bureaucracies.”3 The 
increasingly active role of ordinary individuals in the practice of public diplomacy was 
especially visible during the Cold War era. 
However, the first effort to disseminate American ideals at the institutional level 
was Woodrow Wilson’s initiative to create the Committee of Public Information in 1917 
after the United States relinquished its claim of neutrality and was drawn into global 
conflict. By appointing his long-term friend and a former newspaperman George Creel 
as head of the committee, Wilson placed a strong emphasis on the upcoming 
operations that would conceivably counteract against the propaganda of the Central 
Powers. Wilson’s emphasis served as a crucial boost for the fledgling committee. Creel 
stressed that “the fight for the minds of men as of almost equal significance to victories 
or defeats in the muddy trenches of the Western Front.”4 Although Creel’s committee 
actions successfully influenced the positive construction of America’s overseas image 
throughout the war, it was attacked at home and ultimately was abolished by Congress 
in 1919.5 
It is interesting to note, however, that while government-led information programs 
were labeled as “psychological approaches” or “propaganda,” educational and cultural 
exchanges were characterized by such terms as “cooperative,” mutually 
                                                           
3 Jan Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” in The New Public 
Diplomacy” Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007), 24. 
4Quoted in Robert Elder, The Information Machine: The United States Information Agency and American 
Foreign Policy (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968), 34. 
5 Richard Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture 
Since World War II (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 8. 
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understanding,” and “reciprocal.” Accordingly, there was a contested congressional 
debate that insisted the two be kept separate.6  Ultimately, in 1939, along with Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s “good neighbor policy,” a division of cultural relations was created within 
the State Department. The Division was responsible for a variety of government-backed 
activities, including exchanges of students and teachers, book translations, and cultural 
broadcasting programs in Latin America. A year after the Division’s creation, the Office 
of Cooperation for Inter-American Affairs headed by Nelson Rockefeller was 
established. Roosevelt’s policy toward the newly established office was to encourage 
Rockefeller to “freewheel” his office “beyond the State Department’s cautious 
constraints.”7 
The government’s effort to disseminate pro-American information came to beno 
longer restricted within her southern neighbors when the Office of War Information 
(OWI) was established in 1942 under the direction of the well-known journalist Elmer 
Davis to promote U.S. war policies both on the home front and the battlefront. During 
this time, the phrase “psychological warfare” was created to “demoralize populations in 
enemy and enemy territories.” After the war’s end Truman “liquidated” the OWI because 
conservatives in Congress saw it as the “promoter of the hated New Deal.”8 So whether 
it was a “dirty business of propaganda” or a worthy approach for mutual understanding 
and reciprocal cooperation, the post-war American outreach initiatives on winning 
hearts and minds of overseas men and women were continuingly expanded by differing 
committees and diverse programs of similar missions. The most prominent ones were 
                                                           
6Philip Coombs, The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs (New York:  
Harper & Row, 1964), 31. 
7Coombs, The Fourth Dimension, 26. 
8 Kenneth A. Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad 
(Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 2006), 29-32. 
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the Fulbright Program (1946) and the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 
1948 (popularly referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act), both of which were tailored to the 
circumstances of the dawn of the Cold War. The former has been the most “celebrated” 
academic exchange program that maintains intellectual and scholarly integrity between 
Americans and their foreign counterparts. To support this point, Richard Pells states 
that the Fulbright program seemed “more pristine and less corrupted by politics” than 
any other cultural enterprises undertaken by Washington in the second half of the 
twentieth century.9 
America’s effort to disseminate her ideals intensified by the end of the 1940s as 
Soviet communism expanded beyond its territory. President Harry S. Truman once 
described the Cold War as a “struggle, above all else, for the minds of men.” By 
denouncing the Soviets’ efforts in this culture war as directed at “undermining America’s 
truth,” Truman stated in his Campaign of Truth that the American people would 
eventually succeed if they made themselves “heard around the world in a great 
campaign of truth.”10 The extensive broadcasts of the Voice of America to Eastern 
Europe, for instance, was one of the most prevalent operations of the postwar American 
public diplomacy that the Truman administration used as an overt media offensive for 
spreading America’s values in the region. The Voice of America was one of the 
information programs that survived McCarthyism in 1953. But McCarthy’s relentless 
                                                           
9 Pells, Not Like Us, 58. 
10Quoted in Pells, Not Like Us, 65. 
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attacks on overseas information programs “delivered a final blow to the public 
diplomacy shop at the State Department.”11 
The Eisenhower administration was instrumental in disseminating American 
values through a variety of approaches. As the United States Information Agency 
(USIA) was created in 1953, the American mission to spread its ideology to combat 
Soviet communism became officially institutionalized. The USIA promoted two 
“dichotomized themes” during the Cold War: anti-communism and “positive” themes 
about the United States.12Just as the Voice of America suffered from McCarthy’s 
attacks, the USIA fell victim to a witch-hunter’s rampages. In April 1953, Joseph 
McCarthy identified seven USIS libraries in Europe for investigation and claimed that he 
found 30,000 pro-communist books. Dulles soon ordered books authored by 
“communists, fellow travelers et cetera” to be removed from the libraries of American 
overseas information centers. The USIA removed books authored by those who refused 
to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee and those who were 
overly critical of the U.S.; the works of Thomas Paine, Albert Einstein, Helen Keller, 
Henry David Thoreau, Charles Beard, W.E.B. Du Bois, Jean-Paul Sartre, Ernest 
Hemingway, Arthur Miller, Upton Sinclair and even of Foster Rhea Dulles, the State 
Secretary’s own cousin, were among those removed and censored.13 
                                                           
11 Justin Hart, Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign 
Policy (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2013), 4-5. 
12 Richard Nelson and Foad Izadi, “Ethics and Social Issues in Public Diplomacy,” in Routledge 
Handbook for Public Diplomacy, eds. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (New York: Routledge, 2009), 
336. 
13 Thomas G. Paterson, et al., A History of American Foreign Relations, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 2005), 280; Osgood, Total Cold War, 294-96.  
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As a nationwide campaign created by the Eisenhower administration, the People-
to-People movement was one of the major undertakings that was partially coordinated 
and partially funded by the USIA. Just as both Wilson’s Committee of Public Information 
and Roosevelt’s OWI were swiftly shut down as their mission accomplished after the 
wars’ end, Eisenhower’s USIA was dissolved after the Cold War ‘ended’ by the Clinton 
administration in 1999. 
The People-to-People program was indeed the first secular voluntary movement 
initiated as part of the nation’s foreign relations with the goal of facilitating interactions 
between peoples to preserve peace and mutual understanding during the tumultuous 
years of the Cold War. As the first secular voluntary movement, People-to-People was 
thus a unique program featured during Eisenhower’s second term as president. 
Eisenhower relied chiefly on “massive retaliation,” the mighty force that he hoped would 
prevent the Soviet Union from extending its expansionist policies, but he also believed 
in the role of a ‘massive mobilization’ of ordinary people both in shoring up the 
contagious spread of communist ideologies, and ultimately preserving a “true and 
lasting peace,” as he remarked during the initial People-to-People conference held in 
September, 1956.14 
It is true that not every diplomatic initiative of the Eisenhower administration 
resulted in positive change or impact. Eisenhower’s handling of an invasion of Egypt 
and the Suez Canal and his approval of the CIA covert operations in the emerging so-
called “third world” countries such as Iran and Guatemala were the occasions of the 
                                                           
14 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Remarks presented at the 1956 White House Conference on a Program for 
People-to-People Partnerships at Washington, D.C. on September 11, 1956, Dwight D. Eisenhower.: 
Records as President (White House Central Files) Official File, Box 391 OF 325 People-to-People (5). 
Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, (hereafter EL)  
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administration’s failed strategies that sought to stem “the tide of revolutionary 
nationalism” in the region.15 Suffice it to say that the rich body of scholarly literature on 
these aspects of the Eisenhower presidency occupies great linear footage on library 
shelves. Because of the emphasis on the administration’s political and military actions, 
however, its cultural and humanitarian dimensions have been inadequately 
researched.16 Only a handful of scholars have dealt with the People-to-People program, 
and their works have uniformly ignored the role and the motive of its volunteers.17 
Review of the Literature 
The classic, comprehensive monographs and biographies that discuss Dwight 
Eisenhower’s military, presidential, and civilian life all are virtually silent on his People-
to-People campaign. Even those few scholarly works, which provide a detailed analysis 
of the USIA only cast a glance at the program and none has addressed the case in 
detail. While providing the reader with a quick overview about People-to-People, Philip 
Coombs in his book entitled, The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and 
Cultural Affairs (1964), states that the People-to-People Program was “ill-timed” as it 
overlapped with the many existing organizations and programs conducting the same 
missions. The Eisenhower administration’s miscalculation therefore led the initial 
People-to-People campaign to lose wider public support.18The Information Machine: the 
                                                           
15 Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 217. 
16 Ira Chernus, Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002); 
Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and The United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and 
Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 119; Glenn Wesley 
Leppert, “Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People as an Experiment in Personal Diplomacy: A 
Missing Element for Understanding Eisenhower’s Second Term as President” (Ph.D. diss., Kansas State 
University, 2003). 
17Osgood, Total Cold War; Leppert, Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People and Helen Laville and 
Nicholas Cull, eds., The U.S. Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War (London: Routledge, 2006).  
18 Coombs, The Fourth Dimension, 67. 
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United States Information Agency and American Foreign Policy (1968), a 
comprehensive history of the USIA written by Robert E. Elder, mentioned People-to-
People’s affiliation with the Office of Private Cooperation.19 To my surprise, however, 
the extensive analysis of the USIA’s operational history entitled, The Strategy of Truth: 
the Story of the U.S Information Service written by Wilson P. Dizard (1961) and its 
extended edition, Inventing Public Diplomacy: the Story of U.S. Information 
Agency(2004) published by Wilson Dizard Jr.,20 totally excluded Eisenhower’s People-
to-People Program despite the fact that the latter stated that the president “gave a 
special boost to what he called people-to-people diplomacy” by making globe-trotting 
travels to eleven countries, an approach which has become a “model” for world 
leaders.21 Focusing on radio propaganda, private organizations, and cultural exhibitions, 
historian Walter Hixson’s Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War 
1945-1961 (1997), an oft-cited book on this theme, analyzes the history of American 
foreign policy from Truman’s propaganda initiatives to Eisenhower’s gradualist 
approach. Hixson provides some insights about the People’s Capitalism and the 
Moscow Exhibition, both of which were initiated and organized by the Eisenhower 
administration, but the People-to-People program receives no mention at all.22 
In recent years, however, some historians, such as Kenneth A. Osgood and 
Glenn Wesley Leppert analyzed the history of People-to-People as part of Cold War 
American foreign policy. Investigating the program’s history from the perspective of the 
                                                           
19 Elder, The Information Machine, 296. 
20 Dizard, Wilson, The Strategy of Truth: The Story of the U.S Information Service (Washington DC: 
Public Affairs Press, 1968) and Dizard, Wilson Jr., Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of U.S. 
Information Agency (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004). 
21 Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy, 78.   
22 Walter Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War 1945-1961 (New York: St 
Martin’s Press, 1997). 
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“cultural offensive,” Osgood’s Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle 
At Home and Abroad (2006) contends that the program’s concern was to counteract an 
increase in the Soviet cultural initiatives that would, down the road, undermine 
America’s overseas image.23 Osgood’s book provides useful information about several 
questions regarding the ways in which the People-to-People Program was operated in 
the Cold War culture front. Yet he misses other important initiatives such as the Sister- 
Cities Program and the People-to-People University Program, both of which were 
important corollaries to the larger People-to-People Partnership. 
Leppert’s unpublished dissertation, however, uncovers the organizational and 
operational history of People-to-People by locating the program in the context of 
Eisenhower’s Cold War peace initiatives. Compiling rich archival documents from the 
program files and using a vast array of published sources pertinent to the Cold War 
history, Leppert provides an informative historical narrative.24 
While Osgood criticizes People-to-People as a “camouflaged approach to 
propaganda that used…private individuals as surrogate communicators for conveying 
propaganda message,” Leppert looked at the program as an “opportunity” for ordinary 
Americans to interact with foreign people.25 Given the fact that scholars, such as 
Osgood and Leppert, have recently devoted some effort to the topic, it is indisputable 
that the People-to-People Program is not entirely a “missing element” in the Cold War 
U.S. historical scholarship. Yet, none of these works have investigated the roles and 
motives of People-to-People volunteers. 
                                                           
23 Osgood, Total Cold War. 
24 Leppert, Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People.  
25 Osgood, Total Cold War, 5; Leppert, Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People,  ii. 
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Moreover, there do not exist, it appears, any comprehensive scholarly works 
about the Sister-Cities program which was very successful and is still a popular practice 
in broader U.S. foreign relations. The only available works regarding this aspect of the 
topic examined “sister-cities” from the perspective of geography, political economy, 
entrepreneurship, and advertising. By investigating a sister-city approach from the 
geographic and historical perspective, Wilbur Zelinsky argued that city twinning as the 
“formation of an interactive planetary society” provided intimate interdependencies of all 
strata of humankind, not just a “privileged elite,” and thus it created “transnational 
commonalities of thought and social behavior.”26 In their studies of the concept of 
“sister-cities,” Rolf Cremer, Anne de Bruin, and Ann Dupuis emphasized the operation 
of multi-level entrepreneurial partnerships, which facilitated active sister-city 
relationships. These scholars conceptualize a hybrid form of “municipal-community 
entrepreneurships” by focusing on sister-city relationships in Australia and its affiliated 
countries in South Asia. Cremer, Bruin and Dupuis’s study provides a comprehensive 
view of key features unique to international sister-city partnerships, which rooted in the 
Sister-Cities program of the People-to-People program.27 
Although scholarly works which have placed a particular emphasis on the 
People-to-People program and its various elements are limited, there exists a number of 
relevant works that are valuable for writing this dissertation. The following were the 
select monographs and anthologies which were most informative for both understanding 
                                                           
26 Wilbur Zelinsky, “The Twinning of the World: Sister Cities in Geographic and Historical Perspective,” 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 81 (1991): 2. 
27Rolf Cremer, Anne de Bruin and Ann Dupuis, “International Sister- Cities: Bridging the Global-Local 
Divide,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 60 (2001): 380-81; See also Chadwick F. Alger, 
“The World Relations of Cities: Closing the Gap between Social Science Paradigms and Everyday 
Human Experience,” International Studies Quarterly 34 (1990).  
 14 
and interpreting the cases I have discussed in this project. The diplomatic historian 
Frank Ninkovich’s The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 
1938-1950 (1981)which illuminates the role of culture in the U.S. foreign policymaking in 
the late 1930s through the later years of the Truman administration and Akira Iriye’s 
Cultural Internationalism and World Order which conceptualizes “cultural 
internationalism” as it was elevated to a central position in the postwar international 
relations were most informative for this dissertation.28 
Ninkovich states that the entire foreign policy process itself is subordinate to 
larger cultural dynamics, although cultural relations are a minor form of diplomacy.29 
Culture and diplomacy in this sense are not contradictory but complementary concepts 
as the latter is a fraction of all intercultural transactions. Before the state’s innovative 
step in using culture as a constituent element of the nation’s foreign relations, there had 
been philanthropic initiatives led by private foundations (The Carnegie Endowment, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, and The Guggenheim Foundation were the giants among 
others) the heads of which believed that international understanding would be bettered 
through cultural interchange. These entities generously promoted “intercultural 
fraternity,” the idea formulated by the author as “philanthropic internationalism.”30 By the 
end of the1920s, America’s cultural relations were institutionalized by private leadership 
under the auspices of corporate philanthropy.31 
                                                           
28Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997), 
15. 
29Frank  Ninkovich. The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 2.   
30Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, 15-6. 
31Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, 22. 
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During the power diplomacy era of the 1930s, however, the function of a 
relatively informal system of cultural relations came under scrutiny. The realist and 
statist philosophies tended to prevail in the country’s foreign relations as national 
interest and security issues were underscored in foreign policymaking. By the same 
token, totalitarian cultural and propagandistic policies challenged America’s liberal 
cultural values, urging a governmental coordination of private individuals’ cultural 
initiatives.32 At this crucial time, the State Department pronounced its proposition to 
create the Division of Cultural Relations and private sectors were welcomed to share 
their activities.          
By the advent of WWII, however, the mutual coherence of culture and 
“organizational concomitants” was disrupted. War-driven pressures hit traditional 
cultural relations. The State Department, as the coordinating body, was under pressure 
to be “revolutionized,” while not entangling itself with cultural policy. By mid-1941 the 
role of private philanthropies in funding and making cultural policies was on the way to 
being diminished. Yet, considering its ‘comprehensive’ leadership role in postwar power 
relations, the U.S. was less satisfactory with culture’s “voluntarist approach.”33 
Akira Iriye addresses the questions as to how peace and civilization can be 
incorporated with realist views on international relations.34 While doing so he focuses on 
cultural internationalism which is an idea of “fostering international cooperation through 
cultural activities across national boundaries.”35 In particular, cultural internationalism 
was elevated to a central position in postwar international relations.   
                                                           
32Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, 23. 
33Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, 38-41. 
34Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, 15. 
35Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order , 3. 
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Iriye states that the League of Nations was the “most spectacular instance of 
postwar internationalism” and was the best example of political internationalism as long 
as it embodied humanity’s long search for an institution that would promote cooperation 
among nations to consolidate peace.36 Indeed, the League’s attraction (rather than 
inclusion) of non-western members indicated the rise of cosmopolitanism at the global 
level.37 These and other efforts by cultural internationalists assured the potential of 
intercultural communication. Yet, cultural internationalism had come into better shape 
by the advent of Third World countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Culture in the following 
decades was (and remains) more likely to redefine international relations, though 
nation-states emphasized their interests and power.  
Historian Justin Hart in his book Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public 
Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy (2013) traces the origins of 
U.S. public diplomacy by referring to the 1936 Buenos Aires Conference. The first 
phase of U.S. public diplomacy lasted between 1936-1953, when the U.S. decided to 
incorporate techniques for shaping the nation’s overseas image with its foreign policy 
objectives. The idea was to promote the objectives of Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy 
in Latin America. According to Hart, using public diplomacy as an explicit component of 
U.S. foreign policy strategy was transformative because policymakers “recognized that 
U.S. foreign relations had entered a new era in which [the] U.S. government could no 
longer remain indifferent to perceptions of the United States abroad.”38 
The public diplomacy anthology entitled, The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power 
in International Relations (2007), edited by Jan Melissen, discusses public diplomacy 
                                                           
36Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order,  57. 
37Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order,  61. 
38 Hart, Empire of Ideas, 5. 
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from the post-Cold war perspective39 and Gary D. Rawnsley’s Cold-War Propaganda in 
the 1950s (1999), which discusses propaganda as an integrated part of foreign policy 
examined how its organization was increasingly a professional undertaking, and how 
international politics was no longer the practice of government officials and foreign 
policy elites, but started to involve ordinary citizens and elaborates upon the usefulness 
of such a turn in understanding both traditional and contemporary meanings of public 
diplomacy and propaganda.40 
Richard Pells’s Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and 
Transformed American Culture Since World War II(1997) and American Exceptionalism 
and U.S. Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War(2001) written by 
Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, Here, There and Everywhere: The Foreign Politics of American 
Popular Culture (2000), edited by Reinhold Wagnleitner and Ellen Tyler May, and 
Reinhold Wagnleitner’s Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of 
the United States in Austria after the Second World War (1994)were helpful in 
understanding America’s global hegemonic mission. Pells examines critical questions 
as to why Europeans, who adopt American methods, buy American products, watch 
Hollywood movies, listen to American hits, eat at McDonald’s, and visit to theme parks, 
do not want to be “like us” by refusing to embrace the American way of life. What would 
be the possible repercussions if they insist on remaining un-American and even anti-
American? Having interpreted Europe’s reaction to the “totality of American culture,” 
Pells concludes that European influence on America’s fashion and products and 
                                                           
39Jan Melissen, ed., The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (New York: 
Palgrave, 2007), 11. 
40 Gary D. Rawnsley, ed., Cold War Propaganda in the 1950s (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 2.  
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American impact on Europe’s technology and mass entertainment are the result of a 
complex interaction between two different and increasingly heterogeneous cultures and 
therefore “Americanization of Europe is a myth.”41 
 Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May’s edited book is a collection of 
essays on Americanization of the world through movies, music and popular culture, 
media and commercial advertising. The first three essays provide historical and 
theoretical frameworks for Americanization: John Blair writes on the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century export of American cultures especially blackface minstrel and 
wild west shows, James T. Campbell on America’s long-term influence in South Africa, 
and Oliver Schmidt on the impact of the Salzburg seminar per se on the relationship 
between Cold War politics and culture. The next four essays focus on the impact of 
Hollywood movies on Spanish, Italian and Nigerian societies: Ted Wilson discusses 
policy restrictions on Hollywood movies in the 1940s, Aurora Bosch and Fernanda del 
Rincon concentrate on the perception of American movies in post-Civil war Spain, 
Giuliana Muscio studies the impact of American movies on post-war Italy and Nosa 
Owens Ibie examines the cultural and economic power of American programs in his 
country. The subsequent five essays explore the role of music: Elizabeth Vihlen on the 
cultural politics of jazz in France, Penny von Eschen on America’s use of jazz tours as 
image-making during the Cold War, Michael May on American jazz influence in the 
Soviet Union, Thomas Fuchs on the resentment of rock ‘n’ roll stars by Germans, and 
Christoph Ribbat on the case of rap music from cultural and racial perspectives. Four 
other essays discuss the perceptions and misperceptions of American culture in other 
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countries: Masako Notoji’s analysis of the rather benign perception of American culture 
by Japanese, Myles Dungan’s and David Gray’s essay on the love-hate perception of 
American pop culture in Ireland and England, Gulriz Buken’s critical essay on Turkey’s 
disdain toward Americanization of its local cultural values, and Michael Ermarth’s 
revelation of German elite attitude toward Americanization. And the last three essays 
investigate the role of the media and the internet in global culture: Rob Kroes on 
America’s image behind its freedom in the Netherlands, Michael Jaffe and Gabriel 
Meimann on media domination theories, and Reinhold Wagnleitner on the future of 
worldwide internet and transnational impacts.   
Wagnleitner and May argue that the spread of American culture here, there and 
everywhere represents the global triumph of the American century along with the 
resentments from localities, as a diverse set of local studies with a vast range of 
theoretical and empirical implications. 42 Two essays in particular provide provocative 
contrasting views of how the international audience perceives American cultural 
transfer.  Masako Notoji, Professor at the University of Tokyo and an active member of 
the Japanese Association of American Studies, presents a sympathetic essay on the 
Americanization of Japanese society focusing on two cultural themes: John Philip 
Sousa, the most popular American musical figure in the 1890s and Tokyo Disneyland 
exported by the U.S. as a symbol of its cultural hegemony. Having analyzed the impact 
of Sousa’s “Stars and Stripes Forever” and Disneyland’s theme parks, Notoji notes that 
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sending and receiving American culture is “the dynamic process in which meaning and 
function of the original culture is reconstructed in the new context of the receiver.”43 
Both Sousa’s marches and the Tokyo Disneyland, as an enduring influence on 
Japanese generations, symbolize not necessarily American cultural triumph in Japan 
but rather reveal that the American culture is not a “monopoly” of Americans. They 
characterize both the individual and collective identities of people around the world. As 
such, American culture is “deconstructed and re-conceptualized into the everyday 
experience of Japanese people.”44 The spreading of American culture therefore should 
be interpreted as the “totality of values people practice anywhere and everywhere.” 
Masako Notoji’s conclusion provokes the reader to define America from a more diverse 
perspective. 
             Choosing an entirely different perspective from Notoji, Gulriz Buken, Associate 
Professor of American Literature and American Studies at Bilkent University, Turkey 
warns in her essay entitled, “Backlash: An Argument against the Spread of American 
Popular Culture in Turkey” that Americanization is a serious threat to retention of 
cultural heritage by the younger generations in Turkey. Americanization negates Turkish 
mores and moral values. Utilizing strong vocabularies and casting frequent criticisms of 
almost every aspect of American culture and lifestyle, Buken is concerned that 
American culture is infecting Turkish society. She is particularly irritated with the 
inclination of Turkish youth toward an American-style social behavior characterized by 
“comfort-seeking, self-satisfaction, mechanical homogeneity,” dictated by what is in 
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vogue.45 American shopping mall cultures and their surrounding food courts and debit 
cards, Buken claims, promote spending rather than thrift and American culture is 
exported with its behavior of conspicuous consumption.46 All these “American” 
behaviors tend to undermine traditional Turkish behavioral norms based on decorum 
and austerity.47Buken concludes that the U.S. is quite undemocratically contributing to 
traditional cultures in other countries. It is complicated to assess whether popular 
culture imports are superimposed on or presented to or chosen by people. 
 Reinhold Wagnleitner’s Coca-Colonization and the Cold War examines U.S. 
cultural politics in Austria, especially the acceptance of American pop culture by young 
Austrians. Wagnleitner argued that although the presence of American culture in 
Europe is an “unstoppable phenomenon accompanying the rise of the United States as 
an imperialist world power,” products of American culture “collided with already-existing 
powerful European clichés, stereotypes, associations, perceptions and misperceptions 
of this Strange New World in the cognitive maps of Europeans.”48 But spreading 
American culture via all sorts of avenues, including consumer products, literature, 
language, movies, music, and news and other information programs saw remarkable 
success in the Old World. The author claims that the Hollywood effect was especially 
successful in coca-colonizing a receptive audience in Austria by spreading American 
ideals to young Austrians.    
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 The complex interrelationship of race, culture and diplomacy during the 
Eisenhower administration is well presented in Naima Prevots’ Dance for Export: 
Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War (1998). When requesting five million dollars to be 
spent on America’s overseas cultural programs, which later became the President’s 
Emergency Fund, Eisenhower stated in 1954 that he would consider it “essential that 
we take immediate and vigorous action to demonstrate the superiority of the products 
and cultural values of our system of free enterprise.”49 Eisenhower’s Emergency Fund 
for International Affairs, which “underwrote the nation’s first cultural export program,” 
sponsored the American National Theater and Academy (ANTA) groups and individual 
actors and authorized ANTA to serve as a professional administrative agent for 
performing arts programs overseas.50 
 Through the ANTA-State Department contract, famous American performing arts 
groups such as the Jose Limon Dance Company and George Gershwin’s Porgy and 
Bess reached audiences in South America, Europe, the Middle East and the Soviet 
Union under the auspices of the President’s Emergency Fund in the mid-1950s. 
Referring to the folk opera Porgy and Bess performed in Yugoslavia in 1954, a New 
York Times story wrote: “… All of the warm emotion of the Slav character welled up in 
a joyous affection for the seventy Negroes… With charm and grace, members of the 
cast created new perspectives here for a Communist-led people sensitive to reports of 
American race prejudice and discrimination.”51 
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The use of African-American artists as “good will ambassadors” is analyzed in 
Penny M. Von Eschen’s Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the 
Cold War (2004) in detail. Von Eschen argued that by sponsoring famous jazz artists 
including John Birks “Dizzy” Gillispie, Louis Armstrong and Duke Ellington, U.S. officials 
“pursued a self-conscious campaign against worldwide criticism of U.S. racism, striving 
to build cordial relations with new African and Asian states.” In real life, Von Eschen 
contends, the government’s strategy to promote African-Americans as symbols of 
American democracy collided with the glaring fact that “America was still a Jim Crow 
nation.”52 
According to McEvoy-Levy, public diplomacy or rhetoric is a response to and a 
product of, a complex network of elements such as changes in the international 
distribution of power, the personality and experience of elites, and competitions and 
coalitions with other rhetorical policy networks both at home and abroad.53 It is strategic 
as it is a “subset of political communication.”54 The primary vehicles of government 
public diplomacy are speeches, statements, interviews, strategic and symbolic 
appearances, document signings, foreign visits, wider cultural, educational and or 
commercial initiatives and exchanges.55 
            U.S. foreign policy seems to be conditioned and sometimes constrained by the 
idea of American exceptionalism, a “para-ideology” which has the potential both to 
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foster and prevent international peace and stability.56McEvoy-Levy argues that the 
uniqueness and moral superiority of America referred to in the earliest writings of 
Puritan ideology—a City upon a hill (John Winthrop)—were later enhanced by 
enlightenment ideals such as human perfectibility (Thomas Jefferson). Defined in 
contrast to old world aristocracy and feudalism and promoted via the strength of the 
idea of American superiority, American exceptionalism tended to grow from generation 
to generation: American democracy (Alex de Tocqueville), common sense-revolutionary 
rhetoric (Thomas Paine), manifest destiny (John L. O’Sullivan), frontier thesis--
distinctive American character and democracy, and Americanization (Fredrick Jackson 
Turner), Monroe Doctrine (James Monroe), Fourteen points- internationalism (Woodrow 
Wilson), the American Century—the most vital nation sentiment (Henry Luce), 
America’s (not Europe’s) responsibility to contain communism (George Kennan) ‘bound 
to lead’ (Joseph Nye)—all these politicians, historians, businessmen, even foreign 
travelers left their imprints on the idea of American exceptionalism. It is therefore 
American exceptionalism that shaped the overall thrust of American foreign policy and, 
indeed was ‘justified’ and legitimized by the end of the Cold War when the U.S. 
emerged as a dominant global power that survived a half-century of world conflict.57 
Elizabeth Cobbs-Hoffman’s All You Need is Love: The Peace Corps and the 
Spirit of the 1960s(1998) was invaluable in presenting an example of how one could 
write an institutional history of voluntary organizations such as Peace Corps from the 
perspective of idealism and self-interest. As Hoffman puts it, many people, including 
Americans would “reject US government pretensions to helping others as nothing but a 
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cynical farce” as the heyday of the Cold War passed. But the Peace Corps tended to 
encounter skeptical views. Because it was shaped and functioned by the tens of 
thousands of volunteers, the history of the Peace Corps is the history of 
humanitarianism in U.S. foreign relations.58 
A Statement of Purpose 
Was People-to-People an “instrument” of Cold War American foreign policy 
which was designed to combat the influence of communist ideology around the world, or 
was it “personal diplomacy” that provided ordinary Americans with an opportunity to 
interact with foreign people at the grassroots level? Or was it both? By relying on both 
archival sources and personal interviews with People-to-People volunteers, this 
dissertation explores the People-to-People movement as the case of both power politics 
and idealism undertaken at the national and institutional levels by emphasizing 
volunteer motives. It would be inadequate to reach any useful conclusion about the 
questions posed above without listening to actual participants of the People-to-People 
campaign. 
The dissertation also attempts to answer questions as to why President 
Eisenhower proposed the People-to-People program and what personal and political 
motives he held that led to the creation of people-to-people diplomacy, and why  
thousands of ordinary Americans at home and thousands more abroad were willing to 
support it and volunteer for it. Based on the three case studies, the People-to-People 
program (1956-1961), the People-to-People University program (1961-1975) and the 
Sister City program (1956-1966) I argue that volunteers had the tendency to join the 
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program from personal motives rather than politically prescribed ones (i.e. from the 
government), such as personal cultural enrichment and a sense of belonging to a 
campus organization of good reputation.  
Those individuals who devoted their time and skills to thousands of cultural, 
educational, and environmental initiatives undertaken by People-to-People acted not 
necessarily because they were imposed by the power and prescriptions of institutional 
norms to espouse narrow-minded nationalist ideologies, but because they believed, for 
a variety of reasons, that they were volunteering to do good and that they could benefit 
from the personal enrichment gained from travel and reciprocal international friendships. 
Association with the program entailed that one was “open-minded” and culturally savvy 
by showing interest in the cultures of others. By relying on both primary sources and 
personal interviews with former volunteers, this dissertation attempts to uncover a story 
of the involved ordinary Americans’ hopes, motives, and actions “as they see them.”59 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Given the fact that a key part of this dissertation considers both government and 
volunteer motives behind the People-to-People program, the following concepts such as 
public diplomacy, soft power, social capital and reciprocity are useful in understanding 
and explaining political, social, cultural, moral, and humanitarian dimensions of the 
broader people-to-people diplomacy. This dissertation interchangeably uses such 
concepts as public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy and/or soft power to discuss the 
political objectives and implications of the cases.  
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Although there is a lack of consensus as to an acceptable definition and an 
analytical framework among public diplomacy scholars and practitioners, most scholars 
in this field agree that the phrase ‘public diplomacy’ was first coined during the height of 
the Cold War and was introduced into an American political discourse by Edmund 
Gullion, a career diplomat and director of the USIA during the Kennedy/Johnson years. 
Recent works, however, question whether Gullion’s definition is justified enough to be 
operationalized under any circumstance. But this dissertation uses Murrow’s definition 
as it is the most comprehensive and the most “convenient” among other 
justifications.60An earlier definition of the term can also be found in the work by Gifford 
Malone who views public diplomacy as “direct communication with foreign peoples, with 
the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately that of their governments.”61 In the 
early 1990s Hans Tuch provided a more comprehensive definition. According to Tuch, 
public diplomacy is a “government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an 
attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and 
culture, as well as its national goals and current policies.”62 
By choosing the term “cultural diplomacy,” Geoffrey Berridge and Alan James 
define a country’s outreach initiatives as the “advertisement of achievements in science, 
technology as well as in the arts, humanities and social science.”63 It attaches special 
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importance to promoting links between parallel institutions at home and abroad.64 In his 
recent work, however, Berridge defines cultural diplomacy as “an effort of the 
embassies of some countries to influence the foreign policy of the receiving state by 
helping to export their own cultures to them.”65 
While many scholars consider public diplomacy as the greatest foreign policy 
asset, few of them—namely Joseph Nye Jr. and Mark Leonard—have offered well-
grounded conceptual frameworks thus far. Mark Leonard’s Public Diplomacy (2002) is a 
pioneering effort in defining the topic from a scholarly perspective. According to 
Leonard, public diplomacy is about “building relationships: understanding the needs of 
other countries, cultures and peoples; communicating our points of view; correcting 
misperceptions; looking for areas where we can find common cause.”66As such, public 
diplomacy is much broader and more inclusive than traditional diplomacy. Leonard 
offers three-dimensional characteristics and identifies two other public diplomacy 
purposes that are accomplished based on national interests. Leonard contends that 
since public diplomacy pursues inclusive policies targeting at broader audience, it has a 
hierarchy of effects that it can achieve. These hierarchies include: a. increasing people’s 
familiarity with one’s country; b. increasing people’s appreciation of one’s country; c. 
engaging people with one’s country and d. influencing people. Therefore, public 
diplomacy cannot afford to be a one-dimensional process. The three dimensions include 
daily communications (reactive), strategic communications (proactive) and long-term 
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relationship building, all of which combined are essential in engaging in more efficient 
public diplomacy.67 
According to Leonard, public diplomacy is not necessarily a part or a ‘disguised’ 
face of propaganda. Thus, to distance such initiatives from “crude” propaganda 
activities and to effectively facilitate public diplomacy, one needs to cope with certain 
challenges. First and foremost, it is important to understand the audience at whom 
public diplomacy is aimed. By citing outreach initiatives undertaken by both the British 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the U.S. Department of State, Leonard argues 
that the target audience is no longer a passive recipient of messages and information 
from the other end. Thus, public diplomacy’s job is to convey not just messages but 
“legitimized” messages so the desired result would be legitimate. One does not know 
whether his or her message is legitimate or not if he or she ignores his or her target 
audience’s beliefs and values. Because western values such as freedom, democracy 
and human rights are not necessarily ultimate destinations of humanity and thus they 
should not have to be accepted as universal.68 
 In his widely quoted work, Soft Power: the Means to Success in World 
Politics(2004) the political scientist Joseph Nye offers a fresh, broader view of public 
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diplomacy by introducing the phrase “soft power,”—a country’s ability to get what it 
wants through attraction rather than coercion or payments. Soft power, Nye asserts, 
arises from the “attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”69 
According to Nye, soft power is one of the best workable approaches that 
America should combine with its “hard power” (military power) in the pursuit of national 
and global interests.70 By emphasizing American soft power initiatives during the Cold 
War, Nye contends that America proved to be the strongest nation in large part because it 
accumulated rich experience in the conduct of public diplomacy. Nye’s concept of soft 
power indeed is not a brand new term. By the time of the demise of the bipolar world early 
in the 1990s, he correctly observed that power was becoming less “fungible, less 
coercive, and less tangible.” In other words, the decline of communism and the return of a 
multi-polar international system tended to make “co-optive behavior” and soft power more 
important than ever before.71 Soft power, according to Nye, is much more frugal than hard 
power so that it can offer “more bang for the buck.” This assumption, if valid, could 
illuminate one of the most important features of people-to-people relationships. 
Nicholas Cull’s comprehensive definition of the term public diplomacy based on 
five core components is informative for this dissertation as well. According to Cull, public 
diplomacy is an “international actor’s attempt to conduct its foreign policy by engaging 
with foreign publics,” which is similar to the Manheim’s scheme on government-to-people 
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contact. Five core elements that constitute public diplomacy are listening, advocacy, 
cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and international broadcasting. Another 
conceptual work written from a top-down perspective of public diplomacy is the political 
scientist Jarol Manheim’s Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: the 
Evolution of Influence which presents the reader ‘the formality’ of the concept. Having 
entitled his book as “strategic public diplomacy,” Manheim attempts to elucidate the 
intellectual and economic dynamics which affect the representation of foreign interests in 
the US and its ultimate impact on the making of U.S. foreign policy.  
Manheim categorizes four different kinds of diplomatic activities conducted 
between states and people. First is government–to-government, which is viewed as 
traditional diplomacy between states. Second is diplomat-to-diplomat, personal 
diplomatic interactions at individual level; next is people-to-people, which is public 
diplomacy in its broader meaning, characterized by cultural exchanges and last is 
government-to-people-- another form of public diplomacy (but emphasis is on top-down 
approach). This top-down approach of public diplomacy is employed by the government 
of one nation to influence public/elite opinion in a targeted country for a political 
advantage.72 The scholarly literature on government-to-people diplomacy reveals that 
early efforts were typically labeled as “propaganda” and conceptualization efforts tend to 
scatter around and across disciplines including communication, political science, 
psychology (and manifestly diplomatic history had he mentioned this subfield). Indeed, 
Manheim does not avoid using the term propaganda in substitution for the recent à la 
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mode phrase—public diplomacy as long as they characterize activities embodying the 
same purpose. 73 
“Strategic public diplomacy”, as Manheim defines the term, is the international 
manifestation of a relatively new style of information management which is termed by 
some practitioners as strategic political communication. Strategic political 
communication incorporates the “use of sophisticated knowledge of such attributes of 
human behavior as attitude, preference, cultural tendencies, and media use patterns” to 
shape messages so as to increase their desired outcome while minimizing undesired 
effects. Strategic public diplomacy in this context is not a mere art but an “applied 
transnational science of human behavior.”74 
According to Manheim, the goals of image managers are to reach a larger world 
audience and their motivations are manifold: all efforts of “mobilization,” “legitimation,” 
and “empowerment” of one’s own sources and credentials, and all manipulations of 
“demobilization,” “delegitimation” and disempowerment of the adversary’s facts and 
potentials are attempted to be undertaken. In other words, the art of image-
management, especially during a war is to consolidate the circumstances and 
objectives of the ensuing conflict to the favor of one’s own needs and interests.75 The 
author also discusses the foreign state officials’ visits to the U.S. by locating the actual 
visits in the context of public diplomacy and image-building. Visits of heads of states, 
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Manheim argues, not only assure that the U.S. is the “popular destination of 
international leadership circuit,” but they also become “instruments” of public 
diplomacy.76 
What is common in the above definitions of public diplomacy is that it, public 
diplomacy, is the targeting of government-backed information or communication at 
foreign publics with the intention to change their pre-conceived views of or attitudes 
towards the originating country. In such a sense, the purpose and meaning of public 
diplomacy are perhaps similar to those of propaganda. While the purpose of 
propaganda, according to historian Osgood, is “to persuade—to change or to reinforce 
existing attitudes and opinion,” it is also a “manipulative activity.”77 For Osgood there is 
no difference between the terms of public diplomacy and propaganda, albeit the former 
is a “less bellicose” term which is used to make the idea of the latter “more palatable to 
domestic audiences.”78 By referring to Nazi and Communist propaganda, the public 
diplomacy scholar Jan Melissen states that the term propaganda has two key features: 
“manipulation and deceit of foreign publics” and therefore it has negative connotations 
in western consciousness. But the difference between public diplomacy and 
propaganda lies in their purposes and the “pattern of communication.” While public 
diplomacy engages in two-way communications, propaganda tends to convey one-way 
messages to foreign publics. In short, public diplomacy is similar to propaganda in a 
way it tries to persuade people what to think, but it also tries to “listen to what people 
have to say.”79 
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 Such an interchangeable usage of the terms by both scholars and practitioners 
in the field tend to make already controversial debates even more complicated. Richard 
Holbrooke, a well-known American diplomat and a Peace Corps official, once stated 
that “call it public diplomacy, call it public affairs, psychological warfare, if you really 
want to be blunt, propaganda.”80 But it is true, as the public diplomacy scholar Nicholas 
Cull once stated, that if propaganda is to be used interchangeably with the term public 
diplomacy, “it first has to be divested of its pejorative connotations.”81 
Entities that play active roles in soft power initiatives do not believe themselves to 
be political in nature. Non-state actors including non-governmental organizations, 
educational, philanthropic, religious, and humanitarian groups and numerous individuals 
are not necessarily ‘exercising’ soft power to gain certain political goals. Each and every 
non-state actor has its own mission and priorities and thus the activities being 
conducted under the realm of non-governmental institutions in most cases are designed 
and disseminated without governmental coordination or policy recommendations. In this 
sense, commitments made by non-state actors tend to grow out from personal choice 
and preference and therefore different and distant from government politics.    
Yet the notion that “the personal is political” which has been elaborated by 
historians Sara M. Evans, James J. Farrell, and Rusty L. Monhollon tends to complicate 
the common belief that individual person’s motive for volunteering for grassroots is non-
political. As historian Monhollon argued, Americans in the 1960s “increasingly 
personalized their political responses to pressing issues.” Some Americans 
“personalized their politics” through their participation in grassroots, or protest 
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movements, such as civil rights, feminist or antiwar struggles, while others did so 
through their “resistance to these movements and their goals, or by appealing to a 
narrow definition of national citizenship expressed through Cold War and 
anticommunism.”  
Personalization of politics therefore helped Americans “create, or in some cases, 
recreate, new group and individual identities, a common past, shared cultural and 
political values, and economic status while challenging those of others.”82The social and 
political challenges that pervaded across the nation in the 1960s provided young 
Americans with “new expression and meaning to the political process.” Perhaps this is 
what drove those college students to volunteer for the People-to-People University 
program. Perhaps People-to-People volunteers hoped that taking part in a grassroots 
organization was an opportunity to express alternative politics from a personal 
perspective. Perhaps Monhollon was right when he stated that “the everyday choices 
individuals make about their lives, communities, and sense of self” have political 
implications.83 Or even Carol Hanisch was correct when she once stated that 
"…personal problems are political problems."84 While personal experiences are shaped 
by official political contexts, they are not less political, nor are they wholly determined by 
government design. The People-to-People volunteers’ motives were not identical to 
those of government politics.       
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Considering the two realms of the political, therefore, the present dissertation 
attempts to locate volunteers’ motive in the context of ordinary human interactions at the 
grassroots level by using the political scientist Robert Putnam’s concepts such as social 
capital, reciprocity, bonding and bridging. Explaining the participants’ personal motives 
and ethical inclinations from the perspectives of accumulation of social capital and 
engagement in reciprocal actions helps me depoliticize the genuine interests of 
volunteers who were involved in the programs. Especially, Putnam’s Bowling Alone: 
The Collapse and Revival of American Community (1995) serves as a framework for 
this dissertation’s conceptualizing of the motives of volunteers of the People-to-People 
University program.   
Methodology and Sources 
This dissertation is largely based on archival sources accessed at the 
Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas and the University of Kansas 
Archives at the Spencer Research Library in Lawrence. The vast collections in the 
Eisenhower library contain the White House Central files which consist of speeches, 
letters, memorandums and other official records. In addition, the Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Presidential Papers, the Ann Whitman files, and the Jacqueline Cochran papers were 
especially useful for chapter three. Mark Bortman’s papers relating to the Civic 
committee and the Sister-Cities program, gave the basic framework for the second half 
of chapter three. People-to-People records, which included government documents, 
official speeches, personal correspondence, the program pamphlets, guides as well as 
an assortment of newspaper and magazine clippings, accessed at the University of 
Kansas Archives at the Spencer Research Library were used for chapter four. 
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The second important set of primary sources included the data from the oral 
history interviews the author conducted with volunteers of the People-to-People 
University program. The interview data were primarily used in the second half of chapter 
four. The research methods employed in conducting oral history interviews with People-
to-People University program volunteers proved both a challenging and intellectually 
rewarding experience.  
In addition to archival sources and oral history, this project used unpublished 
sources pertinent to the People-to-People program. Among them, Public Papers of 
Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-1961, Eisenhower’s 
memoirs Mandate for Change and Waging Peace, and two dissertations produced by 
John E. Juergensmeyer and Glenn Wesley Leppert, which were respectively done at 
Princeton University in 1960 and Kansas State University in 2003. The only scholarly 
work which addressed the People-to-People program in its early years is 
Juergensmeyer’s dissertation entitled, “Democracy’s Diplomacy: The People-to-People 
Program: A Study of Attempts to Focus the Effects of Private Contacts in International 
Politics.” Written from a political scientist perspective, Juergensmeyer’s dissertation 
argued that the People-to-People program was “quite successful in expanding mutual 
contacts,” but it “lacked a sense of direction and specific goals because of a deficiency 
in conceptual underpinnings.” Thus, the author suggested People-to-People improve its 
structural and administrative policies, to “encourage a mass increase in private 
contacts” and should attempt to focus on the trend of private interactions so it will 
promote a “long-range establishment of democratic political values.”85Leppert’s 
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dissertation entitled, “Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People as an Experiment in 
Personal Diplomacy: A Missing Element for Understanding Eisenhower’s Second Term 
as President” is a recent study to uncover the organizational and operational history of 
the People-to-People program as Eisenhower’s “tool for waging peace.”86 
 
Chapter Summaries 
This dissertation is divided into four chapters. The introductory chapter provides 
a summary of America’s pre-cold war experience in public diplomacy initiatives. Here I 
introduce relevant scholarship on People-to-People and discuss the theoretical and 
methodological perspectives. Chapter two presents the historical context surrounding 
the broader People-to-People movement. By focusing on the political and social 
environment in the early postwar years through the 1960s this chapter discusses the 
connections between cold war ideologies, internationalism and American vision for 
world leadership, and meaning and usage of people-to-people diplomacy. Chapter three 
and four are case studies which examined the origin, actions, successes and setbacks 
of the national People-to-People movement, the Sister-Cities program, and the People-
to-People University program, which was launched at the dawn of the 1960s. Chapter 
four turns to oral history interviews conducted by the author to explore the motives of 
People-to-People volunteers—motives that were previously unheard and neglected to 
be recognized by previous scholarly works and which this work hopes to bring to light as 
any scholarly work on this topic would be incomplete without them.  
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Chapter 2  
 
Prelude to People’s Diplomacy in Postwar America: 
Pride and Paradoxes at Home and Abroad 
 
In late May of 1956, Abraham J. Feldman, President of the Synagogue Council of 
America, received a “gracious invitation” from President Dwight D. Eisenhower that 
asked him to join a group of American citizens to the White House conference on the 
People-to-People partnership. Having deemed the president’s call a “patriotic task”, 
Rabbi Feldman accepted it as a “privilege to serve” either in his “personal or official 
capacity” as head of the nation’s first cross-denominational Jewish institution.87 Dr. 
Feldman was one of about hundred and fifty Americans, whom Eisenhower invited to 
the “special” conference on people-to-people diplomacy.   
The inaugural meeting of the People-to-People partnership, which was held in 
September 1956 right after Eisenhower’s recovery from his heart attack, was a founding 
moment of citizen diplomacy calling for the American people to contribute their part to 
the American Cold War effort in defense of American freedom and democracy. 
Humbled before the experts in the fields about which he was expected to talk, yet 
“emboldened” by the purpose of the meeting, Eisenhower prompted during the 
announcement of his People-to-People idea that “if we are going to take advantage of 
the assumption that all people want peace, then the problem is for people to get 
together and to lead government—if necessary, to evade governments—to work out not 
one method but thousands of methods by which people can gradually learn a little bit 
more of each other.” Governments can do “no more than point the way,” Eisenhower 
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continued, to “assist in mechanical details,” but ordinary people would help to “widen 
every possible chunk in the Iron Curtain and bring the family of Russia or of any other 
country… and sit down between us to say, ‘Now, how do we improve the lot of both of 
us?” That would be the “truest path to peace.”88 Although Eisenhower’s motives for 
promoting peace through People-to-People were not limited to only his foreign policy, 
the Cold War ideological battle with the Soviet Union served as the major force for the 
Eisenhower administration to take new outreach actions. Yet, Eisenhower neither 
wanted to demonstrate his People-to-People program as propaganda nor did he prefer 
it to be directly linked to government agencies. For American policymakers, as Osgood 
argued, propaganda is only a “communists’ tool” with which they sought to apply Soviet 
models, while American outreach initiatives such as People-to-People diplomacy were 
designed to create “mutual understanding” between ordinary peoples.89 According to 
Leppert, however, People-to-People was a “shift in Eisenhower agenda for peace,” and 
an “experiment in low-key personal diplomacy.”90 
In addition, given his high popularity rate, Eisenhower believed that regardless of 
their political preference, most Americans would stand behind his idea of citizen 
diplomacy that was needed to supplement the nation’s foreign policy. Henry Wallace, 
the presidential candidate from the Communist-backed Progressive Party, remarked in 
1948 that “Ike was sincere about peace.” The beat novelist Jack Kerouac supported Ike, 
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and the civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr., voted for the GOP in 1956. Indeed, as 
Stephen Whitfield once stated, “virtually everyone liked Ike.” 91 
Many of those Americans who were moved by Eisenhower’s speech believed 
that “playing a part” in the president’s project to help the government in spreading 
American freedom and democracy the world over was an “honor” and “interest” close to 
“the heart of every American.”92By the same token, it was a personal sense and moral 
choice evolved from political and cultural circumstances, which shaped an individual 
citizen’s passage to altruistic motives, belonging to and even recuperation during the 
turbulent years of social discontent. In particular, the creation of the People-to-People 
University chapters on college campuses in the early 1960s awakened young 
generation’s consciousness of their role in, and reaction to, a democratic society 
Americans have been envisioning to build for themselves and model for the rest. Taken 
together, these beliefs, choices, and consciousness encapsulated the key impulses that 
motivated many Americans to be part of the People-to-People program.  
 Eisenhower proposed the People-to-People program amid the Cold War 
confrontation, national insecurity, uncertainty in world peace, prevailing anti-
Americanism, and the Third World decolonization. At home, Americans were [plagued] 
with political and social turmoil such as McCarthyism, the revival of racial and ethnic 
consciousness, and attendant social movements; and contradictions of continuing 
poverty and inequality along with unparalleled growth of the nation’s economy and 
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wealth. As we look at the roots of these changes and challenges, we need to trace the 
ways in which America responded to both realities and expectations in the immediate 
postwar years.     
Although the People-to-People movement was originated in the mid-1950s its 
motives were largely influenced by the immediate post-WWII time America’s prediction 
of and due reactions to the emerging quest for a new world order. This chapter will 
focus on the political and social environment in the early postwar years through the 
1960s to figure out the connections between cold war ideologies, internationalism, 
America’s quest for world leadership and the broader people-to-people diplomacy. To 
understand the meaning behind the People-to-People program properly, we need to 
consider carefully how and why it was launched and what events and influences came 
before this nation-wide movement. This chapter situates the People-to-People idea as a 
product of a complex historical time period with a variety of political and ideological 
realities and imaginations. 
American Society in the Early Postwar Years:  
Affluence, Influence and Anxieties 
With the defeat of fascism and the drastic decline of the traditional powers, the 
United States entered the postwar era without military or economic rival. America’s 
unparalleled prosperity and affluence rendered it the strongest postwar nation. If “there 
could ever be such a thing as a good war,” the diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis 
states, “then this one, for the United States, came close.”93The end of the war and the 
overwhelming victory of the United States thus brought most Americans a “sense of 
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national pride” and triumph.94 Such a victory justified America’s military and economic 
capability that none of the industrial nations had possessed at the time providing the 
country with an ambitious vision to act as a leading player in international relations. The 
vision under the auspices of spreading American freedom and democracy to the 
postwar world was deeply embedded in America’s politico-economic and cultural and 
humanitarian missions that the country had engaged in throughout the second half of 
the twentieth century.        
In the immediate postwar years, American policymakers such as Harry S. 
Truman and John F. Dulles reinforced the overarching notion that the United States was 
obliged, if not destined, to shape the postwar world according to American democratic 
values and moral leadership. Early in 1946, President Truman called upon the nation to 
use the moral leadership to “save a world which is beset by so many threats of new 
conflicts, new terror and new destruction,” and to “save the starving millions in Europe, 
in Asia and in Africa.”95 The same year, John Foster Dulles, the would-be Secretary of 
State for the Eisenhower administration, more bluntly stated that the “United States 
ought to take a lead… in restoring principles as a guide to conduct. If America “does not 
do that,” Dulles insisted, “the world will not be worth living in.”96 Dulles later claimed 
during his campaign speech in 1952 that a Republican administration would use “all 
means to secure the liberation of Eastern Europe.”97 
The media mogul Henry Luce’s prediction of America’s preeminence seemed 
assured. “The vision of America as the dynamic leader of world trade,” Luce asserted in 
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1941, “has within it the possibility of such enormous human progress as to stagger the 
imagination. Let us not be staggered by it. Let us rise to its tremendous possibilities.”98 
The postwar world was ready to embrace Luce’s “American Century” that would be 
shaped in line with American leadership. Indeed, the preliminary plans were already 
sketched out even before the end of the war based upon U.S.-led political and 
economic arrangements manifested in the Atlantic Charter (1941), the Bretton Woods 
Conference (1944), and the creation of the United Nations (1945). 
On August 14, 1945, President Truman announced from the Oval Room of the 
White House to his fellow Americans: “I deem… full acceptance of … unconditional 
surrender” of Japanese militarism. Signs of the overwhelming victory across America 
flared. As the crowds in Washington chanted “We want Harry,” Truman appeared with 
his wife Bess on his side and proclaimed that is a “great day.”99 With the skyrocketing 
number of the death toll in the post-bomb Japan, Truman’s popularity rate skyrocketed 
at home. The United States dealt with “a beast” and entered the newest of its 
eras.100The president declared a two-day national holiday. The V-J America was 
peaceful, prosperous, and powerful. Two months after V-J Day, Fortune magazine 
wrote about the day of the Japanese surrender: “It marked not only the war’s end but 
the beginning of the greatest peacetime industrial boom in the world’s history.”101 
Hundreds of thousands of GI veterans headed toward college degrees and 
thousands more set up businesses of their own, purchased homes, and started families. 
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The nation’s economy prospered on unprecedented scale; middle class had expanded 
and unemployment lowered. For many, the “American Dream” seemed to become a 
reality. A young mother in St. Louis exclaimed, “Oh, things are going along just 
wonderfully. Harry has a grand job, there is the new baby.” Then in a moment, she 
would frown, “Do you think it’s really all going to last?”102 The moment of victory seemed 
to easily turn into the moment of fears and anxieties in the early postwar America.  
While the advent and usage of the atomic bombs evidenced how human beings 
could perish in a matter of seconds, it also profoundly “revolutionized American life” at 
home.103 On the next day after the first atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima, the New York 
Herald Tribune states, “…one senses the foundations of one’s own universe trembling.” 
Many ordinary Americans perceived the news in a rather pessimistic tone. The 
Reverend John Hayne Holmes of the Community Church of New York City sadly 
observed, “It seemed to grow cold as though I have been transported to the waste 
spaces of the moon… For I knew that the final crisis in human history had come. What 
that atomic bomb had done to Japan, it could do to us.”104 
The American people did not dare to earnestly accept the reality of peace and 
prosperity as something enduring. The fact of the atomic bomb hung over all the victory 
celebrations “like some eerie haze from another world.”105 Would peace and prosperity 
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be just a “prelude” to another war and depression?106 Historian William Graebner coined 
the term “culture of peace” for the second half of the 1940s because of its private, 
familial and idealistic trends. But the peace seemed to be for many Americans only a 
symbolic dimension of the deteriorating relations and growing conflicts between the two 
wartime allies—the United States and the Soviet Union, which ultimately led to the 
almost half-century long dispute. At this point, the period was the crucial precursor to 
political, social and cultural trends that “came to fruition (bitter or sweet) in the 1950s 
and the 1960s.”107 
Most Americans in the early years after World War II were hopeful about their 
future despite their fears and anxieties of possible depression or another war. Only few 
Americans anticipated the cold war … or thought that the “burden of free-world 
leadership would become permanent.”108 These views were reflected in the major 
political thoughts on America’s future as a rising world power. Liberal-leftists (or 
sometimes called progressives) as strong supporters of the United Nations, stood on a 
positive line by speculating that the “people’s peace” would end colonialism and 
promote social revolutions. Conservatives (or isolationists) held less optimistic views by 
showing little interest (and faith) in the role and power of the UN. For the American 
                                                           
106 Ibid. 
107 William Graebner, The Age of Doubt: American Thought and Culture in the 1940s, (Boston: Twayne 
Publishers, 1990), x. 
108The Gallup Poll conducted on March 16, 1945 reveals that while 38% said that the U.S. “will find itself 
in another war within the next 25 years” while 45% responded “No,” which indicated the mixed public 
opinion about the peace outlook right after WWII. The Gallup Poll, 493. William L. O’Neill, American High: 
The Years of Confidence, 1945-1960. (New York, The Free Press), 6. 
 47 
people, however, peace, not war, was their hope, though the majority of them thought 
that Washington was treating its rival, the Soviet Union, “too soft[ly]”.109 
Although some influential figures such as George F. Kennan, who was a staunch 
advocate of professionalism in foreign policy, underestimated the role of public opinion 
because it bears “emotionalism” and “subjectivity,”110 it is no exaggeration that public 
opinion has tended to constrain to a certain extent American politicians’ choice of policy 
agendas, especially starting from the postwar years.111 In the early 1950s, the political 
scientist Gabriel Almond stated that the “public cannot make an effective foreign policy, 
it can only support one. People know about blast and fallout- not in their technical 
details, but enough to appreciate that general war would probably mean catastrophe for 
the United States in general, and for themselves in particular.”112 Years later the well-
known expert on public opinion, Ole Holsti, noted that the public (though often ill-
informed) is more likely to play more potent role during the post-Cold War era even 
though it is a “plausible hypothesis” rather than a “firmly established fact.”113 And what 
the diplomatic historian Melvin Small stated was a verdict of what the above two experts 
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had speculated. According to Small, “one cannot understand American diplomatic 
history without understanding the central role of public opinion.”114 
At the time of the nation’s anxiety, President Truman was tempted to reassure 
the American people of his decisiveness to be tough on his foreign policy. Thus his 
post-Hiroshima-Nagasaki impression consequently led to the increase rather than 
decrease on the Manhattan Project budget from the late 1945. Truman asked Congress 
in a few years to appropriate a billion dollar for nuclear-weapons production. As such, 
there was no immediate disarmament that would bring peace, but immense interest in 
making more bombs.  
The post-Hiroshima-Nagasaki reactions were still mixed, however. The American 
people viewed that the atomic weapons had brought to the nation a pride and power in 
leadership, and a prestige and superiority in the nation’s scientific and technological 
advancement. It was not “universal horror but unalloyed joy and relief for Americans and 
their allies.”115 Yet until America’s new postwar enemy, the Soviet Union, tested their 
first atomic bomb by the decade’s end, very few people would pause over the “larger 
meaning” and moral implications of such technological advancement for the postwar 
world peace and stability. Despite this, however, Americans in the late 1940s began to 
accept Truman’s assertion, with or without choice, that “there is no complete protection 
against an atomic air attack, but there is a great deal that can be done to reduce the 
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number of deaths and injuries that might result.”116 As historian Paul Boyer states, an 
“overwhelming approval of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings reflects that fact that 
Americans had already been conditioned to accept the terror bombing of cities as a 
legitimate military strategy.”117 
By the same token, the “spontaneous impulse” of most Americans to stand 
behind their government’s decision to use the atomic bomb was justified by many in 
Washington, though Truman’s Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson’s thoughts about the 
bombs had quite changed after the usage of the bombs. Stimson urged Truman to 
negotiate with Stalin because he believed that the bombs could not be used as “a direct 
lever to produce the change.” America’s further engagement in nuclear bombs, Stimson 
warned, would produce nothing but “suspiciousness” and “distrust” for the Soviet 
Union.118 
Truman’s Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace also cautioned in his 1946 
letter to the president that America’s continued production of atomic bombs “must make 
it look to the rest of the world as if we were only paying lip service to peace at 
conference table.” As the “strongest single nation,” Wallace hoped, the United States 
would have the “opportunity to lead the world to peace” if it pursued a more conciliatory 
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approach toward the Soviet Union.119 Stimson’s warning was ignored and Wallace was 
soon asked to resign. After he resigned from Truman’s cabinet in September 1946, 
Wallace became a prominent critic of “America’s ‘get tough’ posture toward the Soviet 
Union.” With similar frontier experience, Wallace believed, Americans and Russians 
could understand each other. He wrote that the “history of Siberia and its heroic 
population reminds one of the history of the Far West of the United States.”120 Thus, 
Wallace’s hope for constructive U.S.-Soviet relations was shattered, especially after the 
Marshall Plan. When the Soviets refused to receive American aid, Wallace stated that 
“‘warlords and moneychangers’ had perverted the plan’s good intentions and planned to 
use it to divide Europe.”121 
As chief decision-maker, Truman was willing to listen to hard-liners, including his 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who had no intention of diminishing the nation’s 
military strength and atomic supremacy. There were even stronger and more 
authoritative voices beyond Washington that influenced public opinion and therefore 
affirmed the president’s stance as well. Karl Compton, the influential physicist and the 
then President of MIT stated that the atomic bomb “strengthened the hands of those 
who sought peace and provided a face-saving argument for those who had hitherto 
advocated continued war.”122 But the most influential figure whose positions “perfectly fit 
Truman’s and Acheson’s view of Soviet issues” was George Frost Kennan, an 
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American diplomat residing in the Kremlin during the early postwar years.123 What 
Kennan observed and then suggested in U.S.- Soviet relations after WWII was power 
politics, which was precisely what Truman was envisioning in Washington. 
Kennan, Containment and Truman’s Foreign Policy Commitments 
Fluent in Russian and well-versed in foreign affairs, George F. Kennan, while in a 
diplomatic post in Moscow, witnessed the “political personality” of Soviet Russia and 
urged American strategists to embrace the concept of the “innate antagonism between 
capitalism and socialism,” which was deeply embedded in the foundations of the Soviet 
power. In the “long telegram” sent from Moscow in 1946, Kennan urged “every 
courageous and incisive measure to… improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and 
community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a 
thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués.” A year after his famous “long 
telegram,” Kennan, in his article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” published under the 
pseudonym Mr. X, prescribed that the U.S. pursue a policy of containment to deal with 
Soviet military power and its geopolitical intentions. So long Kennan’s containment 
policy was ideological, he emphasized that “informational activities are too important” to 
disseminate the “impression of a country.”124 Indeed, the architect of the containment 
policy was one of the supporters of American humanitarian aid to European and non-
communist countries and once praised that the Marshall Plan was “a great act of 
statesmanship.”125 
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Although Kennan’s containment policy was not the only template that framed 
political, economic, and cultural dimensions of America’s Cold War preparedness, it was 
a quite commanding and compelling strategy for cold war tacticians. In particular, major 
foreign policy actions taken in the early Cold War years were designed according to the 
containment orientation: the Truman Doctrine (1947) laid the foundation for America’s 
growing interest beyond Western Europe to hold the Soviet monolith; the Marshall Plan 
marked the first of the largest economic aids the U.S. offered; the creation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty (NATO) in early 1949 marked Washington’s serious commitment to anti-
communist, military foreign policy, and the National Security Council paper 68 (NSC-
68), which called for a tripling of American defense spending, was initialed by Truman in 
1950.126 
Along with such hard power undertakings, however, the merit of cultural and 
communication outreaches has always been considered by US analysts as a crucial 
dimension of the nation’s foreign relations. America’s first state-sponsored student 
exchange initiative, the Fulbright Program, was launched in 1946; Voice of America, a 
first overseas radio system opened during WWII, started to broadcast in Russian from 
1947; Truman’s Campaign of Truth was announced to demonstrate the “truth and 
freedom on our side” in 1950, and his administration established the Psychological 
Strategy Board in 1951. In most occasions, these actions were designed to inculcate a 
favorable image of the United States overseas. 
In the early postwar years, American policymakers believed that poverty and 
economic depression bred totalitarianism and disruption of free trade—a belief they long 
held. By early March 1947, the United States had laid out its first massive aid for 
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Greece and Turkey “to support the peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by 
armed minorities or by outside pressures.”127 Soon after Truman’s aid to the 
Mediterranean countries, dubbed as the Truman Doctrine, his Secretary of State 
George C. Marshall, proposed a similar program during his commencement speech at 
Harvard. Marshall stated that “our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, 
but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.” Marshall’s idea soon reached 
Congress, which approved over $13 billion dollars in economic assistance to be spent 
on war-torn Western Europe between 1948 and 1952.128 
Unlike the World War I allies who had tried to “punish” Germany with the 
harshest war reparations, the United States followed a different path after the end of 
WWII. The harsh treatment of Germany would make it “weak for a long time.” Thus, 
America’s benevolent position toward Germany might have been directed at building a 
prosperous, orderly Europe which required a “prosperous, orderly Germany at the 
center.”129 But it could also have had another impulse. The historian Stephen A. 
Ambrose noted that America pursued a “policy of magnanimity towards the losers” and 
to “teach the ways of democracy.”130 The American benevolence at the time not only 
assisted the war-devastated Europe, but it also attracted the sentimentality of world 
leaders. Ho Chi Minh “hailed the Americans as the true friends of the oppressed of the 
earth.” So did de Gaulle, Churchill and even Stalin. In a desperate, devastated war-torn 
                                                           
127 Andrew J. Dunar, America in the Fifties, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006),17. 
128 Although the Marshall Plan was designed to help European economic recovery, as the majority in the 
Congress defended and argued, it would also help to “unify Western Europe, contain communism and 
pave the way to a multilateral system on which American prosperity depended.” Michael J. Hogan, The 
Marshall Plan: America, Britain and Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 190.  
129LaFeber, The American Age, 440-45 
130Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley. Editors, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy 
Since 1938, (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 50. 
 54 
world, no one but the United States was almost universally regarded, and even 
welcomed, as the “champion of justice, freedom, and democracy.” America never 
enjoyed such high prestige before or since.131 
 Yet, as the historian Jonathan Bell argues, the rationale behind the Marshall Plan 
was more than economic and/or humanitarian; it had racial and ideological elements. In 
his testimony before the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, George Marshall 
explicitly stressed “western civilization” as something America needed to preserve. 
Without American help, Marshall claimed, there was no escape for Europe “from 
economic distress so intense, social discontent so violent, political confusion so spread, 
and hopes of the future so shattered that the historic base of western civilization… will 
take on a new form in the image of the tyranny that we fought to destroy in Nazi 
Germany.”132 
President Truman expressed much the same thought in his earlier statement. 
“We cannot sit idly by and seen totalitarianism spread to the whole of Europe. We must 
meet the challenge if civilization is to survive. We represent the moral God-fearing 
peoples of the world. We must save the world from Atheism and totalitarianism. Only 
our strength will save the world,” Truman noted.133 These were the politically sensitive 
messages that Truman and Marshall revealed at a historically vulnerable time for 
wartime allies and that hinted the alienation of the Soviet Union, both geographically 
and culturally, from the unified European continent. Indeed, the foundation of such a 
chilling atmosphere in U.S.-Soviet relations was already created during Bretton Woods 
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conference days. Disappointed with the U.S. defining the postwar economic structure 
based on its dollar standards, the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov stated that, if the 
Bretton Woods system prevailed, American commerce and culture would dominate in 
Europe. “Was this what we fought for when we battled the fascist invaders?” Molotov 
asked.134 Both Truman and Marshall’s unprecedented international commitments, 
though conducive to American economic and political interests, “hardened the division 
of Europe” and provoked the Soviet ambition for world power, which already started 
sprouting before the war’s end.135The American wartime ally now abandoned its 
previous stance.  
The Soviet Union left the battlefield with immense losses, but arose from it with 
enormous military experiences, as its Red Army was the determining factor in the 
victory of the Allied forces. Despite the devastating human losses and destruction of the 
entire infrastructural system that almost brought the Eurasian empire to its knees, the 
Kremlin leaders did not want to yield to American power and eminence. Nor did they 
wish to abandon their strong belief in communist ideology that they would continue to 
fight for until it eventually eroded from within. Campaigning for a postwar world regime 
guided by the principles of communism, rather than acknowledging dependency on 
western influences, was the determined policy choice that would serve Soviet interests 
for the second half of the twentieth century. It would be hard to imagine that a country 
such as the postwar Soviet Union with its battle-tested military might and activist foreign 
policies equipped with aggressive totalitarian ideologies would simply shy away from its 
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desire for world domination.136 Indeed, the soul of polarizing interests behind the 
imminent conflict between the wartime allies was already lingering in the immediate 
postwar years.  
 American economic assistance was offered to the Soviet Union at a sorely 
needed time, but Stalin did not accept it.137 Indeed, according to historian Arnold Offner, 
neither Truman nor Marshall nor the State Department including Kennan wanted the 
USSR included in the Marshall Plan. Such exclusion, as historian Michael Hogan 
stated, was not only “containment but also the strategy of economic integration that 
militated against the Soviet involvement in the European Reparation Program.”138 Both 
Stalin and Molotov did not doubt that it would happen.139 Historians provide multi-
dimensional interpretations regarding the Soviet denunciation of America’s aid, yet the 
political implications behind the Marshall Plan perhaps embodied Truman’s hope (and 
Stalin’s fear for that matter) to “whet the appetites of the satellites for the capitalist 
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system.”140 Furious with the U.S. policies, which, according to some scholars, “were 
designed to undermine” Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, the Kremlin swiftly moved 
toward different economic arrangements with the countries in the region, which later 
became known as the Molotov Plan. The historian George Herring notes that the United 
States “did not rely exclusively on economic assistance to contain communism in 
Western Europe.” But despite their successes in helping European recovery, the early 
postwar American economic initiatives were dramatic enough to provoke the 
hypersensitive Soviet leaders to distance themselves from the West. Thus, the evolving 
rhetoric of the divided world (and hence East-West division) manifested in George 
Kennan’s “Long Telegram” (1946) and Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech at 
Fulton, Missouri (1946) became a reality culminating in the so-called Cold War. 
The question of who was responsible for the Cold War has been one of the most 
controversial issues for historical analysis.141Three major schools of thought have 
prevailed in the Cold War scholarship thus far: traditionalism, revisionism, and post-
revisionism. Traditional (orthodox) historians argue that it was caused by the Soviet 
Union under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, and its expansionist policy throughout 
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Eastern Europe and beyond. Growing domestic anti-communist sentiments triggered by 
Senator Joseph McCarthy and the intense actions by the House Un-American Affairs 
Committee (HUAC)—all perhaps created a fertile soil for scholars to sharpen their 
words for the common problem the nation faced in the early postwar period. George F. 
Kennan, Herbert Feis and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. are among those historians who 
viewed the Soviet Union as the embryo with which East-West rivalry had sprouted and 
matured for half a century.  
Inspired by Marxist-Leninist philosophy, Kennan argued, the Soviet Union was 
founded on the “innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism.” The 
“secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness, and the 
basic unfriendliness of purpose,” all were the main features of its foreign policy. As long 
as these characteristics would remain in the Kremlin’s policy, there would be no sign for 
changes whatsoever. So “Americans should not be misled by tactical maneuvers”--
which can come in possible disguised gestures.142 
As Feis stated in 1970, it was the “mistrust and hostility of western capitalism,” 
which deeply lingered in the Soviet consciousness for many years, that “sundered the 
bonds formed during the war.”143 In his earlier account of Soviet-American 
relations/tensions from1942 through the first UN meeting at Dumbarton Oaks, Feis also 
viewed that it was the Soviet Union under Stalin which was trying to extend their 
boundaries and their control from their neighboring states and extend their revolutionary 
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effort throughout the world.144Thus, the orthodox scholars tended to blame Stalin’s 
Russia for triggering the Cold War, and regarded the United States as a late-comer to 
the scene. In general, these scholars “echoed the U.S. government’s mindset, reflecting 
the Cold War consensus that bound American society during this time.”145 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, revisionists proposed counterarguments by 
viewing the U.S. as the responsible side for the origin of the Cold War. The revisionists’ 
goal was to prove their (anti)thesis from an economic perspective. Major contributors of 
this school of thought are William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, Gar Alperovitz, 
Lloyd Gardner, Walter LaFeber, and Thomas Paterson. In his book, The Tragedy of 
American Diplomacy (1959), Williams stated that at the end of WWII “most American 
leaders were strongly inclined to deal with the problems of the world by relying on the 
traditional approach” of internationalism and collective security, “organized and led by 
the U.S. in opposition to the Soviet Union.”146 These policies were assured by President 
Truman and other statesmen who continued to see the world in terms of “open-door 
expansion”—a policy which offered Russian leaders “no real choice on the key issues of 
economic aid and military security.”147 Thus the postwar U.S. leaders exerted their 
“open door policy” on the Soviet Union in the expectation that Soviets would confront 
American hostility unless “they do not accept American proposals,” a political dilemma 
which “crystallized the cold war.”148 A decade after his original interpretation of the roots 
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of the Cold War, Williams provided an in-depth analysis of Russian-American relations 
from the 1917 October Revolution through 1947, by focusing on the “frontier-
expansionist thesis.” This expansionist thesis envisioned American relations with the 
rest of the world in terms of a continuing need to expand in order to maintain prosperity, 
democracy, and domestic well-being.149 In addition, the escalating war in Vietnam, the 
domestic public opposition to it, civil rights movements, and the revival of racial and 
ethnic consciousness all completely changed the domestic political environment and 
challenged whether the “assumption that the U.S. system was morally superior” and its 
foreign policy was “inherently benign.”150 
Like Williams, Gabriel and Joyce Kolko argued that only the U.S. emerged from 
the war with “strength and confidence of its ability to direct the world reconstruction,” but 
with a “comprehensive and remarkably precise vision of an ideal economic order” in the 
belief that “world capitalism become a unified [and ideal] system.”151 The Cold War, 
according to the Kolkos, therefore “was far less the confrontation of the United states 
with Russia than America’s expansion into the entire world—a world the Soviet Union 
neither controlled nor created.”152 
 Paterson’s study on the origin of the Cold War was based on both economic and 
political motives. The U.S. policy was “haughty, expansionist, and uncompromising” 
while the Soviet foreign policy was “flexible in the immediate postwar years.”153Thus 
there were not only economic motives but also diplomatic and policy ingredients that 
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triggered the origin of the Cold War. Paterson presented several factors including 
“peace and prosperity ideology,” “presence and awareness of power,” “get-tough 
leaders,” a “particular reading of history,” and the “notion of American superiority,” all of 
which led the American leaders to the “unilateral application of the power they knew 
they possessed.”154 In this way, revisionists basically agreed that it was not the Soviet 
Union at whom the Americans point for the presence of the Cold War, but that it was the 
United States and “its greed for overseas markets” (and combined with its nuclear 
power, according to some) which constrained the former to “communize Eastern 
Europe.”155 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, post-revisionist historians tended to provide a 
balanced interpretive framework for the Cold War historians. Major post-revisionist 
scholars include John Lewis Gaddis, Melvyn P. Leffler, Robert James Maddox, and 
Fraser Harbutt, although their interpretations of the origin of the Cold War, to some 
extent, differed in their works. But post-revisionism, be it an independent school of 
thought or just a rebuttal of revisionism, or a “new consensus” or “synthesis” which 
“draws from both traditional and revisionist interpretations,”156 was a “much vaguer 
school of interpretation than the other two representing the middle ground between 
traditionalism and revisionism.”157 The end of the Cold War actually was not, of course, 
the end of the debate on its origins. It was actually the beginning of more sophisticated, 
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balanced, interdisciplinary, and multi-archival research at its root and all other 
dimensions.158 
By the dawn of 1950, America’s Cold War ideological offensive strategies had 
been quite well framed. America’s comprehensive preparation for imminent international 
tensions in the late 1940s seemed not an empty cold war obsession at a time. It was 
prompted by a chain of events that could have potentially threatened America’s security 
and shaken its vision and ambition to fill the postwar power vacuum. In 1948, the 
Soviets orchestrated a coup d’état in Czechoslovakia to oust anti-communist rulers. 
Three months later the Soviet occupation forces in eastern Germany began a blockade 
of all contacts between Berlin and the west. Yet the most shocking and unforeseen 
event was the Soviet Union’s detonation of its first atomic bomb in late August of 1949, 
which not only brought America’s atomic supremacy under threat, but it also forecast a 
potential communist influence beyond its border. It was shocking, indeed, because 
American scientists [and CIA] predicted that “Russia would not perfect atomic weapon 
until 1952 and even some had not expected Soviets to succeed before 1955.”159 
Making the situation even worse, the Soviet Union’s potential ally, China, 
became a “red-state” within a month after the former’s possession of atomic weapons. 
Territorial skirmishes between the two Koreas had escalated to the level of open 
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warfare by mid-1950, and consequently, communist North Korea invaded South Korea 
in June, 1950. UN/US troops under the supervision of General Douglas MacArthur 
entered the war on the South’s behalf and soon after both the Soviet Union and China, 
directly or indirectly, supposedly committed to the north. With the Korean War, the first 
of several proxy wars in the cold war began.  
By the time Truman passed down the presidential power to his successor, the 
United States was well prepared, both militarily and psychologically, to wage (and 
presumably to win) the Cold War, at all costs. At this point, the diplomatic historian 
Michael J. Hogan candidly remarked that the economic burdens on defense 
commitments “put serious limits on domestic social welfare programs,” and the 
“outcome would be an American national security state that was shaped as much by the 
country’s democratic political culture as it was by the perceived military imperatives of 
the Cold War.”160 It raised new concerns about a “garrison state that could undermine 
American democracy.”161 Even Time magazine’s choice for “Man of the Year” was the 
“U.S. Fighting Man,” the first time the magazine has chosen a “symbol” instead of an 
individual. In such a climate, both nationwide mobilization and militarization of American 
society affected the cold war mentality at large and helped to shape the postwar years. 
How did all of these realities and imaginations in an international conflict impinge upon 
American foreign and domestic policies in the next two decades or so? 
As history witnessed, the Cold War was the fierce rivalry between the two 
nations--the United States and the Soviet Union--contending for full spectrum 
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domination of their diametrically opposed political, economic, and cultural ideals and 
ideologies. The power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, by and 
large, occurred in the so-called “free world” in the hope that one could expand its sphere 
of influence, if it would invest more sources and effort to those who were not yet aligned 
with either Moscow or Washington. Postwar American presidents and their key foreign 
policy advisors were challenged and constrained, but in general, they fully, if not overly, 
committed with all possible politico-economic and socio-cultural resources to curbing 
the Soviet sphere of influence to secure freedom, peace, and democracy at home and 
abroad. Yet the containment policy was not a single framework for his foreign policy. As 
a battle-hardened war hero, Eisenhower relied on “massive retaliation,” the mighty force 
that he hoped would prevent the Soviet Union from extending its expansionist policies, 
while believing in the powerful role that ‘massive mobilization’ of ordinary people could 
play, not only in shoring up the contagious spread of communist ideologies but also in 
creating cooperative international community, and ultimately in preserving a “true and 
lasting peace.”162 
 
 
McCarthyism and the Anti-Communist Crusade at Home  
 
So long as the cold war was cumulatively defined as the conflict between 
capitalism and communism, the most dramatic action of it was a ruthless justification of 
one’s ideologies over the other that gradually led to the intensification of the Cold War. 
One of the earlier ideological fanaticisms that played out so powerfully in American 
society was a “frenzied search” for communists by Joseph McCarthy, the Republican 
Senator from Wisconsin. Such hysteria of anti-communism had already established its 
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firm ground by the dawn of the 1950s, as a “permanent feature” in American social and 
political life.163 The greatest fear of communism that haunted the country came to be 
known as McCarthyism, which lingered in the American society well beyond its initial 
period of turmoil. From 1950 to 1954, McCarthy “played upon cold war emotions,” the 
historian John Diggins noted, and “made charges so fantastic that frightened people 
believed the worst…” He was not just a “consummate demagogue… but also a master 
of the pseudo-event.” To some scholars, McCarthyism was a “calculated movement” for 
the sake of big business groups “to turn back the whole welfare state by likening 
liberalism to communism.” To others, McCarthy’s “vulgar anticommunism was 
opportunistic and aimed not at uncovering spies but simply winning publicity and 
harassing dissenters who spoke out against cold war orthodoxies.”164 
Despite this frenzied “witch-hunting”, McCarthyism, as a byproduct of the Cold 
War, could not completely overcome the immunity of the American core public that 
viewed the ideological confrontations between the U.S. and the USSR as a “continuity 
of war against fascism, of democracy against totalitarianism.”165 But McCarthy’s anti-
communist campaign brought a “hysterical pandemic” to the entire American society. 
Whether or not McCarthyism was born out of political imperatives of the 1950s, “most 
Americans accepted its effects quite willingly, believing their nation to be locked in a 
death struggle with evil communists…”166 
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In the late 1960s, the historian Ellen Schrecker contended that the academia’s 
responses to McCarthyism were institutional rather than individual (although it was) and 
these were responses to the “political pressures of the period.” Many scholars, however, 
tend to agree that McCarthyism did not start with McCarthy. President Truman’s 1947 
Executive Order #9835 which established a new loyalty- security program for federal 
employees and succeeded in “establishing anti-communism as the nation’s official 
ideology” laid the foundations for it.167 So was the creation of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) in 1947 to which Truman gave the authority to conduct covert political 
operations, or what Dean Rusk would later call it the “back alley war” against 
communism.168 Such institutionalization of intelligence not only increased the power and 
prerogatives of a national security bureaucracy, but it also affected American political 
culture in the years to come. In short, as the historian Jonathan Bell states, “the 
foundations of Cold War liberalism were completed with the establishment of the 
Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security apparatus to use American state 
power to combat the geopolitical expansion of unfriendly states overseas.”169 
Backed by Truman’s executive order, the Congress’s House Un-American 
Activities Committee (HUAC) soon stepped up its investigation of communist infiltration 
into government, industries, organized labor, and the universities. Many innocent, 
ordinary Americans, including intellectuals, politicians, and actors were blacklisted and 
victimized as “communist spies” by the HUAC in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
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Indeed, “no other event, no political or congressional hearing, was to shape the internal 
Cold War as decisively as the Truman administration’s loyalty-security program.”170 
Along with political repressions and intellectual humiliation, McCarthyism (as well as the 
government’s loyalty program) also “destroyed the left” and affiliated unions from the 
scene, silenced feminism, black equality, cultural diversity and aborted all progressive 
and positive movements and initiatives; door closed in the cultural arena as well—
teachers, artists, writers, movie directors “modulated their voice.”171 
 
Conformism, Corporatism, Consumerism in the 1950s America 
McCarthyism’s repercussions were far and wide reaching to all sectors of society 
and yoked free thoughts and academic innovations at educational institutions. Such a 
nationwide panic promoted a culture of consensus and conformity, which characterized 
a collective national mind in the 1950s. The conformist tendencies were deeply 
embedded in all media outlet products and popular cultural practices. 
 The burgeoning corporate culture was particularly fed by conformity creating the 
“other-directed” personality, as the social analyst David Riesman illuminated in his book, 
The Lonely Crowd (1950). Riesman’s analysis argued that individuals became 
dependent on the “other fellow’s preference” and therefore were molded and modeled 
by institutional bureaucracy, which is a sign of centralized, collectivistic society. Such 
individual’s loss of self-reliance was incongruous with the notion of individualism 
America has cherished for a long time. In such circumstances, “other-directed” ideal 
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society is the corporation, which is forceful enough to dictate the values and beliefs of 
citizens, and powerful enough to alienate them from their community and family. 
Followed by Riesman’s criticism of an organized society, the social critic William 
Whyte also addressed the conformist, corporate culture in his book, The Organization 
Man (1956), by arguing that “belongingness” as group identity and group solidarity 
naturally guides human beings, which is dangerous for the pure Protestant ethic—or 
“social ethic.” Focusing on the notion of “the age conformity,” Whyte was concerned 
about the degrading nature of an individualistic society. What he suggested was to “fight 
the organization.”172 Whyte’s book referred to the emerging social trend of the fifties, 
which was characterized by the bureaucratic corporate culture. Sloan Wilson’s Man in 
the Gray Flannel Suit (1955) criticizes the pointless nature of a conspicuously 
materialistic society to which Americans were pressured to conform. A corporate and 
consumerist culture prospered at the expense of public goods such as education, 
healthcare, law enforcement and environment, and therefore it failed to bring real social 
progress. The economist John Kenneth Galbraith’s groundbreaking analysis of this 
painful true scenario of the “affluent society” uncovered the “social imbalance” 
characterized by overproduction of private goods and underproduction of public 
goods.173 
The sociologist C. Wright Mills is also one of the social critics who addressed the 
bureaucratic power in a mass, industrialized society. Mills more explicitly defined the 
corporate society in his book, The White Collar: the American Middle Class, published 
in 1956. According to Mills, “the decline of the free entrepreneur and the rise of the 
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dependent employee on the American scene have paralleled the decline of the 
independent individual and the rise of the little man in the American mind.” This “small 
creature” pushed by “big ugly forces… never talks loud, never talks back and never 
takes a stand.” These “little people” therefore are “estranged from community and 
society in a context of distrust and manipulation; alienated from work and, on the 
personality market, from self; expropriated of individual rationality, and politically 
apathetic.”174 Mills’ The Power Elite (1957) rightly identifies centralized power within 
American society. Governments, armies, and corporations shape modern life, Mills 
argued, and families, churches and schools “adapt” to them. These three major national 
powers “turn lesser institutions into means for their ends.”175 Under such circumstances, 
the “higher immorality is institutionalized” and “money is the one unambiguous criterion 
of success, and such success is still the sovereign American value” in the corporate 
era.176 
Such a rapidly growing consumerist populace, which fell into a never-ending swirl 
of spending and embraced the advertising promoted by the booming television industry, 
was a defining character of American culture in the 1950s. The historian David M. 
Potter’s well-known 1954 study, People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the 
American Character, argued that “social mutation had become both rapid and violent, 
and values were increasingly relative rather than absolute.”177 America’s influence was 
not “ideological but material… and it was not our ideal of democracy but our export of 
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goods.” The United States, according to Potter, “has certainly played a far greater part 
than any other country in displaying to the world the variety and magic of the new 
abundance… and disseminates the belief that this abundance may actually be placed 
within the grasp of ordinary men and women.” Popular cultures such as the Hollywood 
films presented “conspicuous consumption not as a mere practice but … as a system 
and an act of faith.”178 Dissemination of democracy and abundance is destined to go 
hand-in-hand, Potter asserted, if the United States wanted to assume world leadership. 
For a country destined, as ours has been, to play such a role it was a 
tragic fallacy that we conceived of democracy as an absolute value, largely 
ideological in content and equally valid in any environment, instead of 
recognizing that our own democratic system is one of the major by-products 
of our abundance, workable primarily because of the measure of our 
abundance… In our own country the promise of equality meant the right to 
advance, without discrimination, to easily attainable ends. Hence the 
principle of equality could be upheld with genuine sincerity… But in countries 
where even decency, much less comfort, lay beyond the point of attainability 
for most people—where the number of advantageous positions was 
negligible—it seemed a kind of deception to offer to individual as good a 
chance as anyone to compete for non-existent prizes or to assure him of his 
freedom to go where he wished.179 
 
When Eisenhower remarked in 1956 that Americans need to “show other 
peoples how they work, what they earn and how they achieve their pay and the real 
take-home pay they get,” he referred to the material comfort of the American people, 
which could also be attainable for people from other countries.180The Eisenhower 
administration’s demonstrations of American consumerism and abundance through 
various presentations and exhibitions such as People’s Capitalism, which was held in 
Moscow in 1959, did not just symbolize the presumably successful American 
democratic system and its convenient lifestyle; it also served as a compelling tool to 
justify the nation’s foreign policy.     
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Providing a solution for “the problems of the youth” in a bureaucratically 
organized society, Paul Goodman in his landmark book Growing Up Absurd, which was 
published in 1960 after being rejected by dozen publishing companies, argued that 
Americans live increasingly in a society in which “little direct attention is paid to the 
object, the function, the program, the task, the need; but immense attention to the role, 
procedure, prestige and profit.” He believed that if this “inefficient” system would 
radically change and Americans could recover from their “mesmerized condition,” then 
America would see a “fairly general prosperity.” So what’s worth doing? Goodman 
suggested that Americans could think of “necessary community enterprises” into which 
they throw themselves “enthusiastically and spontaneously” and be “proud of the 
results.”181It was true that most Americans were engaged in a corporate-driven lifestyle 
in the 1950s. But it was equally true that many Americans, by their personal spirit and 
choice, tended to get involved in social activities by participating in a “common life.” The 
human personality could be constituted, maintained, and nourished through interaction 
with and involvement in civic life.182 
The major premises illustrated by these social critics such as David Riesman, C. 
Wright Mills, David Potter, John Galbraith, Paul Goodman and other writers from the 
1950s were American fears and anxieties about the characteristics of a collectivistic 
society, an antidote to American democracy and free market system. Most importantly, 
however, these intellectuals sought to uncover the meaning of life and the national 
identity in a conformist society, which favored pressured commonalities rather than 
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rationalized conflicts. These analyses of social trends jointly and cumulatively portrayed 
a ‘lost society’ that the “consensus school” of historians of the decade was reluctant to 
acknowledge. 183 
 
Anxiety Healing, Identity Searching, Social Connections…  
In such a climate, the social critics in the 1950s urged Americans to seek active, 
meaningful community affiliations, as Paul Goodman suggested, through which one 
would attain challenging experiences and real sources of individual identity. Religious 
affiliation served one example. In the 1950s, the church membership and proportion of 
Americans who claimed religious affiliations reached the highest levels the twentieth 
century has ever seen. Some scholars claim that the Cold War and the nuclear threat 
pushed Americans to seek comfort and relief. Others argued that the “depersonalizing” 
nature of a mass society made people look for social connections with other fellow 
citizens. Still others stated that the American people went to churches in search of their 
ethnic identity and belonging.184 The popularity of religion was not only increased by its 
membership but also by various practices of popular culture. Novels and non-fictions 
with religious themes inspired people, as did Hollywood movies. 
 Norman Vincent Peale’s The Power of Positive Thinking and Paul Tillich’s The 
Courage to Be both of which were published in 1952, offered the American people a 
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positive outlook on life and inspired them to build confidence and optimism in the most 
anxious time of the nation’s history. They also implied that “positive thinking” could be 
America’s moral contribution to the chaotic world. Having urged the American people to 
“go to church,” Peale’s “self-improvement manual” offered hands-on techniques that 
people could utilize to live a “happy, satisfying life.” According to Peale, “positive 
thoughts create…an atmosphere propitious to the development of positive 
outcomes.”185 The existentialist philosopher Paul Tillich investigated the problems of 
human existence and the meaning of life from a religious perspective. By emphasizing 
individualism over collectivism, Tillich argued that “conformism might approximate 
collectivism… very much in the pattern of daily life and thought. But whether this will 
happen or not is partly dependent on the power of resistance….”186 
Despite his late religious affiliation, Eisenhower as president wanted to show the 
American people moral and religious leadership. Envisaging the role of diverse religious 
cultures in American life, Eisenhower once stated that “our government makes no sense 
unless it is founded on a deeply felt religious faith—and I do not care what it is.”187 
According to the historian William Inboden, “religious faith helped define for Eisenhower 
– as it did for Truman—the line of division between the free world and the communist 
world” and “it appealed as a powerful device to bolster domestic support for 
anticommunism while also undermining communist regimes abroad.”188 Eisenhower 
wrote about his religious conviction to his close friend Swede Hazlett: “I believe 
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fanatically in American democracy, a system… that ascribes to the individual a dignity 
accruing to him because of his creation in the image of a supreme being.”189 
In particular, Eisenhower believed that people’s faith and belief had to a play a 
crucial role to uplift the national spirit and to strengthen anti-communist consensus at 
home. In his September 1954 statement, which was widely disseminated behind the 
iron curtain, Eisenhower even invited the “whole world” to join Americans in prayer for 
peace:190 
May the many millions of people shut away from contact and communion 
with peoples of the free world join their prayers with ours. May the world 
be ringed with an act of faith so strong as to annihilate the cruel, artificial 
barriers erected by little men between peoples who seek peace on earth 
through Almighty God.191 
 
Encouraging people’s religious practices and values, the United States kept alive 
the freedom of worship—a basic human right that America’s cold war rival could not 
grant for their people. At this point, America’s adherence to religious values created a 
positive image for the rest of the world where many countries were startled over Soviet 
atheism and its enmity to religion. Eisenhower’s promotion of social connections, 
however, was not limited to people’s religious affiliation. He encouraged the American 
people to forge personal contacts beyond their churches and cultures to create not just 
a better society at home but also to establish a better understanding between peoples 
the world over through social bonding. The changing nature of political and social 
environment that characterized the mid-to-late 1950s created a fertile soil for such an 
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internationalist idea, which Eisenhower emphasized throughout the second term of his 
presidency. 
 
Shifts in Socio-Political Life in the mid-1950s America 
Although the 1950s tended to be depicted, by and large, as the age of 
McCarthyism, conformism, corporatism and consumerism, which fed fear, silence and 
mindless affluence, the second half of the decade was also the crucial time during 
which the seeds of political activism, racial and ethnic consciousness, and moral 
idealism of American citizens were planted.192The decolonization movement, which was 
taking place in colonized continents, strongly resonated with, and brought international 
dimensions to, the civil consciousness of black Americans whose history was shaped by 
an ongoing fight their basic human rights and to define their social, cultural and political 
identities in American society. Nourished by the Third World decolonization, black 
Americans sought to gain their freedom and equality in social services, including 
education. A series of events such as President Truman’s 1948 executive order for the 
desegregation of armed forces and the Supreme Court’s declaration of outlawing de-
jure school segregation in 1954 after the Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka, 
Kansas, which sorely tested the conflicting views of segregationists and integrationists 
during the Little Rock Crisis of 1956, were pivotal events in the period that preceded the 
civil rights movement that flared in the 1960s.   
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The widespread interest and involvement in religious practices in American 
society brought charismatic figures such as Martin Luther King, Jr. to the public realm 
as well. Backed by the black community of Montgomery, Minister King successfully 
organized a bus boycott in Alabama from 1955-1956, which signaled the quest for 
ending the century-long struggle for constitutional rights and human decency for black 
Americans. Dr. King’s leadership in civil rights movement inspired and influenced young 
generation to develop the social consciousness of American life in subsequent decades. 
It was both the “opportunity and the misfortune” of Eisenhower to be a president 
during the years when African Americans moved to gain their rights.193 Some sources 
suggest that Eisenhower’s lukewarm position towards civil rights can be explained in 
part by his record on racial issues. Born and raised in all-white South and Midwest small 
towns and educated at all-white U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Eisenhower’s 
“experience of people of color was in the role of servants.” But he never was “an explicit 
bigot” and “occasionally showed a dislike of raw prejudice.”194 And none of 
Eisenhower’s closest advisors, including his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who 
was “very very white in his politics as well as his skin tone,” encouraged him to change 
the existing racial status quo.195 Such personal beliefs and attitude toward racial issues 
were not uncommon among American leaders of the Eisenhower generation. The 
historian William L. O’Neill connected Eisenhower’s handling of civil rights revolution 
with generational symptoms. As a “child of [the] nineteenth century,” O’Neill reasoned, 
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“[Eisenhower] did not believe that segregation could, or should, be brought by 
coercion.”196 
President Truman, the historian Thomas Borstelmann argues, was a “racist” by 
birth and upbringing, but he “chose to move away from the explicit racism of his 
childhood as his political career developed and his contacts in the world widened.” The 
Cold War strategist, George F. Kennan also showed racist attitudes when he pointed 
out the “suspiciousness and inscrutability of Soviet diplomats” as the “results of century-
long contact with Asiatic hordes.” Therefore, Borstelmann concludes, Kennan’s 
“perspective on race is not its singularity but its commonness within American 
policymaking circles.”197At this point, Eisenhower’s attitude toward racial issues was 
more conventional than exceptional by the standards of the given time period.  
While critics scathingly condemn the Eisenhower administration’s slowness to 
deal with racial issues, others refer to political and social factors of the decade, which 
constrained Washington planners. As an elected president, Eisenhower did not ignore 
the fact that not all white voters in the South were anti-segregationists at the time. By 
the same token, being a commander in chief made him extremely vulnerable to disturb 
the spirit of national unity and solidarity during a tumultuous period of America’s struggle 
during the Cold War. In all, Eisenhower did not directly display his political (and 
personal) preference regarding a century-long unsettled issue of racial tensions in the 
United States. By the same token, Eisenhower believed that he was the “right man to 
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lead all Americans responsibly along the ‘center line,’ including all black Americans.”198 
But it is crucial to note here that the Eisenhower administration made some progress in 
civil rights: Eisenhower believed in the Fifteenth Amendment and supported voting 
rights for African Americans; he did eliminate racial barriers in public spaces and 
schools, and by 1955 the United States Army, Air Force, and Navy had become 
integrated institutions.199 
The journalist Merlo Pusey stated that Eisenhower critics ignored what the 
president has done to eliminate the racial segregation because Eisenhower did not want 
to “beat the drums” to popularize his works. Because he knew that “shouting from the 
housetops about such achievements undercuts their value.” Nor did he want to filibuster 
this vulnerable issue in the Senate. Eisenhower for the first time appointed an African-
American secretary in the White House. He filled several dozen important posts with 
African-Americans, half of which had never been taken by people of this race. These 
actions had been taken long before the Brown vs. Board of Education case.200At this 
point, one could draw the conclusion that although racism, which had long been a 
“scandalous betrayal of America’s democratic principles,” was not perfected in the 
1950s, the “significant progress,” was made during the Eisenhower administration.201 
Domestic conundrums such as racial relations and its international implications, 
however, could perhaps derail the American pursuit of world influence, especially at the 
crucial time of decolonization movements in non-white continents. Most importantly, 
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such a prolonged delay in settling equal rights issues among its citizens at home was 
incongruent to American democratic creeds. As the Swedish social scientist Gunnar 
Myrdal in his book, An American Dilemma (1944) once stated, “The negro problem” was 
not just “America’s greatest failure” but also its “great opportunity for the future.” Thus, if 
the racial justice is ensured at home, Myrdal hoped, America would gain a “spiritual 
power many times stronger than all her military and financial resource—the power of the 
trust and support of all good people on earth.”202The Swedish scholar’s prophecy 
seemed to be not a plain hope as the United States saw a sweeping progress in its 
domestic racial relations in the following decade, which led to unprecedented civil rights 
legislations in the nation’s history.    
Of all Eisenhower’s convictions, cautions, and calculations it is reasonable to 
assume that he was not “blind” to the urgent national objective. Rather Eisenhower well 
understood that the deep-seated issues such as racial prejudice do not change 
overnight, not even in a generation. To rush at the wrong time would invite larger 
challenges in the future. At this point, the diplomatic historian H.W. Brands states that 
“repeatedly during his presidency, Eisenhower resisted calls to do something dramatic 
in response to fast-breaking developments.” Referring to Eisenhower’s some noticeable 
international achievements, Brands claims that his handling of Dien Bieu Phu in 1954 
and the Hungarian crisis of 1956 both served as good instances of his successful crisis 
management skills. He understood the risks of “erring on the side of activism” and 
therefore “wisely accepted a minor setback rather than the hazard of a major 
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disaster.”203That he so skillfully managed to do so by maintaining peace in many 
occasions, which prevented unnecessary direct confrontations between the two 
superpowers, is something the American people on both sides of political choices 
graciously admired and accepted.204 
 
     Eisenhower’s International Commitments and the People-to-People Diplomacy 
With a firsthand experience in the battlefield and influenced by his upbringing 
with a pacifist mother, Dwight D. Eisenhower’s daily language included the term 
“peace.” Stephen E. Ambrose states that General Eisenhower “hated war” and the 
President Eisenhower “promoted peace.” As a man he left the American people a 
“legacy of love for life, for people, and for democracy.” He assured the American public 
that they could not achieve security by building more weapons of mass destruction. By 
bringing peace in Korea even before his inauguration and avoiding war thereafter 
throughout his presidential years, and by holding down, almost single-handedly, the 
pace of the arms race, Eisenhower achieved his major accomplishments. He made 
peace and he kept the peace.205 
In 1953 the newly inaugurated president revealed his deepest concern about the 
cost of war and the daring need of peace: 
 
The world to be feared and the best to be expected [from a continuing arms 
race] can be simply stated. The worse is atomic war. The best would be this: a 
life of perpetual fear and tension; a burden of arms draining the wealth and 
the labor of all peoples. Every gun that is made, every warship launched, 
every rocket fired, signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger 
and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is 
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not spending money alone. It is spending sweat of its laborers, the genius of 
its scientists, [and] the hopes of its children. We pay a single fighter plane with 
a half-million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes 
that could have housed more than eight thousand people. This is not the way 
of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is 
humanity hanging from a cross of iron.206 
 
Eisenhower promoted peace with the “same intensity that he had given to 
fighting war.”207In December 1953, Eisenhower proposed international cooperation in 
the peaceful use of atomic energy. In response, in 1957, the world organization, 
International Atomic Energy Agency was founded.208 He proposed his Food for Peace 
program in1953 to dispose agricultural surplus abroad and the same year, Chances for 
Peace speech was delivered after Stalin’s death, and his Atoms for Peace speech of 
December 1953 was dedicated to non-military uses for atomic energy. In 1958, 
Eisenhower stated in a press conference: “There is no place on this earth to which I 
would not travel, there is no chore I would not undertake, if I had any faintest hope that, 
by so doing, I would promote the general cause of world peace.”209As Eisenhower left 
the office he warned against the “military-industrial complex” and his memoir titled, 
Waging Peace tells much about Eisenhower’s international commitments to peace and 
stability during the second half of his presidency. 
The United States “never lost a soldier or a foot of ground in my administration,” 
Eisenhower proudly declared to the nation when he left Washington in 1961. “We kept 
the peace. People asked how it happened—by God, it didn’t just happen, I will tell you 
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that.”210 Notably, the celebration of the centennial of Eisenhower’s birth which was held 
in 1990at the University of Kansas and the Gettysburg College was not accidentally 
organized under the name Meeting for Peace.211 
Eisenhower’s commitments to winning and maintaining peace were, however, 
overshadowed by some assessments, especially during his immediate post-presidential 
years. Those assessments tended to rely more on his style rather than substance of his 
policies by magnifying Eisenhower’s “occasional [and deliberate] failure to use the 
presidency as a podium from which to advance his convictions,” which according to the 
Eisenhower revisionist Fred I. Greenstein, “have stemmed from a selflessness and 
freedom from vanity that permitted him to pass from the scene without revealing a good 
many of his most effective actions and methods.”212 Such arguments were especially 
prevalent in earlier journalistic accounts in which Eisenhower was viewed as a weak, 
politically inactive, inarticulate and inexperienced president who delegated his 
responsibilities to his powerful subordinates. He was thus criticized for being “soft” on 
communism and McCarthyism, hard on civil rights and the Third World.  
Yet the new trend in scholarly assessments of the Eisenhower’s presidency had 
come in much positive tone by the end of the 1960s. According to these writers who 
were labeled as revisionists, Eisenhower was shrewd and surprisingly cunning in his 
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leadership style as well as intelligent and conscientious in his decision-making. He was 
a “bright and exuberant man, full of charm bounce and vigor,” who showed profound 
respect for the dignity of the office and a conviction of limitations of constitutional power 
and prerogatives of the presidency. These principles were reflected in all actions 
stemming from Eisenhower’s handling of McCarthyism to the civil rights domestically 
and from the Korean War to the Congo crisis, internationally. Eisenhower was 
conscious of the fact that the dignity of the presidency as an institution is not allowed to 
be equated with that of an antagonist individual like Senator McCarthy. His decision-
making ability was based on both his character and he has the “most carefully 
organized staff and departmental system” the American government has yet seen.  
Comparing both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to that of Eisenhower 
Arthur Larson contended that JFK and LBJ’s use of their cabinet, National Security 
Council, and Operations Coordinating Board was inefficient. Both Kennedy and 
Johnson underused (if not failed to use) especially the NSC during the most crucial 
times of handling national security issues.213 Unlike Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, 
Eisenhower was willing to negotiate with the Soviets.214The political scientist Fred I. 
Greenstein argued, referring to Eisenhower’s successors, about the “fragility” of modern 
presidencies, which started from the immature death of John F. Kennedy and then 
transferred to a “politically crippled” Lyndon Johnson and from a “politically discredited” 
Richard Nixon and then handed off to the “failed” to be reelected Gerald Ford followed 
by Jimmy Carter whose presidency was “plainly on the ropes.” “Neither the presidency 
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itself nor the larger political system,” Greenstein contends, “could be expected to serve 
the nation well when presidents were such birds of passage.”215 
According to the historian Herbert Parmet, Eisenhower was a “humane battler for 
virtue and freedom, a leader desiring above all the restoration and maintenance of 
peace, a man who truly was a ‘soldier of democracy.’”216Eisenhower was not an 
ambitious competitor with the Soviets in the field of military. His sole mission was 
“national solvency and strength that would achieve the goal of peace with justice.”217 He 
left the white House with a remarkable record.  
As the Gallup Poll indicates, Americans considered Eisenhower’s greatest single 
achievement as the fact that “He kept the peace.” Those scholars who rely on recently 
declassified documents argue that Eisenhower focused on broader horizon of issues 
rather than on raw, miscellaneous problems. He would make his cabinet members 
thoroughly investigate issues and “boil them down to a single page” so he would later 
come up with a final decision. He was a principal decision-maker. But, occasionally, 
Eisenhower’s international commitments did not receive a full consensus, especially 
concerning the following two cases. 
From the early years of the Eisenhower administration, the Soviet-American 
rivalry increasingly focused on the Third World, where anti-colonial movements 
accelerated the decolonization process across the former colonies. The social and 
economic turmoil in Iran—the “troubled area” which shares a border with the Soviet 
Union, flared up in the country, as the nationalist leader Mohammed Mossadegh 
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expropriated the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, placing the Iranian relations with the 
British government in a limbo. Desperate to save his country from “suffering financial 
hardships and political intrigues,” the Prime Minister Mossadegh sent a personal letter 
to a newly inaugurated President Eisenhower in January and then in May 1953 hoping 
to get a “sympathetic and responsive attention” from the American government. But 
Eisenhower’s suspicion of communist expansionism in the region and his fear of 
disturbing British-American relations led him to turn down the Iranian government’s 
request.218Without American economic assistance that the country sought to gain at 
much needed time, Mohammed Mossadegh had to turn to Moscow for help, which was 
believed to be the reason for the United States to overthrow the Iranian Prime Minister 
with CIA involvement and to return the pro-American Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi to 
the throne.219 
Similar strategies were applied to America’s southern neighbor when the 
Guatemalan President Jacob Arbenz Guzman sought to modernize his nation’s mineral 
resources by launching a massive land reform program. Arbenz nationalized huge acres 
of the United Fruit Company’s holdings owned by influential Americans, which is why 
Washington was so actively involved. In one sense, the above politico-economic 
changes that occurred in Iran and Guatemala did not put the United States national 
security in danger but they were crucial for America to maintain her hegemonic power 
within the region. Scholars argue that Cold War America’s preoccupation with the anti-
communist psyche greatly contributed to Eisenhower’s decision-making process in the 
Guatemalan case. After “careful and complete investigation” of communist suspicion 
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and the overall Latin American public opinion, Eisenhower wrote in his memoir, the U.S. 
identified that immediate actions against the Soviet-backed Arbenz government were 
necessary to reverse the communist infiltration in the region. CIA interventions were 
successfully carried out by Colonel Castillo Armas, who later became the Guatemalan 
President.220Herbert Parmet stated that Eisenhower is a politically acute and publicly 
conscious man. He was not indeed a “political genius,” but knew perhaps better than 
anyone else around him what the people wanted and how they wanted it. “Ike had a 
remarkable political instinct.”221Undertaking similar lines of arguments, the younger 
generation of scholars contends that domestic pressures and the “relentless 
engagement” of Moscow and Beijing in the Third World countries and the unrealistic 
economic and military assistance from the leaders of newly decolonized countries all 
made the Eisenhower administration difficult to “extricate [itself] from the containment 
framework.”222 
Despite the pressure exerted from the British government in the 1953 Iranian 
case, however, Eisenhower’s cold-war driven overreaction to local elites’ leadership 
style evoked much criticism from both Latin America and Europe.223At this point, some 
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accounts speculate that both Iranian and Guatemalan incidents were part and parcel of 
US economic policies in the respective regions.224But others argue that Eisenhower 
failed to understand or appreciate the power of nationalism in the emerging Third World 
countries.225 
It is sometimes hard to distinguish democracy as an ideal and democracy in 
practice. American presidents and strategists, by implication, are expected to find an 
amalgam of the two. The political scientist G. John Ikenberry formulated this 
characteristic of U.S. foreign policy as an “American liberal grand strategy” in which the 
American promotion of democracy in the broadest sense reflects a “pragmatic, evolving 
and sophisticated understanding of how to create a stable international political order 
and a congenial security environment.”226The British political scientist Harold Laski 
similarly framed that “… The essence of the presidency is the fact that it is an American 
institution that it functions in an American environment that it has been shaped by the 
forces of American history, that it must be judged by American criteria of its response to 
American needs.”227 
                                                           
224Brands, “Fractal History, or Clio and the Chaotics.” Diplomatic History 16 (Fall 1992). 
225 Robert J. McMahon, “Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists,” Political 
Science Quarterly, CI, 1986, 453-73, Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, (Chapel Hill, 
University of North Carolina, 1988). 
226 G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Post-
War Era,” American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays edited by G. John Ikenberry, (New York: Pearson 
Longman, 2005), 268.  
227  Harold Laski. The American Presidency. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940), 7. Quoted in Marian 
D. Irish, Politics of American Democracy, (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1959), 413-14. Yet, 
Eisenhower later in the 1960s argued against major American involvement in the Middle East as Nixon’s 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger recalled: “…Probably the reflecting the agony he went through 
over Suez in 1956, he thought the best course was to let the parties work it out themselves. If we became 
active we would be forced in the end to become an arbiter and then offer the parties our own guarantee of 
whatever final arrangement emerged. This would keep us embroiled in Middle East difficulties forever…” 
Henry Kissinger, White House Years. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 451-52. Quoted in Greenstein, The 
Hidden-Hand Presidency,17 
 88 
The linkage between moral idealism and political pragmatism suggests that 
moral dimensions were not absent from the Eisenhower administration’s policies 
including the president’s People-to-People program. Nor did Eisenhower solely rely on 
power politics. Indeed, the promotion of both democracy and free trade and economic 
liberalization, which constituted the post-war “liberal grand strategy” as the political 
scientist John Ikenberry put it, was America’s cold war foreign policy framework rooted 
in the “American political experience and an understanding of history, economics and 
the sources of political stability.” This “distinctively” American liberal view is not a “single 
theoretical claim” but is built around a “wide-ranging set of claims and assumptions 
about how democratic politics and economic interdependence, international institutions 
and political identity contribute… to encourage stable and mutually acceptable political 
order.” This liberal grand strategy therefore was rich, persistent, dominant and 
appealing. It oriented and united the factions of the right and the left in American 
politics.228 
By the same token, Eisenhower believed that if the country’s foreign relations 
could not effectively be pursued between governments, it could be pursued between 
citizens. So did his Secretary of State, John F. Dulles. At the onset of the People-to-
People Partnership, Eisenhower stated that the people-to-people idea was based upon 
the simple assumption that “no people want war” and that “all people want peace.” That 
is the idea that must become a deed into which all American sources and efforts should 
be poured, which otherwise were being spent on “every bomb we can manufacture, 
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every plane, every ship, every gun,” to “give us time to prevent the other fellow from 
starting a war, since we know we won’t.” 229 
Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John F. Dulles was a man of realpolitik who 
advocated professionalism in the American foreign policy establishment. But he 
believed in ordinary people’s contribution to spreading freedom and democracy the 
world over. At the opening meeting of the People-to-People conference, Dulles 
contended that the task of the United States, because of its position in the world, is to 
make sure that competition with a “nation which does not believe in free enterprise” is 
going “to be gotten through on a peaceful, nondestructive basis.” This process “must be 
made one of evolution and not one of violent revolution…and is determined under our 
form of society not by government but by you… who are working in an individual and in 
a private capacity.” If ordinary people by their works “make clear throughout the world 
that freedom is the preferable form of society,” Dulles insisted, then “other 
problems…will be soluble by your government.”230 Both Eisenhower and Dulles’s 
remarks implied that private citizens could contribute to establishing world peace and 
mutual understanding through exchanges of peoples, ideas, cultures and knowledge in 
which the People-to-People movement successfully engaged at the national and 
international levels from the mid-1950s and beyond. 
The People-to-People program was the first and the largest government-initiated 
voluntary movement that prevailed across America in the mid-1950s throughout the 
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sixties.231 It was the first official effort to incorporate secular voluntarism into the nation’s 
foreign relations. Secular voluntary movements became a new experience by mid-
twentieth century, especially following the end of WWII and the onset of decolonization 
in the Third World. The Peace Corps historian Elizabeth Cobbs-Hoffman argues that the 
“rise of secular conscientious objection,” which was legally recognized in many 
European countries during and after WWII, “paralleled the rise of secular volunteering 
service overseas.” 232 It is true that the fervency and enthusiasm of postwar Americans 
were fueled by a “shared consciousness” and experience of war and revolution leading 
to voluntary movements across the world. It is also true that the Cold War ideological 
rivalry between the communist and democratic worlds raised the grand question as to 
whose ideals were best and therefore universal. 
Promising lavish economic and technical assistance, the Soviets sought to gain 
influence in newly independent countries, efforts which looked “more dangerous than 
Stalin’s propaganda programs,” hypothesized the Eisenhower administration. In 
particular, the Kremlin’s “policy of russification and modernization of their non-Russian 
subjects” was so intense that it could impress both decolonized, non-democratic 
countries, including its Asian neighbors. The Soviets believed that their country had 
been “endowed with a special destiny to clear the Asian wilderness and civilize the 
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tribes of the East” and ultimately modernize the “Asian wilderness.” What was so 
impressive about the Soviet modernization campaign for those satellite countries was 
Russia’s proclaimed belief in a kind of equality and justice that rivaled those advocated 
by the US.233 
Every president, especially those who served two terms in his position, has a 
tendency to reflect on both strengths and weaknesses of his major policy outcomes and 
thereupon reviews his past actions to reformulate, if possible revise, what he deems 
imperative to define his legacy. Much of presidential politics is shaped by political 
climate and context in which he operates. And some resulted from the president’s 
personal belief system and values. These values are reinforced by education and 
experience. In Eisenhower’s case, his personal values and convictions were sustained 
by his international experience that he obtained during his time both in Asia and Europe. 
It is not an exception but a rule that every president’s presumably successful actions 
tend to occur in a changing political and social atmosphere favorable for his personal 
and political convictions. The changing character of political environment in the mid-
1950s laid the groundwork for renewed or changed foreign policy priorities for the 
Eisenhower administration. The postwar shift in public opinion from isolationism to 
internationalism illustrates the point.234 
Eisenhower embarked on a series of bold diplomatic initiatives, particularly 
during the second half of his presidency. The Big Four, the United States, the Soviet 
Union, Britain and France, met to negotiate for possible solutions amid the potential 
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advent of the thermonuclear war at the 1955 Geneva Summit. Eisenhower’s hope at the 
Geneva Summit was to have international agreements on disarmament with Soviet 
leaders, the proposal he called “Open Skies.” To Eisenhower’s dismay, Soviet premier 
Nikita Khrushchev did not accept the proposal, but the general agreements on 
“development of contacts between East and West” did reach at the Summit. Eisenhower 
later noted that “though the communists would miss no opportunity to gather intelligence 
when visiting in the West, the chance to show the life of the Free World to visitors from 
the East promised real results. And we could surely learn more about Communist ideas 
and culture by sending ‘citizen ambassadors’ eastward.” Indeed, some exchanges 
between the United States and Russia soon began, which were “small beginnings,” but 
they “could not have transpired in the atmosphere prevailing before Geneva.”235 
The Geneva Summit resulted in several cultural exchanges including a tour of 
American jazz ambassadors to Moscow and elsewhere and Vice President Nixon’s 
1959 trip to the Soviet Union for a “kitchen debate” with the Soviet Premier on American 
capitalism and consumerism. The Vice President’s Moscow trip was soon followed by 
Soviet Premier’s visit to the US during which Khrushchev unveiled his “peaceful 
coexistence” doctrine. Impressed by American capitalism yet still confident in the Soviet 
system, Khrushchev during his ten-day tour challenged, “You may live under capitalism 
and we will live under socialism and build communism. The one whose system proves 
better will win.” The Soviet leader’s visit was wrapped up in Camp David where both 
sides opened their way to détente.236 This is the atmosphere through which the real 
genesis of the People-to-People idea originated in Eisenhower’s call for “… a free and 
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friendly exchange of ideas and people” at the 1955 Geneva Summit as a practical 
means for ending the Cold War.237 
As a man with considerable overseas experience, Eisenhower was more lenient 
toward internationalism which he believed could create a peaceful, cooperative world. 
Eisenhower’s internationalist approach, which he especially stressed during the second 
term of his presidency, was applied into a variety of America’s overseas outreaches 
including the People-to-People program. The people-to-people diplomacy as such was 
not just part and parcel of U.S. containment policy. It was a necessary part of the 
postwar world atmosphere which tilted toward facilitating international cooperation by 
weaving into the warp of people’s common needs, concerns and values. The idea of 
global cooperation through an internationalist stance thus contributed substantially to 
the creation of the People-to-People program. Eisenhower was aware of the global 
demand of the time, to be sure. By the time, Eisenhower left the White House, 
Republican isolationism was dead and internationalism was sufficiently alive.238 
As Eisenhower’s tenure in office came to a close his conviction in creating a 
social network at the grassroots level strengthened. As such, he did not abandon the 
People-to-People program. Instead, the retiring president became an official chairman 
of the People-to-People program with the approval and encouragement of his 
successor. Eisenhower expanded the program into broader nationwide initiatives 
including those which prevailed on college campuses throughout the sixties. 
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“Torch passed to a new generation” 
Come mothers and fathers 
Throughout the land 
And do not criticize 
What you cannot understand 
Your sons and daughters 
  Are beyond your command 
Your old road is rapidly aging 
Please get out of the new one 
If you can’t lend your hand 
For the times they are a-changin’ 
 
The Times They Are a-Changin, Bob Dylan, 1963239 
As the 1950s drew to a close, the nation’s very soul dramatically changed. So did 
the people’s attitude towards the need for social change. These changes especially 
influenced the young generation and challenged their existence in society. The growing 
demands of racial equality did not just spur the nation’s conscience but it also fueled 
intellectuals  to look deeper into society’s faults, though this wasn’t the first time as other 
intellectuals in the 1950s had spoken out before but were censored and silenced by 
McCarthyism’s anti-communist hysteria. Perplexed by the real meaning of human life 
and social progress, American intellectuals viewed a mass society as a failure, for it did 
not serve all its members and consequently made the poor, women, and ethnic and 
cultural minorities even “lonelier” among “the lonely crowd.” Along with persisting 
injustices in race, class, and gender relations, the mass, consumerist society had 
already left its cataclysmic consequences on nature and the environment. For the poor, 
the social critic Michael Harrington claims, the “progress is misery” and therefore a 
“menace and a threat to their lives.”240 Harrington’s The Other America: Poverty in the 
United States bravely disclosed a “different kind of people”--the unskilled workers, the 
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migrant farm workers, the aged, the minorities and all the others who live in the 
economic underworld of American life… in other America.”241 These people, who 
constituted two-thirds of the total population, were becoming socially “invisible” as they 
were simply “misfits.” At the same time, they were politically invisible not simply 
because they did not belong to unions, to fraternal organizations, or to political parties 
but because “the very development of American society is creating a new kind of 
blindness about poverty.”242 
The American poor, Harrington argued, “do not suffer the extreme privation of the 
peasants of Asia or the tribesmen of Africa, yet the mechanism of the misery is 
similar.”243 At this point, the welfare state is “up-side down,” “helping those least who 
need aid most.”244After all, “this country seems to be caught in a paradox.” And the 
American dream for those “different kind of people” was more a wish than a reality. 
Harrington’s “other America” was not discovered by aliens, but rather disclosed from 
within--quite a sign and symptom of a presumptively democratic society in which the 
voice and virtue of intellectuals are merited.245 But one would enter the time factor. The 
early 1960s was a ripe time for such imprudent thoughts of Harrington’s whose writings 
sprang from the fledgling intellectual endeavors accomplished by such people as John 
Kenneth Galbraith and others in the preceding decade. The historian, Richard H. Pells 
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once rightly stated that “with the appearance of [Michael Harrington’s] book, a new 
decade had truly dawned and a new generation was about to emerge.”246 
Notions such as affluence, luxury, and consumerism, all of which were so alien to 
others outside the mainstream of American society, were not the best measure for 
human happiness, as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) revealed. Men’s assault 
upon the environment brought by technological advancement and a mass society made 
the world “synthetic creations of man’s inventive mind.”247 “Along with the possibility of 
the extinction of mankind by nuclear war,” Carson argued, “the central problem of our 
age has therefore become the contamination of man’s total environment with such 
substances of incredible potential for harm—substances that accumulate in the tissues 
of plants and animals and even penetrate the germ cells to shatter or alter the very 
material of heredity upon which the shape of the future depends.”248 Ironically, the 
chemicals that have “the power to kill every insect”—the good or the bad—are invented 
to “maintain farm production,” which has already faced “overproduction.”249 After all, it 
would alter human gene mutations, not to mention the environmental degradation and 
extinction of biodiversity. How long would industrial-technological society’s “progress” 
last in order to reach regression in human life and the natural world? As history has 
demonstrated, one need not go that far to witness the consequences.  
The decade also witnessed increasingly explicit explosions and protests among 
black Americans for their civil rights. Partly influenced by and partly emulating the flaring 
decolonization movements led by black and brown peoples in Asia and Africa, American 
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civil rights activists, namely Rosa Park, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall 
stood for abolishing the persistence of the “Jim Crow system” throughout the country, 
especially in the south. Using a variety of nonviolent methods of resistance, including 
sit-ins, kneel-ins, boycotts, marches and speeches, these activists were followed by 
thousands of supporters and simultaneously faced brutal resistance and status quo 
bias.  
Many activists were becoming disenchanted with nonviolent resistance. While 
struggling to figure out “what it meant to be black in white America,” Eldridge Cleaver 
appealed from prison in his Soul on Ice (1968) that “black Americans are too easily 
deceived by a few smiles and friendly gestures, by the passing of a few liberal-sounding 
laws which are left on the books to rot unenforced.” And the only way they can ensure 
this is “to gain organizational unity and communication with their brothers and allies 
around the world, on an international basis.” Ridiculed by the mobilization of black 
soldiers to fight for America in Vietnam, Cleaver was appalled that “black Americans are 
considered to be the world’s biggest fools to go to another country to fight for something 
they do not have for themselves.”250  Same question here: “How could the mobilization 
of civil rights movements affected attitudes towards people’s involvement in the 
country’s foreign relations?” 
The newly elected president John F. Kennedy’s reaction to evolving demands for 
racial justice as well as his positions on independence and self-determination of African 
countries defined the dawning of a new age in American domestic and foreign relations 
and created politically favorable environment for not only the protests but also for 
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unprecedented legislative achievements, which culminated in the Civil Rights Act 1964 
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In addition, Lyndon B. Johnson’s land slide victory 
and his party’s majority status both in the Senate and the House set the ideal timing for 
social welfare initiatives and civil rights legislations: Medicare and Medicaid proposals 
were passed; Congress approved a bill providing funds to strengthen international 
studies and foreign languages in 1966; and the Johnson administration declared an 
“unconditional war on poverty”, which the president hoped the “richest nation on earth 
can afford to win.”251 
Racial prejudice, poverty, inequality and environmental degradation were not the 
only domestic issues that policymakers had to tackle, but these issues also became a 
part of the country’s foreign affairs agenda. America’s domestic problems shadowed, by 
and large, the effectiveness of the nation’s foreign policy strategies during the contested 
time between the United States and its communist rival. Thus, the Cold War and its 
concomitant domestic social and racial dilemmas drove the change in the nation’s 
attitude that America was not living up to its democratic ideals. The impersonal, 
alienating mass society inflicted with such paradoxical domestic issues changed 
perceptions and attitudes of young Americans toward their country, and led them to 
resort to their own individual identities for personal recuperation.  
Those young Americans were willing to give their time and effort to activate the 
People-to-People University program which, they believed, was designed to create a 
favorable and hospitable atmosphere for foreign students studying in the U.S. As 
historian Monhollon stated, the “campus culture was generally racist, sexist, and 
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conservative, reflecting the culture at large” during the 1960s.252 By participating in such 
a grassroots program, the People-to-People volunteers hoped that they were 
contributing to a change in the status quo of the KU campus environment, and to a 
reform of a broader campus culture.  
Youth, Idealism, and the Expansion of the People-to-People Campaign  
An understanding of the causes, events, and legacies of the 1960s is incomplete 
without referring to student activism that sprouted at the dawn of the decade. Tellingly, 
inspired by the events as well as works critical of the American consumerism, 
conformism, racial and minority issues, as well as poverty (i.e. The Power Elite, 
Growing Up Absurd, Soul on Ice, and The Affluent Society) that embodied the moral 
imperative of civil rights and social justice that were contested from the mid-1950s and 
throughout the 1960s, younger Americans were ready to embrace new ideas and 
ideals. The young generation was better educated than their parents and had more 
credentials and self-confidence to “challenge conventional wisdom and take on 
established authorities.”253 These young liberal activists, who came of age during the 
paradoxical period of American society, hoped to contribute their passion, values and 
beliefs to social change and national renewal. That is how the new generation’s 
conscience and “youthful bravado” would dictate what they could do for their country.254 
Young people in the 1960s had been raised with the belief that the U.S. was the 
greatest country in the world and the only country that had the power and the potential 
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as well the moral responsibility to lead the world. Exactly from this environment for 
youth idealism, emerged the People-to-People University program with a “youthful spirit 
of idealistic commitment” of young Americans. Coming from a military general, however, 
the idea of “people-to-people” was not exempt from skepticism as to whether it 
embodied “genuine” goodwill. It was even viewed as a symbolic gesture of American 
imperialism. Did People-to-People really stand for peace and democracy or was it 
merely an example of Cold War propaganda? 
The People-to-People program was a part of an overarching strategy that 
postwar Presidents, including Eisenhower, all followed. To many of the program 
volunteers, however, the heart of its idealistic and humanitarian-altruistic drive was a 
noble cause. Thus supporting this noble cause was morally superior than opposing it. 
The idealism of the program, however, does not reflect Eisenhower’s personal 
convictions alone, although he, as president, was concerned with sustaining a peaceful 
world to which he substantially contributed as a war hero. He emphasized the 
significance of the role of each and every single American in forging people-to-people 
contacts across the world, and insisted that his proposed program is “something that 
lays very close to the hearts of … every man, woman and child in America and the 
world … except for those few who want to unjustly and improperly rule others.”255 
Although the People-to-People movement was not as successful as the initial 
organizers believed since its popularity petered out after its first two years because it 
was criticized for duplicating the overseas activities undertaken by non-governmental 
                                                           
255 Remarks by DDE, September 11, 1956. White House Conference on People-to-People Partnerships, 
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and other philanthropic organizations and it failed to fund its operations by private 
capital alone and was forced to request for funds from the government (which 
undermined its supposed independence from the government), it did more good than 
harm to the “American cause”  as defined by Cold War agenda, such as distributing a 
favorable image of the United States in politically strategic locations around the world. 
The misunderstanding and distrust that have chilled relations between almost all nations 
for about half a century could have gone far too long if there were no contacts between 
ordinary peoples at the grassroots level. The people-to-people idea was thus appealing 
for young Americans, its moral, altruistic tone was urgent and its sweeping scope was 
impressive.  
Eisenhower’s statements are not the only evidence for complicating the narrow 
view that the People-to-People partnership was merely propaganda at best and an 
imperial manipulation of popular sentiments at worst that supplemented the 
administration’s foreign policy. Most importantly, it signified a fundamental shift in the 
nature of the U.S. outreach approaches by giving an enormous boost to the idea of 
secular voluntary movements applied for the first time in American foreign relations. To 
that end, the people-to-people idea per se was directly replicated in Eisenhower’s 
successor’s foreign policy which was manifested in the Peace Corps. As the following 
chapter will demonstrate, interviews with former volunteers also suggest that their 
motives for being part of People-to-People were not politically impersonal but individual.  
The People-to-People program was, in the end, one dimension of the overall 
multifaceted national strategy under the Eisenhower administration. The idealistic 
rhetoric involved in its promotion and the idealistic motives with which the volunteers 
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associated their attractions to the program were connected, but did not completely 
match. 
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Chapter 3 
 
“Telling America’s Stories Abroad:” 
The People-to-People Movement, 1956-1966 
 
 
Eisenhower believed in America’s preeminent role in postwar world politics, and 
he forged it neither in a unilateral way nor even through military encounters. He stated 
in his first political speech delivered in Abilene, Kansas, his boyhood hometown, that as 
“partners with others America must carry the burden of world leadership because of 
[her] strength.” Therefore, America “must be spiritually, economically, and militarily 
strong, for her own sake and for humanity.”256 
Along with this manifested role of postwar America in international relations, the 
Eisenhower administration sought to win the Cold War between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, a war-time ally Eisenhower once cherished. Indeed, the emergence of 
U.S. confrontations with the Soviet Union was the greatest disappointment for 
Eisenhower even before his presidency.. His disappointment with Soviet leaders’ 
behavior was quite explicit, especially because he had been a good friend of Marshal 
Georgi Zhukov and had valued Russian contribution to decisively wind down World War 
II. 
After his talk with Zhukov during the 1955 Geneva Conference, Eisenhower was 
privately astonished with how the Soviet repressive regime changed his “old friend” as a 
person. “Zhukov was no longer the same man he had been in 1945… He had been [an] 
independent, self-confident man who… was always ready to meet cheerfully with me … 
                                                           
256 Eisenhower recalled that the “Abilene talk was useful” later in the campaign because it came to be 
regarded as a “good statement of sound progressive Republican doctrine.” Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953-1956 (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, INC., 
1963), 33-35; See also William Bragg Ewald Jr., Eisenhower the President: Crucial Days: 1951-1960. 
(New York: Prentice Hall, 1981), 44-5. 
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and to cooperate. Now, ten years later, he was a subdued, worried man, who repeated 
in low monotone to me the same arguments that had been presented to the conference 
by the Soviet chairman… He was devoid of animation, and he never smiled or joked as 
he used to do…,” wrote Eisenhower in his memoir Mandate for Change.257For 
Eisenhower, it was the Soviet regime and its communist ideology that made ordinary 
Russians isolated from peace-loving countries, such as the United States. It was 
tempting to reach out to ordinary Russians at the grass-roots level. Eisenhower stated 
that “real peace meant no accommodation with the Soviet system, but a full victory over 
it leaving the world no option but to emulate the American system.”258 
The People-to-People campaign originated in this contested time of the Cold War 
characterized by ideological and political bipolarity. By the same token, decolonization, 
the emergence of newly independent states and their ideas of non-alignment greatly 
challenged the U.S. and the Soviet Union to instigate a “new look” in the conduct of their 
foreign policy and diplomacy.259 As politicians in Washington viewed, communists 
already started to occupy the neutral world by initiating their propagandistic activities. 
Soviet propaganda programs “with their distortion of the U.S. [were] being jacked up;” 
Red China was moving in on “Oriental movie market” showing nostalgic appeal in story 
which “recalls China’s past glories;” Russia’s influence on Middle East and Africa was 
                                                           
257 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 525 
258 Ira Chernus, General Eisenhower: Ideology and Discourse (East Lansing: Michigan State University 
Press, 2002), 206. 
259 Between 1946-1960 thirty seven new nations emerged from colonial status in Asia, Africa and Middle 
East. These countries as referred to the Third World, “backward,” or developing nations consisted of 
basically agricultural peoples that served as raw material providers and a huge market for manufactured 
products. As of 1959, for instance, more than one-third of American direct foreign investments were in the 
Third World. Paterson, American Foreign Relations, 295. 
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deepening as they “hold prestige showings in embassies, use block booking to tie 
propaganda with non-propaganda good films.”260 
Having been largely preoccupied with a “falling dominoes” theory, the 
Eisenhower administration applied containment to these emerging new nations to edge 
the Soviet capture of the neutral nations. Eisenhower needed a compelling approach 
that could effectively counteract communist propagandistic activities. He sought to 
mobilize more civilians, not troops, to combat communist expansion in the free world. 
The People-to-People program was a product of the containment policy which was a 
part of America’s liberal grand strategy.261 Yet, just as containment policy was not the 
only framework for Cold War American foreign policy, containment was not the only 
motive behind the People-to-People idea. Granted, President Eisenhower liked power 
and he knew how to exercise it when necessary. This does not mean, however, that he 
did not possess any moral imaginations or that his actions were relegated to only power 
politics.   
The People-to-People program was molded out, in part, of Eisenhower’s 
personal conviction that if people want peace then they need to get together to share 
their common purpose. He believed that peace would not come suddenly, but would 
come by gradual growth of common interests among nations. It may be true that the 
people-to-people approach could not directly impact a nation’s foreign policy, as 
Eisenhower viewed, but it could potentially contribute to it in the long run. That was the 
true purpose of the people-to-people diplomacy that Eisenhower envisioned. 
                                                           
260 People-to-People News, vol. 1, no 2, October 1956, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President  
(White House Central Files) Official File, Box 931 OF 325 (6). 
 
 106 
But the People-to-People movement also began during a difficult time of racial 
relations and social unrest at home. It was a time when African-Americans were 
discriminated against, excluded, and lynched. It was a time when civil rights movement 
leaders were blacklisted, spied on, and red-baited for advocating for their cause. To 
many Americans, domestic racism was more dangerous than Soviet communism. 
Repercussions of a mass society and corporate capitalism were more concrete than 
atomic war. Many Americans were uneasy within equality and poverty amidst plenty and 
prosperity. People of plenty were prosperous but many others were underfed, 
unemployed, and unequally treated. The United States was divided and the American 
dream was a mere dream for many Americans. In such circumstances, America’s 
credibility (and ingenuity) of spreading ideals of democracy abroad would be 
questionable, as it did not make them real at home. “Telling America’s stories” abroad 
as they were was a camouflaged tale, but not a truth. 
The idea of promoting ordinary citizens’ role in the nation’s foreign relations was 
a crucial part of the Cold War American foreign relations, which was later formulated as 
“public diplomacy.” Edmund Gullion, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 
at Tufts University and a retired foreign service officer, defined “public diplomacy” when 
he established an Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy in 1965. Thus Gullion 
defined the term:  
Public diplomacy … deals with the influence of public attitudes on 
the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses 
dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; 
the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; 
the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with 
another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; 
communication between those whose job is communication, as 
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diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of 
intercultural communications.262 
 
Although the phrase “public diplomacy” can be traced to the nineteenth century 
diplomatic discourse, Cull contends, it was Gullion who first used the term in modern 
diplomacy because the old word “propaganda had accumulated so many negative 
connotations.”263 Yet, the term “soft power,” which was coined by the political scientist 
Joseph Nye Jr., is the most frequently used to broadly and inclusively define outreach 
activities conducted by both state and non-state actors to improve country’s image, 
attractiveness, or reputation. As Nye viewed, the United States won the Cold War 
because it used its soft power in combination with its hard power--military and economic 
assets. But according to Nye, soft power is not just a matter of an image or public 
relations, but rather a “form of power—a means of obtaining desired outcomes.”264 
According to critics, people-to-people diplomacy was ineffective political 
propaganda, and those people who volunteered for this tended to be viewed as mere 
“do-gooders.” As the diplomatic historian Emily Rosenberg put it, however, public 
diplomacy would result in the long run, in greater mutual respect and understanding and 
would in time provide a sound basis for successful diplomacy.265At this point, the 
diplomatic historian Thomas Paterson stated that the role of the American “cultural 
                                                           
262 Edward Murrow Center on Public Diplomacy, available at http://www.publicdiplomacy.org. Quoted in 
Nicholas J. Cull. “Public Diplomacy before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase,” In Routledge Handbook of 
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Ninkovich’s Diplomacy of Ideas and Akira Iryie’s Cultural Internationalism for earlier conceptual 
frameworks.   
263 Cull, “Public Diplomacy before Gullion,” 19. 
264 Nye, Soft Power, 129 
265 Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream, 215. America’s usage of public diplomacy elements in 
her foreign policy objectives has been discussed in chapter one. 
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diplomacy” that “parted the curtain” (or at least tore a big hole in it) was a significant 
counter approach during the Cold War.266 
One official at the United States Information Agency (USIA) stated to the press 
that for years the “world has been bombarded with government propaganda—Nazi, 
Fascist and now Russian Communist.” In an attempt to counteract the Cold War 
campaign of the Russians, the U.S. government “has been devoting large sums of 
“telling the American story.” But even though the USIA claimed to have based its efforts 
on “truth” rather than “propaganda,” many observers question whether the government-
to-people approach “packs a punch any longer.” The people in Europe, Asia and Latin 
America have been so “surfeited with propaganda… they are inclined to be suspicious 
of anything that comes from government—even the American government.” So how 
could America have reached these people? The USIA thought it has the answer in a 
people-to-people approach.267 
The idea of the people-to-people approach was mentioned during his re-election 
campaign when Eisenhower stated that the strength of the free world lay in the unity 
that would come of the voluntary associations of diverse nations that could ultimately 
help ensure greater understanding between the peoples of widely varying political 
                                                           
266 Paterson and Garry Clifford, American Foreign Relations, 276. Although the term “cultural diplomacy” 
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exchanges.  
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perspectives.268 To establish and sustain the unity in the free world, Eisenhower wanted 
to do something that would touch ordinary people at the grass-roots level.  
The present chapter discusses the institutional history of the People-to-People 
program by giving particular attention to its origin, development, its various activities as 
well as public reactions to and financial challenges of the program. The chapter will also 
discuss the program’s most successful initiative—the Sister-City program—which has 
been under-researched by scholars.269 
Origin of the People-to-People Idea 
On July 15 1956, less than an hour before his departure for the Geneva Summit, 
President Eisenhower addressed his fellow Americans: “For the first time, a president 
goes to engage in a conference… to prevent wars, in order to see whether in this time 
of stress and strain we cannot devise measures that will keep from us terrible scourge 
that afflicts mankind.” And he positively continued his speech, “We want peace, and 
pessimism never won a battle… Peoples everywhere want peace, a peace in which 
they could live happily and in confidence.” He was heading to Geneva, he underscored, 
to represent the “convictions, beliefs, and aspirations of all Americans.” As he 
concluded his speech, Eisenhower asked all Americans on the “next Sabbath… 
to“crowd their places of worship to ask for help…in [showing] America’s earnest desire 
for peace.”270 
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American delegates to the Geneva Conference consisted of Department of State officials and several 
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The day after his speech in Washington, Eisenhower saw on the other side of the 
Atlantic the same “convincing evidence of people’s deep longing for peace.” These 
people in the city of Geneva, he recalled, were “clearly praying that from this conference 
reliable East-West agreements might open the door to a better era.”271Eisenhower 
believed that people across the world wanted the peace he hoped to ensure with other 
delegates at Geneva.    
Attended by the delegates from the “Big Four” nations, the Geneva Summit met 
on July 16, 1955 with President Eisenhower presiding. The Conference was not a 
typical international conference, as Eisenhower recalled, where only government 
officials would “exploit their nationalistic goals without enough attention to the spirit in 
which differences of ambition and ideology might be resolved.” But the President and 
his Secretary of State did not expect “any spectacular results” from the conference, and 
only hoped to “detect whether Soviets really intended to introduce a tactical change to 
ease tensions.” Despite his tentative hope in the conference’s “worth” and “real value,” 
Eisenhower arrived in Geneva with a set of priority subjects: general disarmament, 
reunification of Germany, cultural exchange between East and West as well as his 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ambassadors, including John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant for 
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extemporaneous “Open Skies” proposal, which encouraged an open aerial surveillance 
of military units and supplies of each nation under inspection.272 
While he was suspicious of communists who would “miss no opportunity to 
gather intelligence when visiting in the west,” Eisenhower hoped that promoting 
exchanges of officials, scientists, students, teachers, engineers, and others would open 
new paths of contact between East and West and would produce “real results.” 
Americans could “surely learn more about Communist ideas and culture by sending 
citizen ambassadors” eastward.273 Thus, the idea on east-west exchange along with 
other issues was outlined in conference documents, and was to be discussed at the 
Foreign Ministers’ meeting scheduled to convene in October.274Invigorated by the spirit 
of Geneva, officials of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and its Office of 
Private Cooperation (IOC) hammered out strenuous tasks in order to mold the 
president’s idea into something feasible in the post-Geneva months.275 
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Yet, according to Theodore Streibert, the USIA director, the idea of the people-to-
people contact and partnership was first disclosed in the President’s speech in New 
Orleans in October 1953, when he departed from his prepared text and said: “Each of 
us, whether bearing a commission from his government or traveling by himself for 
pleasure or for business, is a representative of the United States…” Again at Baylor 
University, Eisenhower urged the graduates to “join with like-minded men and women in 
the many voluntary associations that promote people-to-people contact around the 
world.”276 
In addition, as the archival sources indicate, Eisenhower and other People-to-
People organizers were motivated by Theodore S. Repplier’s 1955report on the state of 
America’s overseas image and “propaganda problem.” As an Eisenhower Exchange 
Fellow, Repplier sent a provocative report from London to Washington on June 17, 
1955 after he came back “with supreme frustration” from a six- month around the “world 
inspection trip” to 13 countries, including Japan, Hong Kong, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Burma, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Greece, Italy, France and England. Repplier, 
who later became a chairperson of one of the People-to-People committees, warned 
that “we lack the inspirational idea” and suggested that the President “make a significant 
speech stating that it is the policy of this nation… to press on toward the goal of a world 
in which poverty is unknown, a world in which all men are free to develop those abilities 
given them by their creator.” He urged American policymakers to focus “especially on 
Japan and India in Asia, and Italy and France in Europe from a propaganda point.” 
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Repplier hinted a more authoritative program as he stated that America’s “propaganda 
offensive needs more power.”277 
Paving the Path for People-to-People 
As the Deputy Director of the USIA, Abbott Washburn had close relationship with 
the Executive Office of the President. He had much experience obtained from 
government agencies of similar mission serving as the Executive Secretary of the 
Jackson Committee and the Executive Vice Chairman of the Crusade for Freedom. As 
such, Washburn was the most suitable person within his agency, who would and could 
shape a logistical framework and budgetary possibilities for new initiatives such as the 
People-to-People program.  
Despite the fact that his agency’s constant target of several “outspoken” 
Congressmen’s criticisms for its higher allocations and “propaganda in a democracy,” 
Washburn then swiftly moved to draft a new project while the “Geneva Spirit” was still 
lingering in the White House. Washburn believed that his move indeed would be right 
for his young fledgling agency which recently became independent of the State 
Department. The agency earnestly needed to “widen and intensify its impact” to reach a 
broader base of ordinary Americans. Most importantly, Washburn believed, it was 
necessary for the U.S. to increase, not to decrease, its outreach initiatives as the 
Soviets were spending more on similar activities overseas, which would allow them to 
achieve a “status quo peace” not a “dynamic peace.”  
                                                           
277 Theodore S. Repplier, “Some Thoughts on American Propaganda.” Repplier stated that “propaganda 
should be understood in its dictionary sense without sinister tones.”  
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Washburn’s first draft memorandum embodying all these pressing concerns 
reached Theodore Streibert, the Agency’s Director, on August 17, 1955. Although the 
memorandum carried not the actual name of the People-to-People, but rather a vague 
one, “President’s Program for International Understanding,” it served as the basic 
sketch for the later People-to-People program.278Streibert instantly accepted the idea 
considering the same factors as Washburn formulated, and he immediately called a 
meeting with other government officials, including the Secretary of State, John Foster 
Dulles. As both Washburn and Streibert hoped, the meeting, which was held in two 
weeks, reached a “general agreement” on the tentative proposal waiting now to be 
approved by the President.  
Streibert met Eisenhower on Labor Day, September 5, 1955. The president 
accepted his inter-governmentally approved proposal. But Eisenhower wanted the 
program to be both non-governmental and non-propagandistic. To avoid misperception, 
he also suggested that potential committee chairmen should not be called to a 
Washington meeting until their agreements were secured in principle. Now that all 
approvals were guaranteed, it would be up to Streibert and his agency to build the 
program and turn it into reality. 
Then, two crucial events occurred which diverted the group’s attention from the 
program proposal for an indefinite time. The first and the most important reason for the 
postponement was Eisenhower’s heart attack in September 1955.Washburn and other 
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major organizers calculated that the president’s presence with an official address was 
necessary to attract the public. The second reason was an unexpected result from the 
follow-up meeting of the Foreign Ministers, held in October in Geneva in which the 
Soviets showed a “sweeping rejection of all Western proposals” including the one on 
east-west exchanges.279 Not only was the ailing President frustrated, but so was the top 
staff at the White House, including those working on the People-to-People project. 
Eisenhower later commented that the “Soviet duplicity” at the October Foreign Ministers’ 
meeting, which was held in the “same room as the Summit Conference” was a 
“disillusionment” and a “grievous disappointment, indeed.”280 
Although active focus on the program proposal was interrupted by Eisenhower’s 
heart attack, Washburn, Streibert and Sherman Adams continued their discussion on 
the People-to-People program. By December 1955, as the president recovered from his 
illness, Streibert reconvened on planning the conference. Sherman Adams drafted a 
letter that would be sent to prospective chairmen. Adams suggested that the President’s 
opening speech should mention neither the Geneva Summit nor the Iron Curtain.281The 
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President’s talk at the People-to-People Conference would stress the problem of Soviet 
“propaganda mechanism,” which was “as serious as the threat of armed attack.”282 
Structurally, Eisenhower initially envisioned fewer committees with clear 
purposes as well. By January 1956, it became clear that the White House, USIA and 
IOC would be the major backbone for at least planning the program, and seed money 
not exceeding $5000 would be provided by the USIA. During this early planning stage, 
the “concept of committees” was suggested and possible individuals were identified as 
potential chairmen of committees. Thus, the preliminary planning for the conference 
was completed by mid-May which culminated in invitation letters to be sent to 
conference attendees. The conference was scheduled to be held on June 12, 1956, 
which did not happen because of Eisenhower’s ileitis attack. Abbott Washburn and 
other conference organizers had to hold off the people-to-people proposal for another 
three months. 
 
Inauguration of the People-to-People Program 
After a year-long preparation by the United States Information Agency, mostly by 
its Office of Private Cooperation, the White House conference on the People-to-People 
Partnership opened on September 11, 1956.With high hopes of appealing to the 
audience, the conference dignitaries included the President, Vice President, and the 
Secretary of State, who delivered personal remarks at the opening session. The 
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audience of more than 150 people consisted of American citizens representing every 
sector of the society. Among them were doctors and lawyers, teachers and theologians, 
politicians and philanthropists, congressmen and cartoonists, entrepreneurs and 
entertainers, writers and publishers, actors and activists. The demographic feature of 
the program committees was as diverse as their activities; they were republicans, 
democrats and independent politicians, Christians, Catholics and Jewish, white and 
black, and men and women.283 
The opening remarks delivered by Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles 
emphasized every individual American citizen’s role in creating an understanding 
between peoples. Vice President Richard Nixon warned “against a superior attitude 
towards others and called for a recognition of the fact that other peoples may have old 
and distinguished cultural traditions.” There are no backward nations,” Nixon stated, 
“nations are just different, and different peoples have different values.” Therefore the 
“unforgiveable sin is to go to peoples with an air of superiority or condescension.”284 
Eisenhower’s people-to-people idea boosted the participants’ patriotism and civic 
activism, resulting in the creation of forty-two committees during the conference.  It was 
seen as a “bold new expansion of popular relations activities on a grand scale.”285 The 
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following day, the conference participants engaged in four major sessions to discuss the 
issues concerning the Cold War America’s overseas image and potential contributions 
that could be made by individual citizens and non-governmental organizations.  
During the discussion sessions, committee chairpersons exchanged their ideas: 
Justice Simmons said that people in the Middle East ask that “we see their problems 
with their eyes… we cannot go to these people and tell them what to do. We must 
accept them as equals and let them know that.” As one of the committee chairpersons, 
Mr. Meany noted that if the program is to “encourage private groups to enter into 
exchanges with the Iron Curtain, [he] cannot be a party to that crime against America,” 
because people behind the curtain are “prisoners, and government controlled,” so he 
could not “deal with the Russian people.” Another chairperson stressed the importance 
of people-to-people being a “two-way proposition.” “We must not just tell America’s story 
abroad,” she said, “rather we must show the people overseas that we want to know 
about them and their institutions.”286 
The opening speeches moved the conference attendees and brought their 
goodwill sense and “morale into high gear.” To them, the logic behind promoting world 
peace through people-to-people communication seemed acceptable. The conference 
organizers frequently emphasized that the People-to-People program was an ideal 
device for managing America’s distorted image so it was urgent to institutionalize it 
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under government guidance. The program’s target would be the “free world,” where 
Theodore S. Repplier had completed a six-month trip in 1955. 287 
The USIA’s personnel provided the newly appointed chairmen with the nuts and 
bolts for carrying out the program errands in each specific area of concern. Examples of 
potential activities were presented during the conference: contacting people in 
corresponding fields, popularizing the people-to-people concept, and sponsoring 
exchanges. Some of those suggested activities were as mundane as sponsoring 
exchange of hobby and craft shows or promoting international photo contests or 
increasing the number of international pen-pals while others such as organizing 
community salutes (e.g., Boston-to-Rome) or implementing projects for the 
handicapped as evidence of America’s “respect for human dignity” were unique. But 
some of the activities such as “stimulating writing books on American ideology and 
People’s capitalism,” or sponsoring “briefing booklets” for Americans visiting and 
working overseas were clearly politicized.288 
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Committees, Commitments, Controversies… 
People-to-People Committees included categories such as advertising, banking, 
cartoonists, books, businesses, farmers, the hotel industry, insurance, labor and letter 
writing. Within a month after the conference most of 42 committee chairmen completed 
their membership rosters, and 16 committees had held their organizational meetings 
shaping hospitality plans, each in their own field. The basic idea was to give overseas 
visitors “warmer U.S. welcome… more meaningful look at American life at home and at 
work.” The Letter-writing committee targeted at “naturalized citizens” who would be 
encouraged to supply names of overseas friends, relatives. The major task for The 
Book committee was to find out “how to get better books… and what kind of books do 
most good overseas.” The Public Relations committee provided a guide for travelers 
abroad under the theme, “When you go, make a friend for yourself, your industry, your 
country.” The Hobbies committee chairman, H.L. Lindquist wrote that if the program was 
“successfully carried out, it could be [a] means of changing world history.”  
The Advertising and the Cartoonist committees would “exploit language of 
humor” to “interpret democracy,” to make peaceful policies and democratic ideals of the 
U.S. understood and to work for a “true partnership with other peoples to gain their 
sympathetic understanding in happier, friendlier and more peaceful world.” The 
Magazine committee planned to find out “reading habits and preference abroad” so it 
would be used to “sharpen aims of U.S. magazine collection drives.”289 The Writer’s 
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committee chaired by the Nobel Laureate William Faulkner sent a letter to American 
writers a “unique” letter requesting them to write their ideas about People-to-People: 
Faulkner’s letter said: “The president asked me to organize American writers to 
see what we can do to give a true picture of our country to other people. Will you join 
such an organization? And he asked his writers to send their ideas and enclosed his 
own ideas as a “sample:” 
1. Anaesthetize, for one year, American vocal cords 
2. Abolish, for one year, American passports 
3. Commandeer every American automobile. Secrete Johnson grass seed in the cushions and 
every other available place. Fill the tanks with gasoline. Leave the switch key in the switch and 
push the car across the Iron Curtain.  
4. Ask the government to establish a fund. Choose 10.000 people between 18 and 30, preferably 
communists. Bring them to this country and let them see America as it is. Let them buy an 
automobile on the installment plan, if that is what they want… 
 
Comments and counterproposals came in and thirty well-known authors met in 
New York to hear Faulkner pursue in “seriousness his idea of bringing in our enemies to 
see us.” Finally, after some abstentions, twenty-five writers including John Steinbeck 
and the young poet Donald Hall accepted Faulkner’s statement. Steinbeck suggested 
the committee bring to America people from all over the world who “do not agree with 
us.”290 
The Perception of People-to-People at Its Early Stages 
With various motivations many of the chairmen of the People-to-People 
committees expressed their willingness to engage in the nation’s civic activities through 
their letters sent to the President before the conference. The letter sent by the 
President’s Office of Macmillan Company Publishers stated that it was a “privilege and 
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an honor” to help “the government’s endeavor to sell the American ideology of freedom 
throughout the world.”291Robert R. Mathews, the Vice President of the American 
Express Company, responded on behalf of his chief Mr. Reed, who was returning from 
Europe, that Mr. Reed directed him to “accept immediately [the president’s] invitation to 
attend the conference”292These are few of the many letters which viewed that it was 
timely to call for the combined efforts of all citizens to make the American way of life and 
its ideals better known to the rest of the world.  
Dulles defined the people-to-people idea as a new effort to bring the individual 
forces of America’s democracies to work upon these great world problems the country 
faced.293 Nixon noted, “Smile and a handshake is the same abroad as in the United 
States… thus people-to-people program would be more suitable than the government-
to-government approach to convey the real affection and friendship.”294 These were 
only a few of the flowing praises for the People-to-People Program. But in spite of 
inspirations and motives expressed by its actual participants, critics did not overlook the 
program. 
During the initial kick-off conference, some committee chairmen raised the 
questions pertaining to its link with the government, tax deductibility, security, and 
funding issues. One chairman asked as to why it was necessary to “obtain security 
clearance” of committee members if the program is non-governmental. The USIA’s 
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initial reply to People-to-People chairmen was explicit and straightforward. Conger 
Reynolds, Chief of the Office of Private Cooperation (IOC) stated that his office would 
only provide “seed money” probably under a contract basis and insisted that funding for 
the program would come from private sources through fundraising.295 Such a response 
was compliant with Eisenhower’s objective to create a self-sustaining private 
organization without government affiliation so the genuine and enduring friendship 
would be maintained by individuals’ initiatives.  
Many chairmen, however, preferred government’s leadership role and guidance 
at the program’s initial stage. The People-to-People organizers and its participants who 
optimistically looked at the program’s success could not anticipate the implications of 
the persisting fear and aversion of the program’s tie with the government agencies. 
Thus, due to continued suspicions and animosities towards the relationship between 
People-to-People and the government, many of the proposed projects lacked financial 
support from trusted foundations. In a report sent by Nelson Rockefeller to the 
President, the real reason all foundations were reluctant to sponsor the People-to-
People program was their fear that it would take over everything that everybody else 
had been doing.296 The Ford Foundation Trustees, upon request of funds from the 
People-to-People Foundation, made the same statement.297  In response to the letter 
sent by Charles Wilson, President of the newly established People-to-People 
Foundation, the Ford Foundation CEO, Henry T. Heald stated that if they were to 
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support the People-to-People Program financially, it would lose, as a private agency, 
the selectivity they wished to retain and would inevitably be thought to be linked to the 
government.298 
Some professional institutions and experts engaging in the field of cultural and 
humanitarian programs saw the People-to-People program as “starry eyed amateurs 
swarming all over the world and messing around with delicate matters of foreign 
affairs.”299 But many people including politicians and pundits appeared to accept the 
people-to-people idea.  As one of the most cosmopolitan senators, Hubert Humphrey 
suggested that “we institute people-to-people diplomacy in the battle to win over newly 
developing nations.” He continued, “we should be wise and prudent to search out areas 
of contact and understanding that are over and beyond the political… We have a natural 
ability for this type of contact.”300 One article in the U.S. and World News Report noted 
that President Eisenhower’s appeal is one of the “most constructive peace efforts of 
current history.”301Demaree Bess in the Saturday Evening Post wrote that the People-
to-People movement would develop “permanent world-wide outlets for the friendliness” 
which should be the most effective answer to the Kremlin’s hate-America 
propaganda.302 Resolutions pledging to support People-to-People were coming in from 
national organizations: Photographic society of America, American Stamp Dealers 
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Association; National Philatelic Museum; Brand Names Foundation, Inc., and many 
more “declared in support of People-to-People and are ready to be of service.”303 
Along with domestic reactions, the international audience expressed their 
perceptions of the program: A French cultural affairs official in America remarked: “I do 
not know what all this American initiative and activity portends. It may mean simply that 
Washington has some new political aim in mind. But I am reporting to Paris that it may 
possibly be a good one.”304 The U.S. neighbor’s reaction was optimistic as the following 
statement suggested: “Two presidents had a quite talk about the program and the 
president of Mexico said it was the “best one of its kind in existence.”305 Venezuela, 
West Germany and Italy were planning to send an increasing number of local 
employees and students to America. 306 
While advocating for Eisenhower’s idea, historian Philip Coombs has asserted 
that the fault that led to the obscurity of the program resided not in the President’s basic 
assumption but in the strategy.307 Coombs believes that the Eisenhower administration 
did not really recognize that “a large and diverse people-to-people program” had been 
under way for a long time. Thus, the real need at that time was not to launch a new 
people-to-people program, but to strengthen the many existing organizations and 
programs which linked both private and public sectors.308 
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The archival sources suggest, however, that Eisenhower was well aware of 
individual-initiated programs that were already well known abroad. Despite numerous 
church-sponsored outreach initiatives, secular volunteer service organizations such as 
Kiwanis and Rotary International, which aimed at providing people with a practical 
means to form enduring friendships, to render altruistic service and to build better global 
communities had already shown international commitments recognized both at home 
and overseas. 
But Eisenhower was dissatisfied with what America was doing to maintain her 
overseas image. At this point, Dr. Gabriel Hauge, administrative assistant to the 
President commented that Eisenhower took “cognizance of the large amount of people-
to-people work” carried on by many American organizations, but he believed that 
Americans needed more.309 
Theodore Repplier’s detailed study of America’s overseas image problems 
played a great role in designing and developing People-to-People. Frustrated with the 
progress of America’s public diplomacy overseas, Repplier submitted to the USIA and 
the President a report, including his suggestions which he believed deserved earnest 
consideration. Repplier’s study provided an alternative view of the inception of the 
People-to-People idea. Thus, having been informed of America’s image problem, it was 
Eisenhower’s intention to systematize all the overseas actions being conducted by 
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private and government agencies subsumed under one institution to be named the 
People-to-People Program. 
Financial Hurdles, Displaced Committees, “Disenchanted Foundations” 
More than two hundred papers in big and small towns carried stories about 
people-to-people over next several months. Americans were getting to know about the 
program. But how to finance the fledgling program was People-to-People’s “most 
immediate dilemma” from the very beginning.310Committee chairpersons were 
“generally under the impression that they would not be expected to raise funds 
personally for their individual committees.”311 Thus non-government financing of the 
program continued to be the basic principle, which was in the hands of Jacob’s 
committee, The Special Task Force on Finances. The USIA officers boasted that their 
department was an “idea factory,” so “we think up ideas and then get private American 
citizens and organizations and businesses to carry them out. We have worked more 
than 1000 organizations.” Thus the “only expense to the U.S. taxpayer is the cost of 
running the idea factory—a small government department of twenty eight persons.”312 
Discontented by the lack of sources, People-to-People organizers came up with 
an idea that establishing a private foundation would be the most effective tool for 
fundraising through various avenues. Thus, the People-to-People Foundation was 
incorporated in 1957 primarily to raise money for its committees which lacked resources 
of their own. First, it applied to Ford Foundation for a grant of $570,000 but the 
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foundation turned down the request. The Ford foundation reasoned that people-to-
people volunteers were “amateurs” and the program had possible duplication with 
existing Ford-supported activities.”313After the requests for funds were turned down by 
three major foundations, several minor ones and most of the 500 biggest American 
business corporations, Charles E. Wilson, President of the newly established People-to-
People foundation, sent a memorandum to its Trustees explaining that the foundation 
had been “extremely unsuccessful” in raising funds for the People-to-People to date. 
The major foundations were “disenchanted with the People-to-People program.”314 
Frustrated, Wilson then wrote a letter to Eisenhower hoping that the president 
would lend a personal support to “his” program. The government thus far has provided, 
Wilson stated, the foundation with funds in the amount of $89,000 for the primary 
purpose of initiating a fund raising campaign to finance the operations of the 41 People-
to-People committees. Unfortunately, this effort “has never gotten off the ground.” The 
last $32,000 advanced… was agreed upon as the final try.”315What “we have not 
understood is why the USIA has persisted in maintaining a large staff to run the 
Program instead of giving the Foundation a contract that would have enabled us to 
develop this project and raise funds.” Therefore, if “you want to carry on this program, it 
will be necessary to divert funds” now used by the USIA in the form of a contract with 
the People-to-People Foundation, wrote Wilson.316 Wilson also mentioned that he 
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wanted to go directly to Congress for $500,000 as several senators including Hubert 
Humphrey expressed their support. But he “would not do it without president’s 
approval.”317To Wilson’s dismay, Eisenhower was not clear whether he should request 
funds for People-to-People from government agencies nor did he show any sign of 
“divert[ing] funds” from the USIA. Wilson’s People-to-People foundation discontinued its 
activities as of June, 1958.  
When suggesting his initial people-to-people idea back in 1956, Eisenhower 
hoped that private foundations and individuals would potentially be a financial backbone 
for the program. Thus he, from the beginning, did not anticipate any financial support to 
be appropriated by government agencies. Eisenhower thought that a monumental task 
such as people-to-people diplomacy would impress and invigorate volunteer-funders. 
For him, promoting the president’s initiative for the sake of America’s national purpose 
should be a matter of the unified spirit that the nation sorely needed during the height of 
the Cold War.  
Despite its financial difficulties, volunteers behind the People-to-People 
program’s various committees did not give up their hope and effort. As of 1959, half of 
the initial 42 committees were actively engaging in outreach activities. Through the 
Garden committee, the USIA Chief Information Officer Mr. James Macfarland, a 
“diplomat with the watering can,” who “introduced squash to Germany,” brought a 
“positive result in German-American friendship.”318 The committee of the Armed 
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Services was engaging in more civilian initiatives: 4000 iron lungs were sent to polio-
stricken Japanese Hokkaido; a group of soldiers and their wives organized “Operation  
Friendship” in Panama; Chief Petty Officer on Formosa donated his savings of 
$9.400 to help build a nursery for the children of Chinese workers; 100,000 textbooks 
for elementary schools were donated to the Republic of Korea and doctors and 
corpsmen of the US Naval Air Station visited every six weeks to treat villagers in 
neighboring provinces.319 
By the time Eisenhower left the White House in 1960 to become a chairperson of 
the People-to-People International with the recommendation of President John F. 
Kennedy, who would later become an honorary chairman of People-to-People, out of 
the initial 42 committees, 26 were actively engaging in People-to-People activities. The 
rather unsuccessful nature of the People-to-People campaign might be explained by 
several reasons: it was initiated by the government and abandoned by it thereafter; it 
therefore did not have coherent leadership; it did not have fixed financial support neither 
from the government nor from private groups; it was too broad and too inclusive and its 
political motive and private target were contradictory.320 
Since the time the People-to-People International was formally chartered in 
November, 1961 and permanently headquartered in Kansas City, private groups and 
individuals, including Joyce C. Hall, President of Hallmark Cards and its associated  
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foundation, financially supported it. Joyce C. Hall was not only a personal friend of 
Eisenhower—a “golfing buddy”—but he was also interested in Eisenhower’s people-to-
people idea as it “matched” those of his own Hallmark Foundation.321 Hall once 
remarked that “the unanimous opinion seems to be that People-to-People is a sound 
approach to our greatest problem…that while much has been accomplished, only the 
surface has been scratched … that the program should be continued and expanded 
independent of government or political association.” He was the most active and 
instrumental person among other board members who worked to restructure 
Eisenhower’s program.322 As Hall planned, there were to be additional programs such 
as the People-to-People University program, Classroom exchange program, People-to-
People Travel and Civic Committees and Mexican Program (Saludos Amigos) which 
would expand initial People-to-People campaign.323 
 The People-to-People program earned bi-partisan support and President John 
F. Kennedy became its first Honorary Chairman. The opening ceremony of the People-
to-People International was attended by all of the living ex-presidents—Eisenhower, 
Truman and Hoover and ambassadors and delegates from sixty countries. With 
renewed purposes and structure, the People-to-People campaign was expanded by 
new programs and projects. The People-to-People University Program, Classroom 
Exchange Programs and numerous other Community chapters were all newly “built-in 
projects.” Among them the Civic Committee’s Sister-City program was the most 
successful and one that continues until the present day.  
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Cities and Citizen Diplomats: The Sister-Cities Program, 1956-1966 
 
One of the more successful initiatives undertaken by the People-to-People 
Program was a sister-city approach which was developed under its Civic Committee. 
The Civic Committee’s purpose was to accomplish People-to-People’s objectives on a 
city-to-city basis.324 Eisenhower’s intention was to “involve individuals and organized 
groups at all levels of society in citizen diplomacy hoping that personal relationships 
fostered through sister cities, counties, and state affiliations, would lessen the chance of 
future world conflicts.”325In its early stages, the Civic Committee’s activities were guided 
by the Office of Private Cooperation (IOC) of the USIA and were basically aimed at 
expanding community affiliations, establishing international friendship councils, and 
organizing community salutes. The officially appointed chairman of the committee was 
George Schuster, President of Hunter College.326 
A year after the White House conference, the IOC made an analysis of the 
progress of the overall People-to-People program and stated that out of the initial forty-
two committees, twenty were organized and had already done something that had 
impact abroad and other committees had taken some preliminary actions and few were 
not yet organized.327 The Civic Committee, as one of those “not yet organized” groups, 
had no chairman and thus lacked organizational leadership. The best way to get those 
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“unorganized” committees move ahead was to “freshen up the leadership of the 
committees.”328 
Thus, the IOC wanted a fresh appointee who would take care of the Civic 
Committee. For this purpose, Schuster was replaced by Mark Bortman, Director of the 
Bortman Plastic Company, and one of the most “active” members of the People-to-
People program. Upon completion of his overseas trip and extensive conversations with 
chiefs of states, ambassadors, and businessmen about the People-to-People program, 
Bortman noted that “the idea of the People-to-People community was applauded as 
[the] best means to world peace and understanding…ever developed…”329 For his 
enthusiasm and extension of People-to-People’s overseas reputation, Bortman was 
recognized by the program’s monthly news published by its Public Relations committee.  
Bortman was an experienced leader who served in high-ranking positions both in 
private corporations and in governmental organizations. Under his leadership and in 
close cooperation with the American Municipal Association (AMA), which “pledged its 
full support to the President in promoting peace and understanding through People-to-
People,” the Civic Committee’s Sister City Program was “reconstituted” in 1958 and 
started to undertake dramatic initiatives to expand various town affiliations projects. 
According to the official correspondence of the National League of Cities which was 
sent to the Civic Committee, a questionnaire was distributed to more than two hundred 
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American communities, which either started or had been operating Sister-City programs 
with two hundred fifty cities abroad.330 
The majority of people involved in this program were unpaid volunteers. The 
government “[did] not control and [did] not finance sister-city programs.”331 But the 
government would respond “with no strings attached” if the leaders of the town affiliation 
program needed “additional” help.332 The USIA official emphasized people not to be 
involved in sister-cities if they would not be willing or able to put forth the time and effort 
and resources to establish “meaningful, continuing” relationships with a sister city 
abroad. The program was “no field for dilettantes or the once-over-lightly approach;” it 
was not a way in which people could do “something” for their country “cheaply, 
effortlessly and without trouble or bother.”333 
The procedures for establishing affiliations between cities were self-starting 
though somewhat bureaucratic. What community people would need to do was first to 
find out whether certain group or community members would be willing to take part. 
Then a community representative would be sent to the mayor of a town for furthering a 
new initiative. Once the mayor’s office was introduced to the community’s willingness to 
have a sister-city, a community-based steering committee for carrying out the program 
would be set up. Principally, the mayor would act as honorary chairman as the 
committee would act independently. The steering committee’s first agenda would be to 
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select a prospective sister-city based upon mutual interests, similar size, economic 
characteristics, cultural interests, ethnic composition of the community, and some 
historical ties with some assistance from the American Municipal Association (AMA). 
To provide a prospective sister-city with some background information about a 
proposing city or town, a detailed background sketch would be prepared and sent to the 
AMA for review. A final step was to write to a prospective partner and wait for an 
acceptance of a prospective sister-city.334 Finding a “suitable” sister-city overseas would 
take more than half a year due to the complexity of matching both cities’ mutual 
interests that would lead to a close, presumably long-lasting relationship. The scope 
and nature of the privately sponsored exchanges of ideas and persons that would form 
the core of a continuing town affiliation tended to rely on resources of participating 
communities. Yet the elements of continuing personal contact and wide community 
participation would constitute the only basis of a town affiliation that would live up to “its 
promise of passing on to the next generation a heritage of improved relations on a very 
small planet.”335 
Although the grand People-to-People project was intended to run its activities 
with less (if any) interference from government agencies, from the initial stage, the IOC 
was responsible for guidance and facilitation of the committees’ overall actions. Under 
this procedure, the People-to-People committees were initially provided with policy 
directions by USIA officers. There was no federal government control over the program, 
nor were federal funds available in support of sister-city activities by local communities. 
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Typical activities in which sister-cities engaged included educational television, lecture 
series, mutual visitations of dancers, craft persons, teachers, workers, exchange of 
students, medical books, photos, tapes, boy scout programs, garden clubs, speakers’ 
bureaus, after Luncheon club, language instruction, libraries, photograph collection, 
athletic and music events, all of which forged both a transatlantic and a transpacific 
nature of broader social, cultural, and commercial cooperation. Some archival sources 
deserve a special mention.  
The International Friendship Council of Fresno has shipped 200 pairs of used 
glasses and 200 eyeglass lens blanks to the Schell Eye Hospital at Velore, India. There 
is more evidence that reveals a commercial impetus of the program. The Iowa 
Yamanashi Pork-Lift project sent 35 pure-bred hogs to Kofu, the capital of Yamanashi to 
form the nucleus of a hog-breading industry in Yamanashi. The latter case set the tone 
for an assumption that cities or businessmen were more likely to prioritize economic 
benefits and thus seemed to have very little to do with fostering world peace. Yet, it was 
assumed, that it would be unlikely that mutual commercial interests would hurt genuine 
friendships between private individuals and would generate hatred and misperception. 
Businesses, if they were to succeed on a broader global scale, needed to take 
American foreign policy into account when conducting their overseas actions. They 
needed to be invested in propagating a positive image of the U.S. abroad. The Town 
Affiliation program organizers were aware of the view that “businesses do not live in a 
house alone, but should help to improve the American image abroad and to help identify 
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itself with the US. Business can make itself perfect in its overseas position, but if the 
national prestige falls, then the image of business falls.”336 
Among sister-city activities, the exchange program was one of the more popular 
means of demonstrating the effectiveness of the town affiliation programs. For both 
American and foreign visitors, their travel purpose and destination were varied. The 
number of American business people who visited their sister-cities was nearly twice 
than that of international visitors.337 But the overseas visitors for student and youth 
exchange purposes outnumbered American visitors. These suggest that the more 
emphasis on education and culture was given among overseas youth and students 
while business and corporate organizations tended to be more interested in overseas 
visitations of town affiliation programs in the United States. 
By the end of 1958, the Sister-City program already had seventy American cities 
affiliated with foreign cities, largely in Europe.338To celebrate this achievement and 
publicize the sister-city idea, the AMA, in cooperation with Bortman’s Committee, 
organized its annual congress in December 1958, during which Ambassador George 
Allen, Director of the USIA made a lengthy statement about the process and progress of 
the Town Affiliation Program339.  
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Allen, a seasoned ambassador who served in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, 
was a cosmopolitan man with a strong belief in the role of ordinary citizens in foreign 
relations. He stated in his address that America and Japan once had the “worst” 
relations but “cordial affiliations” between cities of the two countries now made the 
mutual relations “better than ever.” Ambassador Allen’s conviction was reflected in his 
ambitious goal to have town affiliation programs carried on “until America [had] 3000 
city affiliations.” Such a development, Allen noted, could have a “robust impact” in the 
projection of America overseas.340 
Indeed, the term “town affiliations” came into currency right after World War II. 
But a sustained, nationwide effort was encouraged and promoted by organizations of 
national significance only after the first general meeting of the AMA and the Civic 
Committee of the People-to-People held in 1958.341 Ambassador Allen once remarked 
that Americans have heard of the so-called “adoption of foreign cities” for many years. 
But affiliations between towns would be better than adopting foreign cities.342 
Prior to Eisenhower’s initiative to reinvigorate town affiliations, the city twinning 
projects were spread during the war   through war relief organizations, including 
Bundles for Britain, Russian War Relief, and American Aid to France, Inc., and these 
mechanisms became liaisons between the U.S. and war devastated countries for relief 
aid and the facilitation of rehabilitation.343 The idea was developed, however, as an 
American aid program for war-ravaged cities and was redirected by the committee from 
its original charitable base to a broader and more permanent foundation which was built 
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on mutual interest and friendly understanding. Thus, town affiliations took on new 
meaning and purpose under the leadership of the People-to-People’s Civic Committee, 
and it became a relationship of reciprocal exchanges rather than one of a simple one-
way demonstration of American sympathy.344 Some city twinning efforts began even 
before the People-to-People program in the U.S. 
Sister-City affiliations between Yokohama in Japan and San Diego, for instance, 
began in 1954 with a proposed gift of a Japanese Stone Snow Lantern from the 
Yokohama city residents to the people of San Diego. At that time, there were no 
prescribed methods for developing such an affiliation.345Along with war relief reasons, 
some sister cities were affiliated on a namesake basis and had close ties with the city in 
that foreign country. One such affiliation was New Bern, North Carolina, which had been 
affiliated with Bern, Switzerland. It suggests that this kind of city twinning was not simply 
a namesake affiliation but a long, historic bond since New Bern was founded by the 
people who came from Bern, Switzerland about 200 years ago.346 But why did America 
need a newer rationale for town affiliations during the Cold War?  
As the Sister-City program’s guideline states: Town affiliation helps people make 
friends for their country and help it promote world peace: it will “help demonstrate how 
your ideals are reflected in your way of life; you help bring about a better understanding 
of what your country is doing to bring peace and understanding in the world today and 
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you help combat the distortions of Communistic propaganda.”347Whether town 
affiliations brought about a better understanding between the US and other countries, 
the people involved in the exchange articulated their way of life as a reflection of their 
national ideals. 
Some of its projects suggest that the Sister-City program was not opposed to the 
idea of combating the distortions of communist propaganda. The city of Tacoma, 
Washington made a large exhibit about its lifestyles at the request of the sister-city, 
Kokura, Japan. 1,150,000 Japanese people visited Tacoma’s exhibit. It was housed 
next to a Chinese Communist exhibit and made a singular contribution to Japanese 
understanding of the American way of life.348 According to the United Towns 
Organization (UTO) which promoted Franco-British twinning throughout the world from 
both sides of the Iron Curtain and from Africa, American sister-city program, which was 
conducting its activities through the DOS, was a “serious obstacle to a better world 
understanding.”  
Thus, UTO sent a memo to President Kennedy claiming that the State 
Department sought to use city twinning mainly for “immediate narrow political 
purposes.” For example, twinning of American cities with those of Japan in an effort to 
obtain support for the Japanese-American pact, and with various Southern American 
cities in countries where it was desired to “enhance US prestige.” Such activity “has an 
artificial character because formal prefabricated links lack spontaneity.” Only civic 
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leaders benefit and actual townspeople who are conscious of the political implications 
are mistrustful and gain nothing from such contacts.” UTO’s twinning was “essentially 
cultural and non-political in character and exist to promote real contacts among the 
people.”349But it would be difficult to find a division between the cultural and non-political 
since a transfer of cultural notions to other countries is always political. Thus cultural 
exchange activities could still be highly politically charged. 
It seemed to be true that American officials supported city twinning programs for 
some geopolitical and strategic purposes. Pleased by the “effectiveness” of the Civic 
Committee’s activities, in a letter sent to Bortman, President Lyndon B. Johnson stated 
that twinning American cities with Japanese, German, and Latin American cities was 
important as these were the “vital areas of the world.” Thus, he proclaimed, we “should 
quadruple our efforts and have a thousand sister programs in the near future.”350 
 Out of all the countries involved in the sister-city program, Japan was the most 
active. As of 1963, 59 Japanese cities had already had their sister cities in the U.S. and 
ten more were expected to enter that year.351There was only one Japanese-Soviet 
sister city, Maizuru-Nakhodka. As the source noted, Soviet-Japanese city twinning was 
for economic benefits. No other Japanese city took, as of June 1961, Soviet offers for 
city affiliations even though officials from Kremlin repeatedly made efforts. Japanese 
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mayors took “refuge in excuses.” And few other Japanese town affiliations existed, 
mostly in name only with other Western European countries as well.352 
Yet archival sources suggest that many sister-cities were engaging in non-
political, humanitarian and cultural activities: Brest, France had a children’s health clinic 
built by funds from Denver, CO; Medford, Oregon, had a kindergarten for deaf children 
because Alba, Italy sent over dolls hand-made in Italian homes to be sold in America; 
Coral Gables, Florida, sent a truck to Cartagena, Columbia, and the truck delivered 
lunches to children in 25 schools; schools and libraries in Seattle, Washington, received 
hundreds of books on the Orient from Yokohama, Japan; Hagerstown, Maryland, had 
severe unemployment in 1960, so Wesel, Germany offered financial help,353 and wheel 
chairs were donated to old people’s home in Moulmein, Burma.354 In many occasions, 
sister-cities’ intentions showed nothing but “friendliness and hospitality,” as city 
residents stretched their helping hands to their twin cities: the city of Madison, 
Wisconsin presented a “70-pound cheddar cheese to the visiting Norwegian ship as a 
“gesture of friendship” to its sister city Oslo. Norwegian sailors were amazed and 
delighted with the huge Wisconsin cheese.”355Thus, it earned bi-partisan sympathies 
and support.  
Edward R. Murrow, the USIA Director and an enthusiast of public diplomacy, 
stated that “there are those who would suggest that in the magnitude of our cataclysmic 
                                                           
352 Memo sent from USIS Tokyo to USIA Washington, Status of Japan-American City Affiliations, Feb 
7,1961, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 41, EL. 
353 Address by Edward R. Murrow, Director of USIA at the Washington-Bangkok Sister-City Celebration, 
December 1962, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 4, EL. 
354 Town Affiliation Activities Report, 1964,  Bortman, Mark. : Papers, Box 5, EL. 
355 Action! The People-to-People Community Chapter Program Newsletter, Vol.2 No.5, Sept-Oct, 
1964,Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 52, EL. 
 143 
anxiety, linking two cities may seem a little contribution. But “It is better to understand a 
little, than to misunderstand a lot.”356President John F. Kennedy appraised the Town 
Affiliation Program as an “opportunity to assist the United States materially in carrying 
out its peaceful objectives abroad.”357Eisenhower said that the People-to-People 
movement stands “apart from government, it is not a propaganda agency, not another 
foreign aid program… and it should be expanded a hundredfold.”358 The USIA officer 
stated that he was “certain” that The People-to-People program “has inaugurated a new 
chapter in American history.”359 
One feature of the various interpretations of the sister-city approach was that 
rather than an “irrational” focus on the one-dimensional goal of Americanization or 
American supremacy, as it was reflected in previous city twinning initiatives, this one 
demonstrated reasonable concern for integration and internationalization of world 
communities through a variety of activities at the grass-roots level. The Sister-City 
Program was therefore different from the Truman Doctrine or the Marshal Plan or even 
other cultural/student exchange programs funded by the government, which were 
initially designed to influence leaders and elites rather than build bridges between 
ordinary citizens. With this broader mission, the Sister City program contributed to 
changing the nature of international atmosphere through both domestic communities 
and affiliated foreign cities. 
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Since the sister-city approach was reaffirmed, however, by the President and 
partially directed by the USIA, its potential link with the government was a concern for 
the general public. Especially for those who were not personally involved in the actual 
program, town affiliations tended to be viewed as a politically “invisible” instrument for 
winning the hearts and the minds of foreign audiences. Prescribed answers to the public 
misperception and suspicion highlighted volunteers who enjoyed friendship across 
national boundaries as an “avocation” and a “rewarding hobby.”360Yet, despite the initial 
involvement of government agencies in citizen diplomacy, there were fewer political 
incentives for voluntary participants who would not act as official diplomats for the 
government, but as ordinary citizen mediators for their communities. 
Under the auspices of “sister cities,” American communities were collaborating 
with foreign publics on a day-to-day level. The nature and objectives of the Civic 
committee’s actions were multidimensional and covered a multiplicity of issues across 
ordinary American citizens, including doctors, actors, teachers, farmers, engineers, 
writers, dancers, athletes and even schoolchildren whose enthusiasm and cosmopolitan 
minds were shared by their foreign counterparts. But when government agencies, 
including the USIA provided them with basic thoughts and directions for their 
interactions, it would seem to be mere brainwashing.361 
From the outset of its “freshened up” leadership, the Civic Committee’s work on 
town affiliations was extensive as it reached a “phenomenal record” of three hundred 
affiliations in less than a year, which testified to the program’s achievement in 
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international public relations.  Committee Chairman Bortman’s leadership would inspire 
interested Americans to devote their time and energy to a voluntary program. By 1958, 
the Civic Committee already had a membership of about one hundred Americans active 
in community and national organizations.  
Bortman’s committee was able to mobilize the interest and support of private and 
non-governmental organizations, including the International City Manager’s Association, 
the Inter-American Municipal Organization and the International Union of Local 
Authorities, all of which promoted sustained personal contact between cities as a 
pathway to world friendship and cooperation.362As a chairman, Bortman travelled 
50,000 miles to more than forty countries by visiting eighty-two foreign cities to 
personally investigate potential opportunities to collaborate with the foreign public. One 
source claims that the Civic Committee and its affiliated organizations made more than 
2,000 telephone calls in promoting the program in 1959.  
The committee claimed that by virtue of its “confidence-inspiring” expression of 
America’s good will towards other peoples of the world, it fulfilled the description 
provided by Senator Clair Engle of California as “the most dynamic development in the 
field of US foreign relations since WWII.” It would be an example of the basic objectives 
of public relations—the creation of a favorable image of integrity and responsibility. 
Secretary of State, Christian Herter advocated that this interchange between cities 
struck him as a basic way for peoples of different cultures to get to know one another 
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better. The Director of the USIA, George Allen noted that “town affiliations can break 
down barriers and foster respect and understanding among peoples in other nations.” 
Despite praise for the program at home, its value and effect as public officials 
and cultural leaders attested to an “instrument of international understanding” from the 
participant countries. One of the French visitors to New York wrote: “When I left France 
I did not have any precise idea about the U.S. But I found people ready to share the 
advantages of this beautiful country with anyone who is ready to enjoy them. I found a 
friendly nation where I feel at home… He further stated that when he met an American 
in France he wouldn’t have the “feeling of a stranger,” but a “fellow 
countryman.”363Particularly, its tangential effects in international industrial and 
commercial relations implicit in the large number of exchanges of business and 
professional groups were no less important than its cultural value.  
Through sister-city arrangements, many Americans had an opportunity to travel 
to foreign countries to enhance their understandings about other countries and cultures. 
According to the survey conducted by the National League of Cities, visits between 
sister cities in the United States and abroad increased by 81% in 1964. And visits 
between the people of U.S. and Latin American cities were the “most popular.”364 
Moreover, the views provided by people from foreign cities provided some clues. 
According to the USIA report, the affiliation ceremony was held with the Foreign 
Minister, Aichiro Fujiyama, as principal speaker in Yokohama. This was, as the USIA 
official remarked, “the first time I have heard of a foreign minister presiding at a town 
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affiliation ceremony.” The heads of a hundred leading organizations in Yokohoma 
attended the ceremony. Large press corps, including CBS television, covered the event. 
Ross Tharp, Vice Mayor of San Diego, was the main speaker at the Centennial 
ceremony, which was held before 30,000 people at the Peace Stadium. The audience 
included the Crown Prince of Japan, the Foreign Minister, the Dean of Diplomatic Corps 
and the U.S. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur.  According to the press note, one million 
people lined the streets. A centennial concert was held and the audience of more than 
5,000 Japanese people gave a standing ovation to the San Diego delegation when it 
entered the concert hall. All these would suggest that more requests from other 
Japanese cities would be expected in the future. 365 
Even though the 1960 questionnaire, which was conducted by the AMA among 
communities affiliated with foreign cities, seemed unsystematic and unsubstantial, it 
carried information about the activities and accomplishments of the Town Affiliation 
Program.366 In particular, the level and the percentage of citizens’ advocacy of town 
affiliations program and its impact on the “improvement of good-will toward an 
understanding of the U.S.” would demonstrate the Sister City Program’s achievement. 
The program helped improve collaboration among local communities and perception of 
the U.S.367 
As of October, 1966, 321 communities affiliated with 363 cities in 56 countries. 
Among them 96 cities were from California and 18 from Florida. Internationally, 128 
                                                           
365 USIA Correspondence sent by Snowden Chambers, Program Executive Officer of Private Cooperation 
to Mark Bortman, May 26, 1958, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box No.49, EL. 
366 For the details see the actual survey in appendix B. 
367 71 percent of the surveyed responded positively. 
 148 
were from Europe, 100 from the Far East, 114 from Latin America and 6 were from 
Africa.368 But the fate of the Town Affiliations Program almost came to the brink as 
People-to-People, Inc., was reorganized and all funds for the program support was 
terminated by 1966. Patrick Healy, Executive director of the National League of Cities 
worried that People-to-People’s non-funding status placed his program “in jeopardy,” 
and the sister-cities activities were “threatened with termination” by the end of 1966. But 
sister-city organizers still did not want to separate from People-to-People Inc., as the 
people-to-people concept per se was “prominent.”369But they continued seeking private 
funding opportunities and hoped that a Congressional Charter would be issued to 
incorporate the Town Affiliation Program.370 In 1967 People-to-People’s Sister City 
program was incorporated as Sister Cities International and became an independent 
organization.  
No doubt that the People-to-People campaign and its Sister-City program aided 
in improving cultural understanding between the U.S. and other countries, even if its 
motive behind this “understanding” was also political. But it is important to note that the 
intention of a program like this is not the only factor in a discussion of its effects. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, what matters is that there were effects, which, at least for 
the U.S., were politically advantageous, even if the people who volunteered in the 
program did not consciously think they were participating in a broader political 
movement. 
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Chapter 4 
Youth Idealism, Campus Activism and the Sixties: A Case Study of the 
People-to-People University Program, 1961-1975 
Almost overnight Lawrence, a small town in [the] American mid-west, 
received wide publicity as a City-Citizen of the World. Thirty five 
thousand residents of the city realized that their home is a neighbor to 
the world. 
 
The University of Kansas Alumni Magazine, 1962 
 
 
William F. Dawson, a twenty-two-year old junior at the University of Kansas 
began thinking about foreign students’ “problems” after he had attended an International 
Club meeting on campus in March, 1961. At that session, Dawson said, “my eyes were 
really opened.” He talked to students from all over the world and learned that they were 
not having a “good time.” Most of them had never seen anything beyond campus. As he 
told a reporter for the Saturday Evening Post, he was “really upset” at what he heard.371 
This KU student’s “discovery” of international students’ “problems” revealed a similar 
situation on American college campuses that encompassed about seventy thousand 
students from all over the world at the time. 
It would be tough to predict the impressions that they would take home, Dawson 
noted, and he was afraid as he “knew the answer,” after talking to international 
students.372The Wall Street Journal commented in the same year that thousands of 
international students attending American colleges and universities would go home 
“mad” at the United States. Mostly these “potentially influential” friends for America 
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would return “disillusioned and disenchanted” with Americans because few people 
showed personal interest in them.373 
According to the statistics released in 1961, over twenty thousand American 
students studied abroad each year and tens of thousands more travelled to foreign 
countries. At the same time, though seldom recognized, thousands of young men and 
women from other countries came to America each year to study at American 
institutions and learn from its people. A surprising number of those students coming to 
the U.S., however, “never gained” this understanding. Americans too often failed to 
recognize the “cultural adjustment and loneliness foreign students faced.”374 Since 
foreign students coming to the U.S. were very likely to be the leaders of tomorrow’s 
world, Dawson reasoned, “keeping them excluded from the American colleges and 
communities in which they were living is not only completely inhospitable, but it is also a 
danger.”375 
From the “neglected and isolated living” that foreign students experienced in the 
U.S. would grow the “roots of enmities”… that may “never be erased through good-will 
activity by Americans abroad,” the Christian Science Monitor commented in 1961.376 But 
why did it matter what foreign students on U.S. college campuses thought about 
America? It may not seem important, as advocates of the People-to-People diplomacy 
viewed, until one remembered that the “anti-American attitude of Ghana’s President 
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Kwame Nkrumah has been traced to the discrimination he experienced in the US during 
his student days… and we are probably still turning out Nkrumahs.”377 
The need for an effective international student program was also emphasized in 
1960 by two letters received from overseas by W. Clarke Wescoe, Chancellor of KU. In 
a letter sent to Wescoe, one former KU student from abroad wrote: “Of every ten 
students who go back to their country, nine carry ill feelings toward the American 
people. They live in packs while they stay there. I was sorry to find that the great 
majority of the students at KU are not interested in foreign students and do not know nor 
want to know their problems.” The student also wrote about the city of Lawrence, which 
was doing, as a community, “very little” to make foreign students feel “less isolated and 
despised. I advocate that the beginning to the solution of world problems is through real 
friendship.” 
The other letter sent to Wescoe was from an international student who had lived 
in a fraternity house while attending KU. The letter said: “I mean it when I say that I 
came in contact with what I consider American tradition in the very best sense of the 
word. The credit for my quick adjustment mainly belongs to my friends there.”378 
Whether or not Dawson’s concern about international students and Wescoe’s receipt of 
letters from former international students mutually stimulated one another to initiate the 
People-to-People program at KU, these documents provide insights into interrelated 
scenarios at that time. 
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Bill Dawson and the Birth of People-to-People at KU 
It was thus urgent for Bill Dawson that something had to be done to change the 
situation. He arranged a meeting for a number of foreign students to talk to campus 
leaders so they could “air their gripes.” As a result of the meeting, the People-to-People 
Council was set up on the KU campus at the end of March 1961. Dawson’s fledgling 
organization had a set of goals: to help foreign students in their early orientation and 
provide them with an opportunity to “assimilate” themselves with Americans; offer 
domestic students the opportunity to meet and talk with international students on an 
intimate basis so that it would eliminate the “contrived” and “superficial” nature of 
relationships between the two groups. The Council predicted that international students 
at American colleges would depart with a feeling of close friendship with the American 
people and a better understanding of the U.S., and hoped that Americans would receive 
an equal service in foreign lands. 
The People-to-People program organizers believed that “benefits will work in 
reverse, too.379 Dawson believed that “if it is successful it really can pay dividends.”380 
KU was selected as a pilot site and it was an “ideal ground” for such a program as it had 
a high number of foreign students enrolled on its campus.381 The town of Lawrence, the 
home for the University of Kansas, “may have been the most atypical Kansas towns—
thanks largely to the liberalizing influence of the university,” but it “on the whole was 
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politically conservative” and “not cosmopolitan.” As Lawrence grew from a “small, 
sleepy” college town after WWII, it experienced “acute growing pains.”382 
But political and social turmoil that prevailed throughout the 1960s “transformed” 
Lawrence. Student activism and changing perceptions of youth created “new identities” 
of young people, both as students and citizens. All these changes and challenges 
defined “politics more personally and helped to transform the whole community.”  Thus, 
as Wescoe defined, it was not only a “new era,” for the university, but for the city as 
well.383 
KU’s proximity to Kansas City where the People-to-People International was 
headquartered was another reason for its selection. The People-to-People International 
was at that time headed by former President Eisenhower and financially supported by 
Joyce Hall, president of the Hallmark Foundation. Dawson talked with Hall, who not only 
“warmly endorsed the plan but offered assistance.”384 
 With an initial enrollment of fifty, Dawson’s new group plastered the campus with 
one thousand posters and asked fraternities and sororities to donate $20 each to the 
new program. As Dawson said, “the toughest thing at first was to overcome the 
complacency of American students.” The program hoped, however, that American 
students would realize the “need of opening their eyes” and beginning to “think on [an] 
international scale.”385 
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The People-to-People movement, initiated by Eisenhower in 1956, indeed 
inspired Dawson’s new program. Eisenhower was coordinating at that time the overall 
operation of the program at the recommendation of President John F. Kennedy.386 As 
Swaebou Conateh, a senior at KU from Gambia stated, “this bipartisan nature of the 
organization has remained an important factor in People-to-People.” Dawson and his 
friends made People-to-People a voluntary effort of private citizens to advance the 
“cause of international friendship.”387Without spending a “single government cent,” 
People-to-People was initially a non-governmental, non-political voluntary movement. 
So its duplication at universities was then a “sort of stay-at-home Peace Corps 
operation,” springing spontaneously from the students.388 
As the program coordinator, Bill Dawson was proud to claim people-to-people’s 
non-affiliation with the government. Although the program “is receiving the guidance and 
assistance from the national People-to-People movement,” Dawson stated, “it will be 
financed and operated by students.”389From the very beginning of the People-to-People 
campaign, Eisenhower did not want to affiliate it with government and he did not ask for 
government funding. He expected that it should be an ordinary people’s endeavor. 
People-to-People Commitments 
Although the overall People-to-People University chapters and their 
organizational procedures and areas of operation were designed by the individual 
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university chapters’ executive members and volunteers, the general operational 
guideline was designed and developed by the People-to-People Headquarters located 
in Kansas City. It was based on a typical program which was viewed to be workable at 
any school.390The People-to-People University program’s typical program consisted of 
six committees: Brother-Sister relationships, Hospitality, Forums, Publicity, Job 
Placement and Student Ambassadors.  
The Brother-Sister Relationships committee would begin functioning even 
before foreign students arrived in Lawrence. Letters from KU students would reach 
foreign students in their home a month before their departure for the U.S., extending 
their welcome and asking for information on their arrival time and place. Upon receiving 
a reply, the People-to-People brother or sister would send a second letter informing that 
he or she would meet the incoming foreign student on arrival and help him or her get 
settled in Lawrence. Dawson said that eighty percent of the Brother-Sister relationships 
endured throughout the school term, and they frequently extended beyond campus 
boundaries. Brothers and sisters corresponded with the families of their students as 
well. Dawson, himself a brother of Ranbir Singh, a student from India, exclaimed that 
students who come to the U.S. are “scholars” in their home countries, but one would be 
“amazed at how baffled they are by many things we take for granted.”391 The simple 
questions such as how to dial a phone number, or how to read a timetable, or what is 
the right thing to say or to do would be tremendously complex for foreign students 
coming to a new country and culture. “Naturally, they’ve got handicaps to overcome.” 
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What might be considered ill-mannered here may be the polite thing to do in another 
country, Dawson said. Brothers and sisters were “selected based on their scholastic 
records.”392The Brother-Sister program was later renamed Contact to “make the entire 
program more one of personal contact and concern than a one-to-one problem.”393 
The Hospitality Program consisted of two major subprograms: home placement 
and tours. The Home Placement program provided foreign students with an opportunity 
to visit American families in Lawrence and Kansas communities during weekends, 
holidays and school breaks. And foreign students were invited to speak to civic groups, 
churches and schools about their countries. Tours allowed students to visit interesting 
places near Lawrence and metropolitan Kansas City, such as industrial plants, 
museums, art galleries, civic centers and farms, to meet Americans and see their 
operations. The Hospitality program was later expanded into the Lawrence Host Family 
program, which is currently coordinated by the Office of International Student Services 
and is still popular among international students at KU. 
Through a variety of meetings and gatherings, The Forum Program allowed 
both American and international students to exchange their views on diverse global 
issues, including debates on successes and failures of U.S. foreign policy, so that 
cultural exchanges could be made more “meaningful.” The Public Relations committee 
publicized every People-to-People activity and encouraged news sources to feature the 
program. This committee was responsible for publishing the monthly magazine People-
to-People News—a magazine that covered the entire operations of the People-to-
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People program. Further the committee’s People Talk magazine told stories about the 
KU program to its members and other interested people.   
Having realized international students’ need to work to maintain their lives, the 
People-to-People organizers initiated the Job Placement committee which offered a list 
of potential jobs for international students. Immediately after the program was 
established in summer of 1961, about sixty foreign students showed up at the People-
to-People program’s office seeking summer jobs. Yet, finding jobs for them in the city of 
Lawrence with only about thirty thousand people presented an impossible task for the 
organizers. Even for Americans, summer jobs sometimes were “hard to come by,” 
Dawson said. 394Raymond W. Edwards, one of the chairmen, stated in 1963 that it 
would be difficult to find jobs for foreign students because of the “racial, physical and 
religious barriers,” even if they were “entitled for manual labor” and not for jobs in their 
areas of studies.395 
But Dawson, his friend Rick Barnes, the first chairman of the Job Placement 
committee and fourteen others called a well-known businessman in nearby Kansas City 
to talk about the People-to-People mission. The businessman promptly wrote thirty-
seven leading firms in the state urging them to provide jobs for international students at 
KU. Only one came through hiring two students. Dawson and Barnes however did not 
give up their work. They would continue to call potential employers including local 
businessmen, newspaper editors, radio stations, chambers of commerce and anyone 
else who would listen to their story. Their “unstinting efforts” paid off as they received 
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offers for the remaining job requests.396 The students worked in “bowling alleys, on 
construction projects, on farms and pumping gas,” Dawson recalled. A shoe store in 
Topeka that hired one foreign student was proud to put a sign in its window that read, 
‘French, German, Spanish spoken here’ and asked for another student from People-to-
People the next summer, as it “helped their business.”397A construction company man 
wrote Dave Waxse, now chairman of the Job Placement committee, commented thus 
on an international student’s skill: “After Madanmohan Fadia left, we had to hire three 
men to do the work he did by himself.”398 
The Student Ambassadors Program had two goals: to enable American 
students to go abroad to learn more about other cultures and to “make them as good 
travelers” as possible. The program was quite successful in its early stages. As Dawson 
noted, in the summer of 1962 eight hundred students representing People-to-People 
University programs from all over the country visited about hundred and twenty colleges 
and universities in Europe. The primary goal of the European trip was to “improve 
student-to-student relations and help Europeans toward a better understanding of 
Americans.” During the orientation sessions which were held in Washington D.C., 
People-to-People student-ambassadors were taught to convey a favorable image of the 
United States to people they would meet overseas. However, from the perspectives of 
students, there were many incentives for travelling to foreign countries. Being a student 
ambassador for People-to-People was an opportunity to live a life of high adventure. 
Moreover, obtaining foreign experience through voluntary programs would also serve as 
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an attractive record in their future credentials. According to Monhollon, in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s most students at KU were “more intent on making grades, seeking the 
credential for a job and status in corporate, Middle-Class America than in learning.”399 
From the points of view of student ambassadors, the “most common 
misconception” they encountered in Europe was that people thought that “all Americans 
are rich.” Especially in Berlin, the students reported, they felt the “gravity and 
importance” of their trip. Viewing the wall, talking to East Berlin students and watching 
families risk their lives to escape to West Berlin made them even more determined to 
work toward better international understanding. The program coordinators were 
overwhelmed with the success of the program as many students showed interest in 
being student ambassadors and planned to send fifteen hundred student ambassadors 
not only to Europe but also to other pilot areas.400 
 
Successes and Expansions 
In the early years of the People-to-People University program, its achievements 
were “tremendous.”401The program officers were “extremely pleased with the response,” 
as Dawson noted, as they had more than 800 applications from KU students who want 
to help with People-to-People.”402 Dawson hoped that in the end it “might do more good 
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than President Kennedy’s Peace Corps.” And an active People-to-People program on 
every campus could go far in “correcting foreign students’ perception” of the U.S.403 
At the beginning of the fall semester of 1961, every international student was met 
on arrival in Lawrence by his or her “brother” or “sister” from the People-to-People 
program with whom they had corresponded during the summer. Both foreign students 
and visitors were provided with housing, if they had not arranged in advance; some 
were invited to live at the Hotel Eldridge for one dollar a night; churches, civic 
organizations and clubs encouraged support of the program; numerous invitations came 
from farmers houses, fraternity houses, from modest dwellings and large ones; each 
fraternity and sorority offered free room and board for a full term for one foreign student 
and a restaurant owner “adopted” two Philippine girls. Fraternities, the Student 
Government Body and individual Americans donated approximately four thousand 
dollars to help the program.  
For hundreds of college students from Saconika to Sacramento, the summer of 
1962 was a “third semester in which building international goodwill was their assignment 
and the world was their classroom.” Embarking on People-to-People projects in the U.S. 
and abroad, the students engaged in a variety of volunteer activities: five Japanese 
students from Waseda University set out on foot from San Francisco to “walk out across 
the United States so they could get to know our country from the ground up;” an 
American student spent two days “giving cholera shots to three thousand fluttering, 
pecking chickens on a farm in Israel;” thirteen young men from colleges in Europe and 
the Middle East spent three weeks in little Paola, Kansas “building a lakeside park and 
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barbecue pit as a gift of understanding.” They worked “without pay as guests” of Paolo 
city. 404 
Student ambassadors from Big Eight schools—the University of Missouri, The 
University of Nebraska, The University of Colorado, the Oklahoma State University, the 
University of Iowa and the University of Kansas—travelled abroad to “learn about other 
people, their interests, problems, ambitions, and points of view and make friends abroad 
for America.”405 Before leaving for foreign tours, these ambassadors attended a two-day 
rigid orientation session conducted by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, 
Department of State (DOS), Peace Corps, Civil Rights Commission, USIA and U.S. 
Travel Agency. Robert Kennedy discussed “How Students Can Help United States 
Foreign Relations” and government agencies oriented students on issues such as 
“Selected World Political Problems,” civil rights, integration, right to work and progress 
in Vietnam, Laos and Berlin. These Americans were not “Ugly Americans” because 
“they talk, exchange ideas and review common problems” with their foreign fellows.406 
Student Ambassadors visited European countries as well as the Soviet Union. 
They were received by dignitaries including the West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt.”407 
Upon returning from an overseas trip, student ambassadors remarked that “students 
and young people are all alike the world over.”408 Such observations made by the 
students were appropriate to the overall purpose of the program prescribed by the 
government since seeking similarities rather than differences between the American 
culture and the cultures of other nations created the sense that the American culture 
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can be accepted as good almost anywhere. Overseas dissemination of the People-to-
People program started in the summer of 1962 as the program’s first office opened in 
Brussels, Belgium. Jim Murray, a freshman and Mike Hites, a sophomore at KU joined 
the European People-to-People to coordinate the Brussels office and the Student 
Ambassadors program.409 
In the summer of 1962, the National People-to-People program sent seven KU 
foreign and American students to the Seattle World Fair to advertise the program. 
Reuben McCornack, an Abilene junior, said that five thousand memberships were 
received by the Kansas City headquarters by the end of the summer due to a 
“successful selling” of People-to-People at the Seattle Fair.410 
As such, the People-to-People program “quickly gained momentum.”  Foreign 
and domestic students at KU as well as the university administration, local and national 
officials and citizens of Lawrence were “unstinting in their praise of the achievements” of 
the program.411 Chancellor Clarke Wescoe noted that the People-to-People program 
was a “tremendous success” as “it makes an international exchange what it should be:” 
American students returned home with the sense that they were received favorably 
overseas and international students felt at home on American college campuses. 
Wescoe further stated that “actually the program, at this stage, is more successful than 
any of us had hoped it would be.”412  Wescoe served as a Board of Trustees member of 
the People-to-People International, which presented a “special citation” to the 
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Chancellor in “recognition and appreciation of KU’s pioneering work in the college-level 
People-to-People movement.”413 
Joyce C. Hall, the President of the Hallmark Foundation and a major sponsor of 
the People-to-People program, stated that Lawrence and the University “should be 
proud of their work with foreign students,” and “I hope you sense your responsibility and 
I hope you give other campuses a program which they cannot duplicate. It is [an] 
exciting thing for the University and Lawrence to be so internationally aware.”414Kenneth 
Holland, president of the Institute of International Education once called Dawson’s 
success at KU “the first attempt on a national scale to better relations between 
American and foreign students.”415 Chester Bowles, Undersecretary of State remarked 
that “students at KU have done a remarkable job” and deserve all the encouragement 
and support we can give you in Washington.” The most compelling statement regarding 
Dawson’s people-to-people diplomacy provided by the Saturday Evening Post, which 
wrote that “If there had been more Bill Dawsons around when Kwame Nkrumah, the 
president of Ghana, was a university student in Pennsylvania a number of years ago, 
perhaps he would not be the leading pro-leftist in Africa today.”416 
Archival sources demonstrating international students’ reactions to the People-to-
People program are rather limited; though those few students who expressed their 
feelings were happy and satisfied with the program. Shafik H. Hashmi, a senior at KU 
from Bombay, India and President of the International Club noted that “there is both 
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quantitative and qualitative increase of American membership… More than half of about 
four hundred members of the Club are Americans and this is an important contribution 
of the People-to-People program.”417 The People Program “has changed KU” and “truly 
created a new spirit and atmosphere at KU as far as relations between the American 
and international students are concerned.” Hashmi said that he found “great interest 
and zest” among more than three hundred KU students, who were associated with 
various parts of People-to-People.  
Three hundred Lawrence residents expressed their interest in accommodating 
international students as “house guests.” Achievements were “significant, impressive, 
and praiseworthy.” The fact that KU was taking “this lead” should be a “matter of pride 
for all Jayhawkers and inhabitants of Lawrence.” One had only to attend a meeting of 
People-to-People to appreciate the “enthusiasm, energy and confidence” of its 
workers.418 
A student from Philippines said that the climate on campus “soon changed so 
noticeably.”419Rosella Mamoli, a graduate student from Italy wrote in the University Daily 
Kansan that she had personally met quite a few students who had given lots of their 
time and good will working for People-to-People. They had not done it for “prestige,” 
Mamoli said, but they “just help us… and believe it or not… people-to-people had not 
failed in the eyes of foreign students.”  She added, “we only wish we could help the 
American students who will come to our countries just as much as you have helped 
us.”420Said Lalit Kothari, a junior from India said that he had “a new view of America and 
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a new feeling for Americans” after attending People-to-People activities.421  There was 
even a request from Athens, Greece, which was sent to the People-to-People National 
Office indicating that the “program is the most dynamic change in the college scene in 
years. “Since I naturally want to send our students to campuses where their happiness 
will be furthered,” the Greek educator wrote, “I would like a list of U.S. schools which are 
affiliated with People-to-People university program.”422 
Encouraged by its “tremendous success,” the People-to-People program 
coordinator Bill Dawson with his friends Rick Barnes and Rafer Johnson, a graduate of 
University of California at Los Angeles and an Olympic champion, decided to interrupt 
their studies to expand the KU program to other college campuses across the country. 
Johnson, the 1960 Olympic decathlon champion and the winner of the 1960 Sullivan 
award as the nation’s outstanding amateur athlete, extensively travelled for the State 
Department and for Peace Corps.423Johnson was not only a high-echelon addition to 
People-to-People volunteers but he was also a representative of African-Americans. He 
once stated that “one of the most reassuring elements in my many trips abroad was the 
evidence of interest and understanding given to me, as a human being and an athlete, 
by young people in every country. People-to-People is a means by which our students 
can show the same interest and understanding to foreign visitors on our 
campuses.”424Johnson turned down other “glamorous commitments” on the west coast, 
including “movie contracts” to support what he terms, “a more worthy cause”425 Indeed, 
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as it was noted in People-to-People News, “all university students are urged to accept 
the responsibility of participating in the People-to-People activities planned for the 
coming school year.”426 
Dawson and his friends went to other states, “preaching the virtues” of the 
program, seeking from governors the “same moral support and encouragement” given 
already by President John Kennedy and General Eisenhower. 427 Along with other 
political figures such as the former President Herbert Hoover, the people-to-people 
concept received endorsement from two KU Chancellors—Chancellor Wescoe and 
former Chancellor Franklin D. Murphy who left KU to become the President of UCLA, 
both of whom served as members of the National People-to-People Program Board of 
Trustees.428 They asked governors to request the support of chancellors and presidents 
of universities and colleges to arrange meetings of student representatives. By 1962 the 
governors of ten states had given them “overwhelming” support.  
At the meetings on college campuses, Dawson and his friends described the 
origin and development of KU’s People-to-People, underscored its importance as 
supported by the opinions of national leaders and educators and presented an 
operational guideline, which could be adapted to each local campus situation. At such a 
speed, Dawson hoped, by spring 1962more than six hundred colleges and universities 
in America would be participating in the People-to-People University program.429 As of 
1965, just as the national People-to-People program was growing by generating six 
million contacts in three years, so was the People-to-People university program by 
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opening more than hundred University chapters and bringing more than seven thousand 
American and foreign students in personal contact.430 
 
Conflicts, Controversies and Setbacks 
The People-to-People University program was not without flaws. It experienced 
administrative and financial hurdles. Its activities were criticized for duplicating efforts 
given by campus student organizations. As did many other campus student 
organizations, People-to-People wanted to be, both organizationally and financially, an 
independent group—not to be funded or dependent on All Student Council (ASC) at KU. 
It wanted to have its own representation. But for the People-to-People organizers, these 
goals were not fulfilled. 
During the Board Members meeting Bill Schaefer, People-to-People’s new co-
chairman for the academic year of 1962-63, noted that “all of the committees and 
members of People-to-People must work toward elimination of weaknesses” within the 
organization.” Co-chairman Reuben McCornack added that as committee heads, “we 
must not be glory-seekers,” but “must strive to realize the goals of People-to-People and 
work for the good of all.” Before leaving KU for a new People-to-People mission in 
Europe, Tu Jarvis, a former chairman warned:  
We must have personal contact with international students and must 
realize that although discipline and organization are needed to make the 
organization function, that the international students are equal, perhaps of more 
importance and we must remember that they will not understand the 
organizational side of People-to-People so we must not emphasize that side of 
the organization in talking with them. It is, instead, more important that we set up 
a means for them to meet others.431 
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Jerry Harper, Schaefer’s successor, noted in 1964 that the People-to-People 
program “must be unyoked from ASC” because their relationships were “highly 
unsatisfactory.” Harper and other Executive Committee members were willing to 
separate from the ASC because the latter decided to “undercut People-to-People 
funding request by some three hundred dollars and reduced the budget for the program 
by a little over hundred dollars while Peace Corps committee had its budget increased 
over a thousand dollars.” As the People-to-People officers argued, the Peace Corps 
committee “serves very little function which is of direct benefit to the individual student.” 
Thus, People-to-People leaders were “perplexed by the ASC decision” and refused to 
submit the program’s budget report.432 
According to the 1965 research conducted by Prakash F. Nagori, a student from 
India at KU, the effectiveness of the People-to-People programs at Big Eight 
Conference universities was “not very satisfactory” due to the following reasons: it had 
lack of effective administrative leadership; it needed more volunteer American students 
involvement; its collaboration with other campus student organizations was inefficient; it 
was not adding new programs and projects; it lacked continuity and it superimposes a 
national program on a local campus” which was “not always appropriate.” Thus People-
to-People, Nagori concluded, “has not been living up to the expectations” of the Big 
Eight Conference schools.” ”433 
Foreign student advisors at some universities criticized People-to-People for 
“heavily being run by ‘Greeks’ who were only interested in personal publicity.” They 
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responded that in some cases volunteer-students attracted to People-to-People used it 
as a “ladder” to more prestigious campus organizations. They also criticized the 
program for its focus on few programs such as Student Ambassadors through which 
American students would travel abroad. As such, it “did not take advantage of the 
opportunity to get much out of the co-mingling” with the eighty thousand foreign 
students who were physically present on American college campuses.434 
Although the People-to-People university program expanded into more than one 
hundred college campuses, some universities refused to have a People-to-People 
chapter on their own campuses, such as Colorado University. Azmy Ibrahim, the 
Foreign Student Senator at CU published a long article in the New Conservative stating 
that there was “no place” for People-to-People at CU because it duplicated many 
activities conducted by campus student organizations, especially for foreign students.435 
Yet, both international students and their advisors wanted People-to-People to 
continue its activities as its “potential … was tremendous.” 436After attending the 1966 
Midwest Regional People-to-People Conference, Anima Bose, another student from 
India, suggested that people-to-people could be useful on university campuses if it 
would “assist in destruction of prejudice; serve as a link between different cultures and 
provide an opportunity for American students to participate in improving communication 
between foreign students and the rest of the student body.”437 
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Clark Coan, Dean of Foreign Students and People-to-People advisor at KU, once 
warned that “one must remember that you can provide the opportunity but you do not 
twist arms.” People-to-People activities “must be planned well and properly explained to 
foreign students. And their participation must be voluntary.” It is important for People-to-
People “not duplicating services of his office.”438Coan also warned against “spreading 
the organization too thin.”439 
Previous scholars have stated that government-initiated programs such as the 
People-to-People campaign were nothing but instruments of U.S. policy, which “rallied 
to combat the influence of communist ideology” through propaganda.440 But the 
questions about its volunteers,their voices and their motives were often overlooked, if 
not entirely omitted, in their studies. Based on personal interviews with the People-to-
People University program volunteers, the remainder of this chapter attempts to look at 
the program through the eyes of its volunteers.  
 
Volunteer Stories 
Dale Sprague was born in Ellsworth in 1945 and raised in McPherson, Kansas. 
Both were small Midwestern towns and, as he put it in our interview, nothing was 
“special” there. But Sprague had already had rich international experience by the time 
he came to the University of Kansas. Sprague’s parents—his father Perry was a 
chemical engineer and his mother Viola was a teacher at a local school—invested much 
into their son’s childhood experience by providing him with an opportunity to learn about 
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cultures other than his own. Sprague started travelling at about the age of nine or ten 
and had been in more than fifty foreign countries before he started college. He loved to 
travel and meet people from other countries. Thus for Sprague the “place to meet 
international people was People-to-People.”441As a senior at KU, he said that “a great 
deal of my interest in foreign students stem from my travels to foreign countries.”442 
Sprague became one of hundreds of People-to-People volunteers “as soon as he got to 
KU” in 1963, was very active in his sophomore and junior years, and eventually became 
the program chairperson in 1967. 
The People-to-People University program was a product of the early “sixties,” a 
period with complex political and cultural upheavals. It was a time of movements  that 
quested for changes inAmerican society. It was a time of “youthful revolution” which 
brought radical challenges to the old generation. It was a time of social movement and 
student activism which hoped to bring a change into American society.443 As one critic 
stated,“the naïvité of some of the millennial dreams of the period is  today, yet somehow 
this vision remains one of the most attractive features of the sixties.”444 
The growth of youth activism led to the ideal of personal growth and search for 
self-fullfilment for young Americans, especially college students, who defined the moral 
climate of the era. During such an idealistic time emerged student activists and their 
sense of personal commitment that could be confirmed by action, and from this time 
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period, student volunteers who would be attached to secular voluntary movements such 
as People-to-People and Peace Corps emerged as well. For many People-to-People 
volunteers, the idea of promoting world peace through mutual understanding between 
people was highly charged with idealism. Dale Sprague viewed that People-to-People 
was a “very idealistic organization and idea. I think that it probably, from a practical 
viewpoint, had many problems trying to get people to understand what it was doing. 
However, I think as a whole, People-to-People is an excellent concept and 
idea.”445Perhaps individual youth idealism was therefore one of the driving forces for 
People-to-People volunteers, not political commitment. 
As Keniston contends, “youths tend to get together with other youths in youthful 
countercultures, charaterized by their deliberate cultural distance from the existing 
social order but not always by active political or other opposition to it.” Thus “youth is a 
time when solidarity with other youths is especially important…”446To corroborate this 
point, Sprague said that he “never saw any politics in People-to-People, at least on the 
college level.” They were “just people interested in being together and doing things 
together, nothing more.” It was “nothing to do with Cold War or Russians. I did not see 
any fear of Russia as far as Russians are individuals… That was “part of the beauty of 
People-to-People that we were not working with governments so much as we were 
working with people. Just like you and just like me.”447From a volunteer perspective, 
Halley Kampschroeder, a chairperson from 1966 to 1967 also emphasized the lack of 
political impulse behind the University chapter of People-to-People. According to 
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Kampschroeder, “probably [People-to-People] had some political undertones,” as 
“Eisenhower’s goal was political.” But “we were not political.”448 
Although there was no formal recruitment process for People-to-People,the most 
active group of volunteers was the one from campus Greek societies. Dale Sprague and 
his friend David Waxse, who was also, at one time,a People-to-People chairperson, 
both were members of campus fraternities. As the archival sources indicate, a typical 
People-to-People volunteer tended to be a white, middle class American student who 
was involved with more than one campus student organizations. In most cases, board 
members were honor students, many of whom were recognized through university 
published sources such as the Jayhawk Year Book.The International Student Club was 
an important organization to popularize the People-to-People program among 
international students. 
David Hann’s background was different. He had a “blue collar childhood, pretty 
normal.” He did not belong to a campus fraternity and his motive for People-to-People 
was different from that of other volunteers. As a Vietnam war veteran, Hann liked to 
“mingle with international students” because “most Americans [at that time] did not like 
veterans.” Thus joining People-to-People seemed attractive, although he “considered” 
Peace Corps when he came back from Vietnam. Hann was in Okinawa, Japan for some 
time thus his international experience also influenced him to volunteer for campus 
organizations, including the International Student Club.449 
As these volunteer stories and archival sources thus indicate, the opportunity to 
meet people from different cultures and travel to different countries attracted many 
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American students into the People-to-People University program. Sprague’s interest in 
and experience with the program in many respects were characteristic of most 
volunteers’ motive for the People-to-People University program, though certainly not all 
volunteers had his unusually extensive background in international travel. What was 
common for volunteers was their sense of involvement in campus organizations where 
they could meet international students. For them, People-to-People was an attractive 
choice, as the program was a “significant, well-known” and a “well respected” 
organization on campus in the 1960s.450 
For American students, the People-to-People program provided an opportunity 
for personal enrichment. Sprague affirmed that “understanding our cultures was really 
our objective. Thus People-to-People ran both ways, for Americans to learn from them, 
teach and help them. It “has definitely given me an open mind.”451For international 
students, most of whom were culturally, linguistically, and even academically struggling 
to settle down in a new country, the People-to-People program was, as one student 
from Philippines said, “as if a fairy godmother had suddenly popped up in the silent 
hours of what had been a long dark night.”452 
People-to-People volunteers helped foreign students accommodate themselves 
into American society in a variety of ways and at most critical moments. At a college in 
California, for instance, four students from Kenya found almost every door in town 
closed when they tried to find rooms on their own. Two of them finally managed to rent 
a “filthy basement in an old house” and the other two ended up in “a cockroach-infested, 
unfurnished one-room shack.” There was a situation “bound to generate deep 
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resentment” until the university’s People-to-People program’s Housing committee 
stepped in. The committee “stirred up embarrassing publicity about the community’s 
discriminatory practices, carried the case to the county Fair Housing Board, and finally 
won for each African student a clean room at a reasonable cost.”453This practical help 
was not just a case of handling unfair and intolerable human behaviors such as racial 
prejudice, but it was an example of domestic students’ effort to help international 
students to overcome so-called “culture shock” that Americans could also encounter in 
foreign lands. 
As Sprague said, he “cannot help, but think that people who knew each other, 
although they live in their own countries, have good feelings or better understanding 
about Americans, for example, just as I have better understandings about people from 
India and from the Middle East. And that is very, very helpful to me as an individual.” In 
such circumstances, the People-to-People program’s idealistic goal—helping foreign 
students to integrate into American society and to create conditions for mutual 
flourishing of both domestic and international students—could also be framed, naturally, 
under the concepts of “social capital” and “reciprocity.” 
Social capital, according to the sociologist Robert Putnam, is connections among 
individuals in its most simplistic sense. Yet the term was first used in the early twentieth 
century by L.J. Hanifan, one of the reformers of the Progressive Era. Hanifan defined 
social capital as:  
…those tangible substances [that] count for most in the daily lives 
of people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse 
among individuals and families who make up a social unit… The 
individual is helpless socially, if left to himself… If he comes into contact 
with his neighbor, and they with other neighbors, there will be an 
accumulation of social capital, which may immediately satisfy his social 
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needs and which may bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial 
improvement of living conditions in the whole community. The community 
as a whole will benefit by the cooperation of all its parts, while the 
individual will find in his associations the advantages of the help, the 
sympathy, and the fellowship of his neighbors.454 
 
According to Putnam, social capital-- that is social networks and the “associated 
norms of reciprocity”—comes in many different shapes and sizes with many different 
uses. Through those different networks, social capital is accumulated. Some forms 
involve repeated, intensive, and multi-stranded networks. Some tended to be informal 
while others are quite organized, formal with regular meetings, with written goals and a 
constitution and affiliation with larger national, international organizations. Some forms 
of social capital are, by choice or necessity, tending to reinforce exclusive identities 
such as fraternal societies, church-based women’s groups and the like. Still some 
networks are more likely to include people across diverse cultural, social, and political 
cleavages.  
By integrating both American and international students, People-to-People was 
an example of a social network through which both groups accumulated diverse cultural 
and social assets. Through People-to-People volunteer had an opportunity to create 
human networks, which are maintained to foster the norms of reciprocity: I’ll do this for 
you now, in the expectation that you (or perhaps someone else) will return the favor. Or, 
as Putnam puts it, reciprocity can be specific and generalized depending on whether or 
not you expect mutual benefit. A specific reciprocity is defined by such network as “I will 
do this for you without expecting anything specific back from you.”455 But the 
generalized reciprocity—“I will do this for you now, without expecting anything 
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immediately in return and perhaps without even knowing you, confident that down the 
road you or someone else will return the favor”—is the “touchstone” of social capital.  
As its goal suggested, People-to-People hoped that if American students helped 
foreign students coming to the U.S., they would depart with a warm feeling of 
Americans so perhaps they could be of equal service to Americans in their countries. 
Such reciprocal nature of the people-to-people idea connoted a combination of “short-
term altruism and long-term self-interest,” which together typically make both 
participants better off.456 
 
“People-to-People at KU Ceased…” 
The People-to-People University program at KU was abruptly ended after the 
1974-1975 academic year. There are no available archival sources that provided 
reasons of the short destiny of the program. The University Daily Kansan noted in 1971 
that People-to-People needed American volunteers.457Bud Huffman in his article 
“People-to-People Program Lacks Manpower” claimed that “the program was once 
formerly organized with elected officers and membership requirements, but now it has 
five or six active students and much more informal.”458 Nancy Kaul, a Shawnee Mission 
sophomore and the chairperson of the program for the last two academic years, stated 
that “more students were needed to find homes for sixty foreign students during spring 
break.”459 These archival sources suggest that the People-to-People program’s 
activities were limited to Tutorial System and Home Stay by mid-1970s. In 1971 Clark 
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Coan stated that the “biggest problem with People-to-People is getting American 
students involved in the tutorial system.”460 It seemed to have been true that “the 
destiny of this program rests in the hands of American students,” as Dawson said in the 
program’s early stage.461 
Why then were Americans less interested and involved in people-to-people by 
the mid-1970s. In a 2003 interview with me, David Hann, who was a chairperson of 
People-to-People in 1969-1970, referred to the end of the Vietnam War. “It is kind of 
winding down the Vietnam War,” Hann recalled, and “there was still a lot of campus 
unrest and so forth.” According to Hann, one of the things that might have caused the 
closure of the program was the “unsuccessful recruitment of potential new members”—
ones who would actually take “leadership roles.” People-to-People volunteers did not 
realize that in order to maintain the organization they had to be thinking almost 
continuingly about the future, about reaching up getting more American students to join 
in finding up which of those would be interested in staying taking leadership in trying to 
train them and orient them about People-to-People and its importance.462 
As the war in Vietnam escalated, a growing number of students came to view 
that the United States was an imperialistic country and that it was not living up to its 
democratic ideals that it tried to spread to the rest of the world. In such circumstances, 
students’ trust in government declined, as did their interest in campus organizations 
such as People-to-People. As early as in 1970, according to the Survey Research 
Center at the University of Michigan, “trust in government” was low in every section of 
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the population. Public opinion surveys conducted in 1971—after seven years of 
intervention in Vietnam—showed an unwillingness to come to the aid of other countries, 
assuming communist-backed forces attacked them.463 
According to historian Howard Zinn, “much of the national mood of hostility to 
government and business came out of the Vietnam War, its fifty five thousand 
casualties, its exposure of government lies and atrocities.”464 On top of this came, Zinn 
contends, the political disgrace of the Nixon administration in the Watergate scandals, 
which led to Richard Nixon’s resignation in 1974, a first in American history.465 This 
dislocation of political and social life of the nation undoubtedly influenced the American 
people’s civic virtue and trust in public life. 
In addition, the changing attitude of the Greek system, then popular at KU, also 
added to the decline of People-to-People. Fraternities and sororities at KU were 
privately owned and operated but they were largely dependent on the university’s 
support and recognition. But the racially exclusionary politics of fraternities and 
sororities had become a serious issue during the 1960s. Indeed, discriminatory politics 
was promoted by the national charters of the fraternity and sorority houses. They 
“specifically forbade” local chapters from pledging racial or religious minorities and 
“forced local houses to pledge only individuals acceptable to every member of the 
fraternity nationwide.” Several fraternities at KU still had the offending clauses well into 
the 1960s and alumni, benefactors and national officers continued to pressure local 
houses not to accept minorities. But with the presence of the SDS on campus in 1965, 
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however, the issue of racial prejudice at fraternity houses “was transformed into a 
referendum on the existence of the entire Greek system.” According to the radical 
groups, the Greek system was a “microcosm of elitism and class divisions” in American 
society and therefore the mere existence of fraternities and sororities was “anachronistic 
and undemocratic.”466 Since the majority of the People to People volunteers were Greek 
society members, the decline in Greek system also reflected a decline in the People to 
People Program.  
Moreover, having enjoyed more free time and freedom, Americans became more 
likely to feel free to “do their own thing.” Hann stated that “our society, even though we 
have high standard of living, seems like everybody is so busy, worried about their job, or 
their money, or whatever, that is part of it.467” Hann’s points seemed to be reflected in 
Michael Walzer’s observation which stated that American society, which is “perhaps the 
most individualistic society in human history” gives its citizens an opportunity to enjoy 
free affiliation to surrounding world, and which ultimately changed social, political, and 
personal identities.468 
According to the social psychologist Kenneth Keniston, the “overwhelming 
majority” of American students and young people in 1960 were “politically apathetic, 
accepting and inert.” But by 1970, the “situation had changed profoundly.”469 The 1970 
Gallup Poll considered campus unrest to be the nation’s “main problem” as of July 
1970.470 AsTodd Gitlin, one of the decade’s popular figures, defined the late 1960s as  a 
“long unraveling, a fresh start, a tragicomic Kulturkampf, the overdue demolition of 
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fraudulent consensus, a failed upheaval, unkept promise, valiant effort at reforms 
camouflaged as revolution—and it was all of those.”471Thus, the deteriorating political 
and social climate of skepticism due to Vietnam war could be the major factor in KU’s 
People-to-People’s loss its volunteers in the mid-1970s. The People-to-People 
University program faded away with the decade.  
The People-to-People program evolved at the intersection of national interests 
and the idealistic beliefs and personal goals of the American volunteers and 
international students who were drawn to it. Whether or not it provided measurable 
impact on how volunteers thought about their life and identity, the people-to-people idea 
per se is morally charged, and not distinguishable from politics. The People-to-People 
University program volunteers hoped that what they were doing was good for 
international students and themselves as long as it had good intentions on the individual 
level. The People-to-People University program was derived from a government-backed 
program, but grew up in a small midwestern town and prevailed across the nation. It 
appealed to the ideals and personal and social goals and needs of its volunteers—
whether they were interested in the adventure and pleasure of travelling abroad or were 
genuinely interested in making foreigners feel at home—who facilitated a human 
network in which the American hosts could be comfortable in their belief in the 
superiority of American culture and the foreign guests could have their pragmatic needs 
met. Such a reciprocal relationship between international and domestic students passed 
as one that promoted a “mutual understanding” between people. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The national People-to-People campaign was the first government-initiated 
secular voluntary movement of ordinary people initiated as part of the nation’s foreign 
policy. Founded in the mid-1950s, it was a product of and a reaction to the Cold War 
international conflicts that emanated from diametrically-opposed ideologies of 
democracies and the communist world. U.S. claims to the superiority of democracy over 
communism were rooted in immediate post-war America’s quest for world leadership.  
As the architect of the nationwide People-to-People movement, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower urged the American people to be “good-will ambassadors” who would “help 
make the truth of our peaceful goals and of our respect for the rights of others known to 
more people overseas.”472 He believed that every single American citizen’s role is 
crucial in disseminating American ideas and ideals to the rest of the world, presumably 
to the free world, to win the hearts and minds of a foreign audience. It was thus 
Eisenhower’s belief that it was not only governments, but also civilian populations who 
had a role in, and even responsibility for, the maintenance of world peace.  
The elevation of ordinary people’s role in foreign policy rendered people-to-
people diplomacy as a part of the Cold War American liberal grand strategy, which was 
aimed at containing communism and creating a favorable political, economic, and 
cultural environment conducive to American democracy. For such a commitment, 
communism was a common enemy for Cold War American leaders, regardless of their 
political philosophy and constituencies, and their containment policy was non-partisan. 
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In 1960, the Democratic presidential candidate, John F. Kennedy stated, “The enemy is 
the communist system itself—implacable, insatiable, and unceasing in its drive for world 
domination… [This] is a struggle for supremacy between two conflicting ideologies: 
freedom under God versus ruthless, godless tyranny.”473 Yet, the American struggle for 
overseas supremacy played out parallel to its struggle over domestic doldrums that 
defined the decade as well.   
The People-to-People campaign was therefore a product of the tumultuous 
decade of the “Long Sixties,” a historical time which started from the mid-1950s and 
continued through the mid-1970s. It was a time of the “affluent society” with apparently 
contradicting, morally compelling issues of race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, religion, 
wealth and status. As Maurice Izerman and Isserman and Michael Kazin rightly defined: 
 In the sixties many Americans came to regard groups of fellow 
countrymen as enemies with whom they were engaged in a struggle for 
the nation’s very soul. Whites versus blacks, liberals versus 
conservatives (as well as liberals versus radicals), young versus old, 
men versus women, hawks versus doves, rich versus poor, taxpayers 
versus welfare recipients, the religious versus the secular, the hip versus 
the straight, the gay versus the straight—everywhere one looked, new 
battalions took to the field, in a spirit ranging from that of redemptive 
sacrifice to vengeful defiance.474 
 
With the changing nature of American political and social life, young Americans 
in the early 1960s embraced radical perspectives embedded in the philosophies and 
values of civil rights, feminist, and other social movements. The activist era awakened 
consciousness of young generations, especially college students who came to question 
not just the morality and the efficacy of American political institutions, but also the 
meaning of their lives and their relationship to the wider world.   
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Many of those Americans who volunteered for the National People-to-People 
program launched in the mid-fifties were driven by their patriotism and a sense of moral 
obligation to be part of America’s effort to disseminate its democratic ideals to the world 
over. The activist environment of the 1960s, however, motivated young college students 
to devote their time and effort to humanitarian, altruistic undertakings by participating in 
volunteer movements such as the People-to-People program. 
In this study I have traced the origins, operation, successes and failures of the 
People-to-People program featured during the second term of the Eisenhower 
presidency. The People-to-People program was a government-backed popular 
movement which spread in the 1950s and expanded into the 1960s. It was partially 
coordinated and partially funded by the United States Information Agency during its first 
few years. As the previous chapters have explored, People-to-People and its various 
programs and projects including the Sister-Cities and the University chapter, while 
government-initiated, were models for secular voluntary movements of ordinary citizens 
that were committed to improving mutual understanding between peoples from different 
cultures.  
The idealistic appeal of people-to-people diplomacy, along with opportunities to 
travel and create reciprocal community among domestic and international students 
made the People-to-People University program one of the most popular student 
organizations on college campuses in the 1960s. People-to-People’s popularity and 
ideals at that time attracted young Americans and provided them with both the 
opportunity and enthusiasm to interact with foreign peoples at the grassroots level. It 
also gave them a sense of belonging to a broader, constructive human network which 
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promoted an appreciation of diverse cultures and the “bonds of solidarity” that nations 
needed during the contested period of the Cold War.475 
Taking part in a government-initiated program might have rendered private 
individuals “surrogate communicators” for conveying Cold War propaganda messages, 
but the People-to-People volunteers in this study did not position themselves as 
government agents. Upon consultation with archival sources and oral histories, this 
dissertation argued that it was not the Cold War ideology exclusively that moved 
volunteers to be a part of People-to-People, but their personal hopes, goals, prior 
experiences, beliefs, curiosity, and desire for reciprocal international relationships that 
led them to choose to mingle with people from other countries and cultures.  
To understand secular volunteer movements such as People-to-People we have 
to understand its volunteer motives and their efforts which were different from those of 
government politics. Thus, this work hopes to contribute to the existing scholarship on 
secular voluntary movements by taking actual participants’ voices in relation to 
government motive, which is a previously neglected perspective. When studying a 
program at the interface between the government and the public, unofficial public side 
must be considered as well as the official government side so that one may acquire a 
more complete picture of the given program.  
In addition, in giving significance to a program that contributed to a positive 
experience for international students on American university campuses, this study also 
hopes to integrate the international students’ experience as a target for American public 
                                                           
475 Hoffman, All You Need Is Love, 259. 
 186 
diplomacy. It was strategically important for the United States to initiate a program that 
operated upon foreign students who were already well-prepared to affirm their positive 
view of the United States, as evidenced by their presence on the U.S. soil in the first 
place, and it was important that they not be disappointed and return home disillusioned. 
The People-to-People program as a tool for Cold War American public diplomacy thus 
played an important role in solidifying and affirming a pleasant experience for 
international students. Since, as historian Paul A. Kramer states in a Bernath Lecture in 
2009, “the problem of student attitudes towards American society also became one of 
the heightened concerns”476 for the United States, it was a logical move to address 
these student attitudes—attitudes of a “picked group” whose impressions would be 
carried back to their home countries “to spread if good, like bountiful propaganda; if bad 
like a festering virus.”477 
Judging by the government’s involvement with the initial idea of the People-to-
People campaign, it is not arguable that it had a political purpose. Some volunteers and 
organizers may have been in agreement with the Cold War agenda of ensuring a 
positive view of the U.S. to future international leaders in American universities. But this 
does not capture the motives expressed by volunteers and organizers in the research 
for this dissertation. Moral and idealistic impulses, as well as social and personal goals 
and desires, defined People-to-People volunteers’ contribution to the relatively 
successful nature of this nationwide movement. In particular, in the case of the People-
to-People University program, for volunteers and international students who benefitted 
                                                           
476 Paul A. Kramer, “Is the World Our Campus? International Students and US Global Power in the Long 
Twentieth Century,” Diplomatic History 33 (Fall 2009), 802. 
477 Quoted in Kramer, “Is the World Our Campus? International Students and US Global Power in the 
Long Twentieth Century,” 802.   
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from the program, personal motives, goals, and assessments were not identical to those 
of the government.  Both sides of the story are necessary for historical understanding. 
This dissertation is a call for more studies of the neglected perspectives of volunteers 
and for the insights in reciprocity in international relations among people that they 
provide. 
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Appendix A 
Table 1. Exchange of persons by geographic regions478 
Number of reporting Area Visitations 
from other 
countries 
U.S. 
visitations to 
sister cities 
Total 
70 Europe 77 178 255 
20 Far East 659 458 1117 
23 Latin America 1515 2272 3787 
1 Near East and 
South Asia 
4 10 14 
1 Africa 0 0 0 
52  2255 2918 5173 
 
Table 2. Exchange of persons by interest area479 
Area U.S. sister-city to 
foreign cities 
Foreign sister-cities to the 
U.S. 
Youth summer exchange 387 533 
Youth for school semester 77 183 
Teachers 198 141 
Business people 1017 570 
Municipal officials 89 161 
Skilled labor 156 43 
Legal 27 22 
Journalists 40 22 
Radio & TV 11 8 
Professional 140 54 
Artists 23 63 
Actors, musicians, and 
dancers 
145 133 
Others (tourists, sports 
groups, and misc. individual 
travelers) 
608 322 
Total 2918 2255 
 
                                                           
478 National League of Cities (Formerly American Municipal Association) Official Correspondences from 
Patrick Healy, Executive Director to Mark Bortman, Chairman of Civic Committee of the People-to-People 
Program, p 2.  
479Ibid, p 4. 
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Appendix B. 
Table 3. Results of Town Affiliation Questionnaire480 
Questionnaire result: American Municipal Association, 1960 
 
1956-1960 2. Response Indicators  3. Actual results and 
AMA comments  #  1. Questions (copy from the AMA’s 
official document)  
1 When was your affiliation started?  a). 4%-1956 and before 
b). 8%-1957 
c). 0%-1958 
d). 9%-1959 
a). After 1956 the rate 
steadily increased  
b). More communities 
became aware of the 
program  
2 List the projects undertaken by your 
community last year and indicate which 
was most successful and why?  
a). Host cities-pen pal 
letters 
b). Suite extensive-
exchanges of children’s 
clubs 
c). Big area of 
exchanges-scrapbooks, 
boy and girl scouts 
d). Others-art work, 
tape recordings, seeds, 
plants, trees, 
exhibitions, fashion 
shows, naming streets 
and buildings, 
exchange of students, 
workers, teachers and 
municipals, annual 
fiestas, and 
celebrations of 
affiliation day  
a). These exchanges 
had been done at no 
cost to the government  
b). More projects, 
including establishment 
of parks, implementation 
of language classes for 
future affiliations 
planned  
3 Has your affiliation helped improve 
local community relations any?  
a). 5%-definitely the 
program helped 
improve community 
relations both socially 
and economically 
b). %-reported that the 
program did not help 
improve community 
relations  
a). People were brought 
together to work for a 
common goal and 
common good of the 
community  
b). Community members 
enjoyed more close 
cooperation of people of 
all walks of life 
c). Increased personal 
                                                           
480 The Questionnaire was conducted among the American communities affiliated with sister cities abroad. 
American Municipal Associations, 1960. MBP-B-1. EL.  
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relationship  
4 What percent of your population knows 
of your affiliation?  
a). 8% indicated 10-
50% of the population 
were aware of the 
affiliation 
b). 3% said 50-100% of 
the population knew the 
affiliation  
c). 3% did not know  
a). Affiliation committees 
should work more 
actively for press 
cooperation  
5 How many people from your 
community visited your sister-city last 
year?  
a). 9%-any number 
from 1-22 and above 
a). The visits were 
reciprocated and the 
people overseas were 
as much interested in 
their sister city in the US 
and vice versa  
6 Has there been any participation in 
your community or sister-city by 
members of the armed forces?  
a). Approx. 40%-there 
had been some armed 
forces near or in the 
area of one or both 
cities  
b). About 50%-there 
had not 
c). 0% no response  
a). Affirmative answer to 
this question  
b). Participation had 
ranged from band 
concerts to march in 
celebrations  
7 Have you been able to detect any 
improvement of goodwill toward an 
understanding of the U.S. as a direct 
result of your sister-city program?  
a). 1%-had noticed an 
improvement in 
goodwill and 
understanding  
b). 9%-had not noticed 
any improvement  
c). % no response  
a). Increased note of 
friendliness in the 
exchange of letters and 
increased note of 
greetings  
b). Great many residents 
of sister-cities learned 
enough of the local  
 
 
